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A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF LONG-LIVED FIRMS
How do long-lived firms strategically renew themselves over time? Viewing organiza -
tional longevity as sustained strategic renewal, this PhD research investigates three key
principles of self-renewing organizations. Building on the coevolutionary perspective that
incorporates both selection and adaptation perspectives, we developed a comprehensive
framework to investigate these three key principles in the oil industry as our case industry,
with Shell (1907-2008) as our focal case company and BP (1970-2008) as our comparative
case company. Besides the multilevel and comparative case study methods, we employed
the method of longitudinal content analysis to incorporate the temporal analysis of
sustained strategic renewal over an extended period of time. First, we investigated the
principle of matching the internal rate of change with the external rate of change. Our
results suggest that aligning the internal rate of change of a firm with the external rate of
change of the firm’s environment positively influences the firms’ sustained strategic
renewal. Second, enviro nmental turbulence requires firms to renew their organizational
structure and develop self-organization. Our findings propound that self-organization
positively influences sustained strategic renewal. Third, we investigated exploratory and
exploitative strategic renewal trajectories as well as the role of top management team
(TMT) in influencing these trajectories. We found that balancing exploration and
exploitation positively influences sustained strategic renewal and that the TMT’s
corporate governance per spective (share holders / stakeholders) does influence strategic
renewal trajectories. Finally, we substan tiated managerial implications based on the
enabling antecedents of the three key principles.
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1 Research background 
In the business world, there are various forms and scales of corporate entities 
ranging from e.g. large enterprises, limited liability companies to small family 
firms. Nevertheless the basic goal of firms since their originations, besides to grow 
and to prosper, is often to survive (Barnard, 1938; Rice, 1963; Katz and Kahn, 
1966; Adizes, 1989; Dertouzos et al., 1989; Suárez and Utterback, 1995; De Geus, 
1999). However, in the course of time, most companies figure out how difficult it 
is to retain their sustainability as their business environments unceasingly change. 
Unruly economic and political conditions, rapid technological development, 
relentless competition, and many other external factors often impede or even halt 
the business journeys of a firm.  
From a strategic standpoint to thrive over time, firms must align their 
internal actions with conditions of their external environments (Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967; Miles et al., 1974; Bourgeois, 1980; Hambrick, 1982; Miller and 
Friesen, 1983; Miller, 1992). The key premise here is that alignment between firms 
and their environments help maintain the competitiveness and survival of the firms 
over the long run (Summers, 1980; Hambrick, 1983; Baaij et al., 2007). 
Consequently, firms need to have an innate ability to assess environmental change 
and its implications for new strategies, structures, technologies and cultures in the 
firm. The research theme of how firms sustain strategic momentum or changes, 
innovations, and renewal has thus been central to both management scholars and 
practitioners (Weick, 1987; Boeker, 1989; Barr et al., 1992; Huff et al., 1992; 
Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1994; Maljers et al. 1996; Volberda et al., 2001a, b; 
Sanchez and Heene, 2002; Crossan and Bedrow, 2003; Malerba, 2004). 
Altogether corporate longevity, that we define in this thesis as sustained 
strategic renewal, merits thorough investigation. Existing research has resulted in 
several prominent findings on the common organizational characteristics of long-
lived firms (e.g., De Geus, 1999; Collins & Porras, 1999; Hall, 1997, Huygens et 
al., 2001; Meyer and Zucker, 1989; Kwee, 2004; Stadler, 2007; Burgelman & 
Grove, 2007; Kwee et al., 2008). These common characteristics, however, focus 
mainly on the internal aspects of organizations. This focus is not incorrect, but 
rather it is incomplete because investigating corporate longevity requires a more 
encompassing, i.e. strategic, perspective on organizations. Such a dual perspective 
takes into account both internal characteristics of organizations as well as the 
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forces in their environments that set limits on organizational discretion and the 
possibility of influencing these forces strategically to increase the chance of 
organizational survival. The aforementioned approach requires a comprehensive 
framework of how firms change and deal with environmental changes over time 
and what kinds of competences and processes are required for sustaining strategic 
renewal within a firm’s competitive regimes.  
This PhD study intends to address these issues by incorporating several 
theoretical perspectives. The focus is on the fundamental scientific questions about 
key principles of self-renewing organizations (Volberda and Lewin, 2003) in order 
to understand how long-lived firms survive and renew themselves over time. We 
aim to contribute to the organizational longevity literature. To this end, there are at 
least six major tasks in our research agenda, i.e. to: (1) use both selection and 
adaptation perspectives to explore the three key principles of self-renewing 
organizations (Volberda and Lewin, 2003) as a prerequisite to corporate longevity 
or sustained strategic renewal; (2) develop a conceptual framework and 
propositions of the three key principles; (3) propose and use an appropriate 
methodology to do a longitudinal and empirical study of the three key principles; 
(4) investigate the main constructs and attributes of key principles; (5) 
operationalize these principles by discerning important attributes; (6) develop new 
metrics to quantitatively assess the principles (cf. Flier et al., 2003); and (7) 
substantiate managerial implications based on the enabling antecedents of the three 
key principles (Lewin and Volberda, 2004). 
 
1.2 Why Does Research on Corporate Longevity 
Matter? 
First of all, why does longevity matter in the corporate world? Such a question 
hardly crosses our minds. Perhaps this is because firms are all around us and thus, 
we tend to take their existence for granted (Aldrich, 1979). Our reflection to the 
question leads us to address the question from two sides. First according to Suárez 
and Utterback (1995, p. 415), from the side of the firm itself, “survival is, at least 
in the long term, a prerequisite for success in other terms, such as market share and 
profitability.” Hannan and Freeman (1984, p. 158) also posit: “Nothing legitimates 
both individual organizations and forms more than longevity. Old organizations 
tend to develop dense webs of exchange, to affiliate with centers of power, and to 
acquire an aura of inevitability.” Firm survival is, therefore, a fundamental 
objective for organizations (Barnard, 1938; Rice, 1963; Katz and Kahn, 1966; 
Adizes, 1989; Dertouzos et al., 1989; Suárez and Utterback, 1995; De Geus, 1999). 
We may acknowledge, however, that some organizations have no intention to 
endure for a long period of time. The study by Porsander (2000), for instance, 
shows that the temporary organization ‘Stockholm – Cultural Capital of Europe 
1998’ is meant to be short-lived since its core purpose is only to handle the 
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processes leading up to the event in 1998. Once it had accomplished this core 
purpose, it was dissolved. Nevertheless, even in such (con)temporary 
organizations, the study described that the struggle for immortality still prevails 
during their limited durations. 
Second, from the side of our human society, most of us may have some 
interests in the survival of commercial firms. Parson (1956) and Aldrich (1979) 
argued that this is because long-lived firms are necessary and important in our lives 
as purposive systems that enable us to accomplish collectively what cannot be 
accomplished by each of us as individuals acting on our own. Hence, the existence 
of long-lived firms plays an important role in our society and human well-being. 
Consequently, we arrive at the fundamental question of the importance of 
conducting research on corporate longevity. Our reflection tells us that by studying 
corporate longevity, we are able to obtain a better understanding of sustained 
strategic renewal. Long-lived firms are not merely idiosyncratic organizational 
outliers. Their long records of history are substantial for us to keep track of how 
they have engaged in renewal activities as changes emerge over time. This is very 
much in line with the concept of strategic renewal that propounds renewal as an 
ongoing journey shaped by management’s strategic actions and the evolvement of 
the environmental changes (Volberda et al., 2001a). Studying corporate longevity 
is thus a promising advancement of a better understanding of sustained strategic 
renewal phenomenon. 
 
1.3 Defining Longevity as Sustained Strategic Renewal 
The idiosyncrasy of long-lived firms lies in their puzzling ability to renew 
themselves over time. We argue, therefore, that the research on organizational 
longevity could be treated as viewing longevity as a firm’s strategic capacity to 
sustain renewing itself over time. Strategic renewal capacity of a firm is subject to 
among others its concurrent and balanced resourcefulness in pursuing novel 
innovations, capitalizing its current capabilities, and rejuvenating its mature 
business (Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1994). We based our definition of corporate 
longevity as sustained strategic renewal on the following arguments. 
Longevity: Internal focus 
Understanding corporate longevity is not a straightforward notion. Even so, it does 
not mean that the notion is unreal and insubstantial. What is often unclear is its 
definition (Akin, 2000). First of all, what does one mean by “longevity” when 
speaking about corporate longevity? As the word “longevity” is analogous to the 
study of the length of life of living organisms, mounting research of corporate 
longevity has been conducted by using the biological perspective (e.g., Meyer and 
Zucker, 1989; De Geus, 1999; Konz and Katz, 1996, 2000). Firms are regarded as 
living entities experiencing the life cycle of birth, all kinds of changes and death 
(Adizes, 1989). Meyer and Zucker (1989, p. 70), for instance, define “the date of 
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birth as the date when an organization is founded and the date of death as the date 
when the organization is dissolved.”  
Such parallelism, however, needs to be taken with extra care. Unlike any 
living organisms, firms “cannot die in an individual, biological sense” (Krell, 2000, 
p.9). Organizational death and biological death are not really identical (Sutton, 
1987). For one thing, Sutton (1987, p.543) contends that “when a biological entity 
dies, so do all of its components (except in rare cases such as organ transplants)”. 
In case of organizations, organizational members could continue being alive 
despite organizational death. For another thing, the difference between 
organizational and biological deaths can also be argued from the age factor. 
Biologically, the mortality of a living organism increases with age. On the 
contrary, there is a likelihood that organizational mortality decreases with age 
(Sutton, 1997; Meyer and Zucker, 1989; Hannan and Freeman, 1984). This does 
not mean, however, that firms can last forever. Admittedly, it is a major weakness 
in current corporate activity where “long-term planning and investment decisions 
by management are based on the supposition that the life of the corporate is 
indefinite” (James, 1974: 49). Then again, what is a more appropriate way to 
define corporate longevity?  
Organizational longevity denotes long duration or continuance. This means 
there is a sense of continuity from one generation of a firm’s leader to the next 
generation of leaders. This is also indicated by one of Shell’s former top executives 
during our interview:  
 
“As a leader, you do indeed have a strong feeling that you inherit a great company and that 
you have to take a good care of the company to give it to the next generation. Most of the 
time, the successor that takes over will be involved in projects that his/her predecessor 
started. This is a sort of guarantee that there is continuity. I do think that such a feeling plays 
an important role in the long-term viability of the business.”  
(Interview with a former top executive of Shell, 7 November 2007) 
 
Montuori (2000) further defines corporate longevity as an organization’s ability to 
sustain its continuity; or briefly, the durability or continuance of firms. Considering 
this is still an all-embracing definition, we pose another question: what do we 
mean by “long-lived firms”?  
On a cursory examination, long-lived firms are usually age-driven. But age 
itself is a relative measure. Akin (2000), for instance, established a thought that 
perhaps organizations as social constructions, like things, last as long as the society 
around them say they do. Sutton (1987) shared the similar line of thought by 
suggesting that if an organization is viewed as a social construction of reality, then 
it can be defined as dead only if potential participants perceive that it does not 
exist. Since it is generally acknowledged that relatively few companies survive as 
independent entities for very long periods of time, Krell (2000) further questioned 
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whether an organization can still be regarded as a long-lived firm if it no longer 
engages in the same business or purpose, if it merges with another firm, if it is 
taken over by new owners, or if it changes its name. Katz and Kahn (1966) 
addressed these issues by proposing that organizations are cycles of events; 
mergers or name changes are not considered here as deaths because the full set of 
the organization’s activities continue intact, albeit under a different label. To put it 
another way, when mergers and name changes occur, the set of activities that 
compose an organization may continue intact even though it is construed as 
defunct. Next we look at corporate longevity from a renewal context that takes into 
account both the internal and external focus. 
 
Longevity in renewal context: Internal and external focus 
Following the preceding thoughts, we observe that besides the old-age factor, long-
lived firms may be categorized into two models based on the types of renewal that 
are linked to the environmental conditions: first-order renewal and second-order 
renewal (Barr et al., 1992; Forte et al., 2000; Watzlawick et al., 1974; Winter, 
1984). The first-order renewal model is the category of venerable firms that remain 
more or less the same. They retain some resemblance to their origins (such as its 
structure, culture, and systems) despite their ability to transform their activities 
(such as an addition of a new product to the portfolio or a business diversification). 
Their environments are relatively stable and benign. Such firms enjoy high levels 
of reproducibility where they essentially recreate structures and strategies that 
might have been adequate before the context changed, but which are now poorly 
aligned with environmental conditions. Winter (1984) termed this period and 
process as the “routinized regime”. Their ability to draw critical resources and 
legitimacy will be diminished. Their survival might be prolonged – if the 
environment is relatively benign, if they enjoy excess slack resources, or if new 
organizational forms are slow to emerge – perhaps resembling the “permanently 
failing organizations” described by Meyer and Zucker (1989). However, in a 
hostile internal and external context, such firms would eventually be defeated by 
new entities designed specifically to take advantage of the new environmental 
conditions.  
The second-order renewal model is the category of firms which we refer to 
the sustained self-renewing firms (Volberda & Lewin, 2003). To some extent, 
through the processes of sustained renewal, firms in this category have mutated 
from its original state into its present state. By state, it means that the mutation or 
change can take place at the margins of structure, line of business, culture, or other 
organizational attributes. Since some of the underlying characteristics are not 
suited to the new competitive environment, firms in this model strategically renew 
themselves over time. Such periods of change in environmental dynamics are 
termed as “entrepreneurial regime” by Winter (1984). As suggested by Volberda et 
al. (2001a, p. 160), strategic renewal is referred to as “the activities a firm 
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undertakes to alter its path dependence.” Table 1.1 summarizes the two types of 
renewal order. 
Table 1.1: Two renewal models 
Renewal 
order 
Definition Type of 
environment 
Key references 
First-order 
renewal 
Firms that experience slight rather 
than substantial changes and have 
high resemblance to their origins 
Relatively stable 
and benign 
Watzlawick et al., 1974 ; 
Winter, 1984 
Second-
order 
renewal 
Sustained self-renewing firms that 
have mutated from their original state 
into their present state, renewed 
themselves over time according to the 
changing environment 
Changing and 
dynamic 
environment 
Winter, 1984; Barr et al., 
1992;  Forte et al., 2000; 
Lewin & Volberda, 1999; 
Volberda & Lewin, 2003  
 
The second-order renewal is thus the main interest of our study. 
Accordingly, we propose that in this research, long-lived firms are firms that are 
able to manage sustained strategic renewal. Therefore, we refer to corporate 
longevity as sustained strategic renewal. In other words, we use the construct of 
sustained strategic renewal as a proxy of corporate longevity. 
 
1.4 Research Aim, Approach, and Questions 
A major proposition of the approach of this study is to use an in-depth contextual 
data to investigate the influence of external environment to internal corporate 
change and an extended sequence of longitudinal data in order to offer a 
longitudinal and comparative analysis. By this means, we hope to provide an 
expanded focus on sustained strategic renewal. Subsequently, the aim of this PhD 
research is: 
 
“to investigate the dynamic relationships between a firm and its environment in the 
context of sustained strategic renewal by developing a conceptual framework and 
propositions and by conducting a longitudinal and comparative case study of large 
incumbent long-lived firms.” 
 
Additionally, we base our study on the three dimensions of strategy: content, 
context, and process. In choosing this approach, we consider the sustained renewal 
construct as a three-dimensional phenomenon, like the concept of strategy, 
consisting of the context, content, and process (Pettigrew, 1988; Mintzberg, 1990). 
First, the content dimension is related to the “WHAT” question. Second, the 
context dimension, in this case we intend to take into account the environments in 
which firms operate relates to the “WHERE” question. Third, processes are related 
to the “HOW” question, particularly about describing and explaining the temporal 
sequence of events that unfold as an organizational change occurs (Abbott, 1988). 
Van de Ven and Huber (1990, p. 213) suggest that “process studies are 
fundamental to gaining an appreciation of dynamic organizational life, and to 
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developing and testing theories of organizational adaptation, change, innovation 
and redesign.”  
As this issue is central to organization science, besides focusing on the 
content and context dimension, our research also focuses on the process element by 
studying how strategic actions emerge, develop, grow, and terminate in a firm’s 
sustained strategic renewal trajectory. This will be the advancement to the previous 
study of dimensions of strategic renewal as carried out by Volberda et al. (2001b). 
Furthermore, Volberda and Lewin (2003) identify three overarching principles of 
self-renewing organizations as shown in Table 1.2. In their judgment, these three 
key principles must underlie the theory of self-renewal, i.e. an organization that is 
capable of sustaining second-order renewal.  
Table 1.2: Three key principles of self-renewing organizations 
Three principles of self-
renewal Explanation and references 
• The principle of 
managing internal rates 
of change 
Self-renewing organizations focus on managing requisite variety by 
regulating internal rates of change to equal or exceed relevant 
external rates of change (e.g., competitors, technology, consumers, 
etc.) (McKelvey, 2003). 
• The principle of 
optimizing self-
organization 
Self-renewing organizations optimize self-organizing (Anderson, 
1999a; Nonaka, 1988) 
• The principle of 
synchronizing 
concurrent exploration 
and exploitation 
Self-renewing organizations synchronize concurrent exploitation and 
exploration (Lewin & Volberda, 1999; Lewin et al., 1999; March, 
1991). 
Source: Volberda and Lewin, 2003 
 
The challenge here is the operationalization of the three key principles by 
identifying important attributes, developing measurement proxies, and conducting 
quantitative analyses. To address this challenge, this PhD research is conducted in 
an attempt to answer the following research questions (RQs):  
 
RQ1: Based on a selection-and-adaptation (coevolutionary) perspective, how do 
firms develop their competences to strategically renew themselves over time? 
RQ2: Based on an adaptation perspective, how do firms learn and adapt in the 
context of changing knowledge environment? 
RQ3: How do large incumbent firms regulate their internal rates of change to 
match up with the external rates of change? 
RQ4: How do firms manage self-organization to sustain their strategic renewal 
over time? 
RQ5: How do firms balance their exploratory and exploitative strategic renewal 
actions over time? 
RQ6: To what extent does top management team influence the strategic renewal 
trajectory of a large incumbent firm? 
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Table 1.3 gives an indication of how we address each research question. The table 
also shows the types of study we employ for studying each research question, the 
case companies used and durations of each study, and the key constructs resulted 
from each of the study. 
 
Table 1.3: Overview of PhD study 
Research 
Question 
Chapter Type of 
Study 
Case company and 
Period 
Key construct  
RQ1: 
Competences 
development 
3 Conceptual, 
longitudinal 
and 
comparative 
The Hudson’s Bay 
Company (HBC) and 
Royal Ten Cate 
(RTC); 1800-2000 
• Coevolutionary competence 
• Competence modes  
RQ2: 
Organization-
al learning 
4 Conceptual None • Stages of organizational 
learning processes 
• Type of action learning and 
type of knowledge 
environment 
RQ3: Rate of 
Change 
8 Empirical, 
longitudinal 
and 
comparative 
Royal Dutch Shell 
(Shell), 1907-2008 
and British Petroleum 
(BP), 1970-2008 
• Quantification of internal 
and external rates of change 
• Comparison of the external 
rate of change in the oil 
industry with the internal 
rate of change of Shell/BP 
RQ4: Self-
organization 
9 Empirical 
and 
longitudinal 
Shell; 1985-2007 • Quantification of self-
organization by using the 
Shell’s case 
RQ5: 
Balanced 
Exploitation-
Exploration 
10 Empirical, 
longitudinal 
and 
comparative 
Shell, 1907-2006 and 
BP, 1970-2006 
• Quantification of 
exploitative and exploratory 
strategic renewal actions  
• Longitudinal visualization 
of Shell’s and BP’s 
strategic renewal 
trajectories  
RQ6: Role of 
Top 
Management 
Team 
10 Empirical 
and 
longitudinal 
Shell, 1959-2004 • The influence of top 
management team’s 
corporate governance 
perspective on Shell’s 
strategic renewal 
trajectories 
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1.5 Research Contributions 
This research contributes to a more encompassing perspective on corporate 
longevity that takes into account both internal aspects of long-lived organizations 
and how these organizations cope with the forces from their environments. More 
specifically, this research contributes to the study of microstate adaptations through 
a firm-level adaptation over a very long period of time (cf. Lewin and Volberda, 
1999). By doing this, it meets the empirical requirements of capturing organization 
adaptation within a historical context of a firm and its environment suggested by 
Volberda and Lewin (2003). This also corresponds to the strategy content research 
which focuses exclusively on what strategic actions of the firm that lead to 
competitive advantage under varying environmental contexts (Montgomery, 
Wernerfelt, & Balakrishnan, 1989). 
Additionally, this work also contributes to the longitudinal study (Pettigrew, 
1990) and strategy process research (cf. Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992; Burgelman, 
1983, 1996) as it investigates how firms achieve and maintain strategic positioning 
through both deliberate and emergent actions. Our research methodology of 
longitudinal study, which demonstrates a strategy process approach, aims at 
tracking simultaneously over time, multiple contextual factors, strategic actions 
and the resulting outcomes. We suggest that the strategy process within a firm 
influences its adaptation and strategic renewal trajectories. Process studies are 
fundamental to understand dynamic organizational life as they study the temporal 
order of the antecedents and consequences of changes in organizations over time 
(Van de Ven & Huber, 1990). Through multiple and complementary lenses, we 
thus provide an insightful study of unfolding change processes of organizational 
adaptation and strategic renewal. 
Furthermore, this PhD research brings the qualitative study of organizational 
longevity to the next level by quantifying and measuring the key principles of self-
renewing organizations. We propose to use metrics linking strategic renewal 
actions of firm to environmental selection and to managerial intentionality (cf. 
Flier et al., 2003). This is a contribution to the paucity of empirical research on 
sustained strategic renewal. Additionally, our methodological contribution lies on 
the research design of multilevel and comparative methods. 
On a management level, we contribute to demonstrating the importance of 
the three key principles for sustained strategic renewal in strategic management of 
large incumbent firms. More specifically, we focus on the role of management in 
managing the three key principles. To that end, we investigate and substantiate the 
enabling antecedents of the three key principles that may give indications to 
managers at a large incumbent firm of how to advance the principles. We also 
investigate the extent to which changes in the composition of the Top Management 
Team (TMT) and their corporate governance perspectives may have an impact on 
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the speed of a firm’s strategic renewal journeys (Volberda et al., 2001). Table 1.4 
summarizes the type and description of contributions the study of this thesis aims 
to contribute. 
 
Table 1.4: Linkage of the research contributions and the studies in this PhD thesis 
Type of 
contribution 
Description of contribution Related study in this thesis 
Conceptual 
contribution 
• Advancement of corporate 
longevity as sustained 
strategic renewal 
• Based on and built upon the 
existing literature, 
conceptualization of three key 
principles of sustained 
strategic renewal 
• Development of a framework 
of the three key principles 
based on two combined 
perspectives: selection and 
adaptation perspectives  
• Development of propositions 
of the three key principles 
• Chapter 3: From the selection 
perspective, we explore the three key 
principles through the strategic renewal 
trajectories of two long-lived firms that 
are guided by the firms’ coevolutionary 
competence in response to environmental 
selection 
• Chapter 4: Based on adaptation 
perspective, we explore the three key 
principles by conceptualizing how firms 
learn and adapt in the changing context of 
knowledge environment 
• Chapter 5: Incorporating two 
perspectives, we developed a conceptual 
framework and propositions of the three 
key principles 
Methodological 
contribution 
• Development of a multilevel 
study (industry and firm 
levels) and comparative 
method (Shell and BP) 
• Operationalization of 
constructs of strategic 
renewal and the three key 
principles 
• Chapter 6: A proposal of suitable 
longitudinal and comparative research 
design, selection of industry and 
incumbent firms  
• Chapter 8-10: Development of empirical 
studies of the three key principles by 
using a longitudinal, multilevel and 
comparative research design 
Empirical 
Contribution 
• Measurement of the three key 
principles by using data from 
multiple sources 
• Providing evidence on 
propositions through a 
comparative study of Shell 
(investigation of three 
principles, 1907-2008) and 
BP (investigation of two 
principles, 1970-2008) 
• Chapter 8: Operationalization and 
measurement of internal vs. external rates 
of change through a multilevel (industry 
and firm levels) and a comparative study 
of Shell (1907-2008) and BP (1970-2008) 
• Chapter 9: Operationalization and 
measurement of self-organization through 
a study of Shell (1985-2007) 
• Chapter 10: Operationalization and 
measurement of exploitation and 
exploration through a comparative study 
of Shell (1907-2006) and BP (1970-2006) 
Managerial 
contribution 
• Importance of the three key 
principles for sustained 
strategic renewal in strategic 
management of large 
incumbent firms 
• Chapter 10: Empirical longitudinal 
research on the influence of top 
management team’s corporate 
governance perspective on strategic 
renewal trajectories  
• Chapter 11: Highlights of main 
managerial implications from the key 
findings of the PhD research 
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1.6 Outline of the PhD Thesis 
To facilitate the line of inquiry of the PhD research, this thesis is outlined as 
follows (see Figure 1.1). Part II of this thesis comprises theory and framework. In 
Chapter 2, we present our theoretical foundations of strategic renewal from two 
perspectives: environmental selection and adaptation perspectives. The 
incorporation of the two perspectives leads us to the discussion of the three key 
principles of sustained strategic renewal (Volberda and Lewin, 2003). Chapter 3 
explores the three key principles based on a selection-and-adaptation 
(coevolutionary) perspective by looking at the coevolutionary competence of two 
long-lived firms, i.e. The Hudson Bay Company and Royal Ten Cate, both during 
1800-2000. Chapter 4 is a follow up of Chapter 3 by exploring the three key 
principles, focusing in more depth on an adaptation perspective. Here we address 
how firms learn and adapt over time by studying stages and phases of 
organizational learning. Subsequently, we illustrate the three key principles 
through the types of organizational learning that match certain types of knowledge 
environment. In Chapter 5, we develop a conceptual framework and propositions 
of the three key principles by advancing on the enabling antecedents of the 
principles introduced by Lewin and Volberda (2004). The antecedents are 
categorized into strategy, structure, managerial process and leadership. 
In Chapter 6 (Part III), we start with elaborating the research methodology 
and research design that used in this research. We also point out how we selected 
our case industry and case companies, data collection methods, and data analysis 
techniques. Next in Chapter 7, we describe our empirical settings. Our empirical 
studies in part IV of the thesis are based on the oil industry with two sample firms: 
Royal Dutch Shell plc (further: Shell) as our focal firm of the study and British 
Petroleum plc (further: BP) as our comparative firm of the study.  
Part IV of this thesis covers the empirical studies conducted in this PhD 
research. The empirical studies consist of the analyses of the three key principles. 
In an attempt to operationalize and measure the three key principles, we develop 
some measurement indicators. Chapter 8 consists of the empirical study of the first 
key principle, i.e. an investigation of how large incumbent firms manage their 
internal rate of change to match or exceed external rate of change. To this end, we 
use a multilevel method (at the industry and firm levels) and a comparative study 
of Shell and BP. Chapter 9 analyzes the second key principle, managing self 
organization. To investigate self-organization, firm-specific data that can only be 
obtained from an internal access to a firm is required. Since we only have the 
access to Shell, for the second key principle, we use a single case study of Shell. 
Chapter 10 focuses on the issue of how to synchronize exploitation and exploration 
concurrently. Besides that, we also incorporate the managerial intentionality by 
investigating the role of top management team in guiding a firm’s strategic renewal 
trajectories over time.  
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We conclude our study in Part V (Chapter 11) by summarizing the key 
findings of the three key principles and by presenting our research contributions, 
managerial implications, research limitations and accordingly suggestions for 
future research.  
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Part II: Theory and Framework 
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2. Selection and Adaptation 
Perspectives on Strategic Renewal 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Theoretical foundation plays a fundamental role insofar as it provides a frame of 
reference and a set of sensitizing concepts and constructs. We integrate three 
parallel research streams of selection perspective, adaptation perspective, and a 
combined selection-and-adaptation, i.e. coevolutionary, perspective that build up 
the strategic renewal theory. The combined selection-and-adaptation perspective 
further leads to the advancement of the three key principles of self-renewing 
organizations (Volberda & Lewin, 2003). We begin this second chapter with a 
broad overview of prior research on organizational longevity. In essence, Chapter 2 
serves as a foundation to further develop our conceptual framework of this PhD 
study. 
 
2.2 Prior Research on Corporate Longevity 
Much of the existing research in the strategy field is intimately bound up with 
questions such as why firms differ, how they behave, how they choose strategies, 
and how they are managed (Porter, 1991). Yet, the question of what makes firms 
differ in the length and brevity of life – or what the longevity enablers are – raises 
a still broader question. The quest to explain why firms differ in their longevity has 
thus long been a fundamental issue in organizational study. Accordingly, mounting 
research has been conducted to explain this complex phenomenon. 
The traditional answer to the existence of firms was mainly based on a set of 
largely economic-driven assumptions. Traditional economic analysis of the firm 
assumes that firms will make choices to maximize lifetime profits. A British 
economist, Ronald Coase (1937) in his article called “The Nature of the Firm” 
argued that the main reason why company exists is because it minimizes the 
transaction costs of coordinating a particular economic activity. The economic 
argument has also deepened since Coase (1937), with some economists preferring 
to look at the firm as a network of contracts and others seeing it as a bundle of 
organizational capabilities.  
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Contrary to this assumption that high profitability or high performance 
matters the most for the continuance of firms, Meyer and Zucker (1989) argued 
that high performance is not a prerequisite for longevity. De Geus (1999) and 
Collins and Porras (1999) supported this proposition in which they also argued that 
the profitability of a company was a symptom of corporate health, but not a current 
predictor or determinant of corporate health and thus cannot guarantee the future 
survivability of a firm. In brief, they propounded that the profitability is a means to 
an end. Subsequently, the performance-based approach to study longevity has also 
been criticized by Aldrich (1979) and Hannan and Freeman (1989) who argued that 
good performers might have certain features which differentiate them from poor 
performers; however, these features might not be responsible for the survival of an 
organization.  
Although the approaches in investigating firm survival vary, there is a high 
degree of commonality in the organizational characteristics that are believed by 
many researchers to the relative longevity of firms. Based on this line of thought, 
the foregoing research places a major emphasis on ascertaining which 
characteristics explain the longevity of firms (e.g., Collins and Porras, 1999; De 
Geus, 1999; Volberda, 1998; Hall, 1997; Huygens et al., 2001; Kwee, 2004, 
Stadler, 2007). Their approach has been to a large extent inductive (except for 
Hall) and was performed by including multiple companies and subsequently 
investigating processes mainly inside the organizations. Their work pointed out a 
number of common organizational characteristics that are vital to firm survival.  
The large volume of existing research conducted by other researchers in the 
field has also resulted in findings akin to the above common organizational 
characteristics of long-lived firms. One of the prominent studies is that performed 
by De Geus (1999) which identified four major traits of long-lived firms: (1) a 
strong sense of identity; (2) a decentralized organization or a tolerant management 
style; (3) sensitivity towards the environment; and (4) conservative financing. In a 
more recent study, Stadler (2007) put forward four principles of enduring success. 
In another study, Van Zanden et al. (2007) took the descriptive and historical 
approach to study the long-term success of Royal Dutch Shell that they described 
as an “intricate organization” (Volume I, p. 6). Likewise inspired by longitudinal 
field research of a single firm, Burgelman and Grove (2007) conducted their study 
at Intel Corporation. Their study indicates that balanced cycles of induced and 
autonomous strategy processes are at the heart of corporate longevity. They further 
emphasized the critical role of alert strategic leadership at the top management 
team level in balancing these processes in strategy-making.  
Table 2.1 summarizes some of the antecedents or longevity enablers of 
long-lived firms resulted from the previous study on corporate longevity. However, 
these enablers encompass, in particular, internal dimensions and are less clearly 
related to the environmental context. Understanding the idiosyncrasy of long-lived 
firms requires a more comprehensive analysis than the analysis of the firms’ 
internal characteristics. Environmental factors have to be embedded in the analysis. 
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Moreover, explaining longevity demands a dynamic perspective to study how a 
particular firm develops over time through its capability to adapt to and influence 
the environment, including the role played by managerial intentionality (Lewin & 
Volberda, 1999). This research project intends to bridge these gaps by integrating 
both environmental and firm dynamics. 
 
Table 2.1: Prior research on corporate longevity 
Authors Focus Study Sample Longevity enabler 
Meyer and 
Zucker (1989) 
Permanently failing 
organizations 
4 illustrative case studies Diversity of interests of 
stakeholders 
Collins and 
Porras (1994) 
Successful, visionary 
companies 
18 paired case studies  Strong sense of identity, 
bold missions, tolerant 
management style, home-
grown management, 
continuous self-
improvement 
Pascale (1990) Successful companies 6 case studies Continuous self-
improvement, adaptive 
tension, self-organization 
and emergence (edge of 
chaos) 
Konz and Katz 
(1996, 2000) 
Hyper-longevity (over 
250 years) 
276 male religious orders 
(historical) 
Strong sense of identity, 
sensitivity to the 
environment 
De Geus (1999) Successful, long-lived 
firms 
27 case studies Strong sense of identity, 
tolerant management 
style, sensitivity towards 
the environment, 
conservatism in finance 
Hall (1997) Long term survivors 
(over 200 years) 
214 companies in UK 
(questionnaire) 
Tolerant management 
style, conservatism in 
finance 
Stadler (2007) Enduring successful 
companies 
9 paired case studies 
(among others, Shell - 
BP) 
Exploit before explore, 
diversification, remember 
mistakes, be conservative 
about change 
Burgelman and 
Grove (2007) 
Strategic dynamics, 
induced and autonomous 
strategy processes, 
strategic leadership 
1 longitudinal field 
research of Intel 
Corporation (1968-2005) 
combined with executive 
experience 
Matching cycles of 
autonomous and induced 
strategy processes, alert 
strategic leadership 
Van Zanden et 
al. (2007) 
Successful, intricate 
organization 
1 case study (Shell) Clear sense of objective, 
tolerant management 
style, close financial 
controls, strength in 
technology, global 
character (networks) 
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2.3 Strategic Renewal Theory: Selection and 
Adaptation Perspectives 
To what extent is sustained strategic renewal an indispensable capacity for a firm’s 
long-term survival? Huff et al. (1992, p. 55) conjectured that “the need for renewal 
is never ending. Viable organizations must have the capacity to frequently improve 
its alignment with internal and external demands.” Likewise from a strategic 
standpoint, companies must become efficient and effective at renewal 
simultaneously. Renewal must be the natural consequence of an organization’s 
innate resilience (Hamel & Välikangas, 2003).  
Volberda et al. (2001a, p. 160) defined strategic renewal as “the activities a 
firm undertakes to alter its path dependence.” By definition, this implies that 
managerial theories on renewal are mainly built upon two main perspectives, i.e. 
selection and adaptation perspectives (Lewin & Volberda, 1999). Selection 
perspectives view renewal as highly restricted by resource scarcity, convergence to 
industry norms, and structural inertia. In other words, the strategic activities of 
successful firms are very similar and limited to strengthening and exploiting their 
existing core competencies. In contrast, adaptation perspectives suggest that firms 
are able to and do change, overcoming their rigidities. Firms learn to behave 
differently and explore new competencies.  
Furthermore, both adaptation and selection theories and their related 
empirical studies rely on same survival outcome measure in support of their theory. 
From the adaptation perspective, theories interpret survival as a result of a firm’s 
unique resources and capabilities or superior regimes of routines or optimal 
resource allocation strategies that account for competitive advantage. Whilst from 
the selection perspective, theories interpret survival as evidence that new entrants 
are the surviving organization form when incumbent firms have been selected out.  
Combining several degrees of selection and adaptation perspectives allows 
us to develop a coherent managerial framework of sustained strategic renewal. In 
the subsequent sections, we elaborate on all three perspectives, i.e. selection 
perspective, adaptation perspective, and a combined selection-and-adaptation 
perspective. Drawing from the three literature streams, we aim to expand on the 
theoretical foundations by bringing together the various theories from both 
selection and adaptation perspectives to develop a framework for discussing firm 
competitiveness and survival. 
Selection Perspective 
A selection perspective assumes that organizations are not able to change easily 
and quickly. Theories residing in this camp include among others organizational or 
population ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1989) and, on occasion, 
evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982).  
With regard to organizational survival, organizational ecology researchers 
have provided empirical evidence (e.g., Hannan and Freeman, 1989) and deductive 
theoretical support (Hannan, Polos, and Carroll, 2004) of the value of inertia for 
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firm survival. Organizational ecologists have suggested that selection processes 
tend to favor organizational forms exhibiting levels of structural inertia, i.e. forms 
that are less amenable to change (Hannan & Freeman, 1984, 1989). The theory of 
structural inertia has equated detrimental effects of core organizational changes to 
a renewed “liability of newness” – the higher mortality rate that new organizations 
experience (Hannan & Freeman, 1984).  
Questioning the selection perspective, Wischnevsky (2004) asked if 
structural inertia assumptions are appropriate to explain the relationship between 
organizational change and survival in the context of a drastically changing 
environment. Unlike early population ecology formulations that embraced the 
notion that organizations were subject to absolute inertia (i.e. the inability to 
change due to internal and external constraints), the theory of structural inertia 
explains the detrimental effects of core changes on survival using the concept of 
relative inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984, 1989). While conceding that 
organizations can change, the theory contends that they rarely do so in a way in 
which organizational changes match environmental ones at the necessary speed. 
Relative inertia is defined in terms of timing, which is a function of three variables: 
“the temporal pattern of changes in key environments,” “the speed of learning 
mechanisms,” and “the responsiveness of the structure to designed changes” 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984: 151). 
Besides the concept of liability of newness, there is also the concept of 
liability of smallness. This thesis stems from the idea that selection processes favor 
large organizations’ structural inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1984) access to 
capital and trained workers (Aldrich & Auster, 1986), and legitimacy with external 
stakeholders (Baum & Oliver, 1991). Furthermore, empirical findings from 
evolutionary studies in both ecology (Freeman et al., 1983; Hannan & Freeman, 
1984) and economics (Audretsch, 1997; Sutton, 1997) indicate that mortality rates 
decline with increased size.  
Despite the growing studies of selection perspective, it has been criticized 
for their lack of attention to time-variant effects (Baum, 1996). To address this 
critique, Barley (1990) suggested that an evolutionary perspective is especially 
important if one wishes to analyze transformation of action rather than merely 
identify and examine historical trends. According to the evolutionary perspective, 
the evolutionary process changes the source of competitive advantage in an 
industry, especially the knowledge and scale resources associated with barriers to 
entry and survival (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Gort & Klepper, 1982; Nelson & 
Winter, 1982). Evolution thus introduces a dynamic element into selection 
processes, since firms face very different competitive environments before and 
after transformations. This evolutionary observation, then, suggests the need for a 
time-variant approach to investigating various organizational and environmental 
characteristics and firm survival. This suggestion brings in the need of adaptation 
perspective that observes the dynamic of organization-environment alignment over 
time through organizational adaptation. 
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Adaptation Perspective 
An adaptation perspective assumes that through the adaptive responses to the 
changing environment, organizations are able to change to align with their 
environmental changes. Theories typically placed in adaptational camp include 
contingency theory (Woodward, 1965; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Burt, 1983, 1992), institutional 
theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), and transaction cost 
economics (Williamson, 1975; 1985).  
On one research stream, resource dependence and organizational learning 
theorists have suggested the view that organizational changes are undertaken for 
their adaptive value, thus implying that improvements in organizational survival 
rates and performance can be expected from such changes. On another research 
stream, some researchers who view organizations as open rational systems (cf. 
Scott, 1992) have emphasized that the degree of fit between organizational features 
and external environment influences organizational effectiveness. Thus, 
contingency theorists have argued that organizational effectiveness will benefit 
from the adoption of specific organizational structures that are best suited for 
particular task environments (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Mintzberg, 1979; 
Thompson, 1967). 
Furthermore, the adaptation perspective (Child, 1972) suggests that 
smallness is a virtue in highly uncertain, dynamic environments. The issue of 
significance in a time-variant model is whether and how the advantage of size 
changes over time as an industry evolves. The argument is that the degree to which 
organizational size facilitates survival is likely to be conditioned by changing 
competitive conditions accompanying the structural discontinuity in an industry’s 
life cycle. Accordingly, the advantage of size is substantial during an industry’s 
growth period, since empirical regularities indicate a positive relationship between 
firm size and survival for any given growth rate (Sutton, 1997). Largeness 
enhances firms’ ability to shield themselves from uncertain winds of change during 
the growth phase, thereby reducing mortality rates.  
Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) indicate that, in a rapidly changing business 
environment, the ability of a firm to achieve competitive advantage depends on its 
dynamic capabilities – its ability to recreate competencies required to establish 
adequate organization-environment fit. They indicate that dynamic capabilities are 
instrumental in the renewal of competences to match environmental requirements. 
Organizations that possess such capabilities would achieve competitive advantage 
in the face of significant environmental variation. In the same line of thought, 
Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) conjectures that achieving long-term success 
requires a dynamic capability enabling firms to satisfy current demands while 
simultaneously being prepared for tomorrow’s developments. Building upon the 
literature, Jansen et al. (2009) conceptualize organizational ambidexterity as an 
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organizational-level dynamic capability and argue that structural differentiation 
and integration play a crucial role in a firm’s ability to pursue exploratory and 
exploitative innovation concurrently (which later refers to the third key principle of 
sustained strategic renewal).  
Altogether, Table 2.2 summarizes respectively the diverse theories of 
mainly the selection perspective and the theories of mainly the adaptation 
perspective. 
 
Table 2.2: Diverse theories of mainly selection and mainly adaptation perspectives 
Selection Perspective Adaptation Perspective 
• Population ecology: environments select 
organizations through resource scarcity 
and competition; long-lived firms 
accumulate structural and procedural 
baggage until they get selected out 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1984). 
• Strategic choice theory: organizations 
have the capacity to adapt themselves and 
reshape their environment; organizations 
should achieve a dynamic fit with their 
environment (Child, 1972; Miles and 
Snow, 1978). 
• Institutional theory: firm survival and 
longevity is achieved through maintaining 
congruence with shifting industry norms 
and shared logics; long-lived firms resist 
change and adopt fast follower strategies 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Greenwood 
and Hinings, 1996). 
• Learning theories: organizations can use 
their unique skills for learning, unlearning 
and relearning to align themselves with 
their environments; organizations should 
remain vital by balancing the exploration 
of unknown futures and the exploitation 
of known pasts (Argyris and Schon, 1978; 
Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 
1991). 
• Evolutionary theory: longevity and 
survival are achieved through 
accumulation of know-how and tacit 
knowledge in the course of action; long-
lived firms reinforce incremental 
improvements and routines (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). 
• Dynamic capability theory: firm survival 
and longevity is achieved through 
knowledge creation and integration; 
organizations should retain its capacity to 
renew, augment, and adapt their core 
competencies over time (Teece et al., 
1997). 
• Resource-based theory: environments 
select organizations through competition; 
long-lived firms exploit and sustain their 
competitive advantage through barriers to 
imitation by investing in inimitable 
idiosyncratic capabilities (Penrose, 1959; 
Wernerfelt, 1984) 
• Behavioral theory of the firm: longevity 
and survival is directly related to the 
availability and control of organization 
slack; organizations should have the 
strategic intent to allocate slack to 
innovation (Cyert and March, 1963). 
Source: Adapted from Volberda et al. (2001a, p.162) 
 
In the next section, we move beyond purely selection or adaptation 
perspectives by viewing both perspectives as an interrelated, combined 
perspective. This means we consider joint outcomes of environmental selection 
and adaptation perspectives by drawing on the literature of coevolutionary theory. 
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Coevolutionary Theory: Selection-and-Adaptation Perspective 
No single theory of purely selection or adaptation can fully explain how and why 
firms coevolve and develop over time (cf. Dooley & Van den Ven, 1999; Van de 
Ven & Grazman, 1999: 186; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). While selection theorists 
view change and renewal as highly restricted by resource scarcity, convergence to 
industry norms, and structural inertia; adaptation theorists suggest that 
organizations can and do change by learning and exploring new competencies to 
overcome their rigidities (Volberda et al., 2001a). In other words, the major 
difference between the two perspectives is a thoroughly researchable topic 
pertaining to the rates and conditions of change in organizations and the outcomes 
change generates.  
Rather than focusing on the broader controversy between selection and 
adaptation views, we sought to comprehend the implications of a particular type of 
organizational transformation in a particular external context for organizational 
survival through a combined selection-and-adaptation perspective: coevolutionary 
theory. The coevolutionary perspective is an integrative framework for studying 
organizational evolution as a joint function of managerial intentionality and 
selection pressures imposed by the environment (Lewin and Volberda, 1999). 
According to Volberda and Lewin (2003, p.2108), “for coevolution to occur, the 
population must consist of heterogeneous firms that have adaptive learning 
capability and are able to interact and mutually influence each other.” This is in 
line with the growing need in the field of strategy research which is to take 
interdependence and dynamism into consideration. This view has highlighted 
especially the internal processes by which firms in their regimes of rapid change 
renew their capabilities and strategies and adapt to meet the challenges for the 
future (e.g. Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1992; Baden-Fuller and Volberda, 1997; 
Sanchez and Heene, 1996; Teece et al., 1997; Volberda, 1998; Volberda et al., 
2001a).  
While firms in dynamic environments are challenged to renew themselves to 
survive in the long term, it is understood that these firms at the same time are 
confronted with short-term competitive forces, influencing their present 
profitability. However, these long- and short-term requirements seem to conflict. 
While renewing to adapt for tomorrow requires change, flexibility and creativity of 
firms, profits for today requires order, control and stability (Volberda, 1998). 
March (1991) conceptualized this tension as the exploration/ exploitation trade-off 
firms face. He associates exploration with search, variation, experimentation and 
innovation; whereas exploitation is associated with refinement, efficiency and 
application. Additionally, Levinthal & March (1993), Lewin et al. (1999), and 
March (1991) suggested that maintaining a balance of exploration and exploitation 
activities in a firm is a primary factor in its survival and prosperity. As such this 
“exploration / exploitation theory”, as Lewin et al. (1999, p. 537) suggest, “takes 
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dynamism into consideration by advancing an explanation for why and how 
organizations survive over time or fail to do so”   
In this context, the basic problem for most firms is “how to engage in 
enough exploitation to insure the organization’s current viability and engage in 
enough exploration to insure its future viability” (Levinthal and March, 1993: 105). 
To address this issue, the theory of coevolution has been introduced by many 
scholars to bridge the selection-adaptation or exploitation-exploration chasm (e.g. 
Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Murmann, 2003). Consistent with the coevolutionary 
framework, Sidhu et al. (2004), for instance, found that both environmental 
pressures and managerial intentions influence an organization’s exploration 
behavior. Additionally building upon March’s idea of exploration-exploitation as a 
metric for progress, Volberda et al. (2001b) asserted that multi-level 
coevolutionary processes taking place over time and leading to adaptations are 
essential for strategic alignment of firm competencies with the environment. In 
short, the inability to coevolve with the environment would be detrimental to 
organizational survival (Rindova & Kotha, 2001). 
Lewin and Volberda (1999, p. 526) emphasized the importance of the 
coevolution perspective defining coevolution: “as the joint outcome of managerial 
intentionality, environment, and institutional effects.” Coevolution assumes that 
change may occur in all interacting populations of organizations. Hence, 
coevolution indicates that adaptation and selection are not orthogonal forces but 
are fundamentally interrelated. Correspondingly, Volberda and Lewin (2003) 
proposed three key principles of self-renewal (Table 1.2) that are necessary for 
enabling managed selection, coevolutionary adaptation processes. The three key 
principles, which we consider as a prerequisite of corporate longevity or sustained 
strategic renewal, reiterate that adaptation and selection are not completely 
opposite forces but are fundamentally interrelated: organization and environment 
coevolve (Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Murmann, 2003). We are now going to 
elaborate in detailed on the three key principles of self-renewing organizations in 
the following section. 
 
2.4 Key Principles of Self-Renewing Organizations 
The various theories from both selection and adaptation perspectives are brought 
together to develop a framework for discussing firm competitiveness and survival. 
In this respect, coevolutionary theory brings together the joint perspectives of both 
selection and adaptation. In the coevolutionary theory, how organizational factors 
interact with environmental factors and how such joint outcomes affect 
organizational longevity is of great interest to organizational scholars. Such 
organizational factors include the organization’s market entry timing, founding 
leader characteristics, and type of products or services that the organization sells. 
Similarly, environmental factors (such as business climate, competitive pressures, 
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and legal and regulatory issues) that could interact with organizational strategy 
need to be studied.  
 To advance on the coevolutionary theory, Volberda and Lewin (2003) 
derive three higher order principles from complexity theory (Anderson, 1999a, b; 
Axelrod & Cohen, 2000; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; Gell-Mann, 1995; Holland, 
1999; Kauffman, 1995) and practitioner-oriented writings (e.g. Clippinger, 1999). 
The three key principles of self-renewing organizations, they argue, underlie any 
theory of self-renewal and its associated enabling managerial routines and 
capabilities involving strategy, structures, processes and leadership. The following 
sections will discuss each of the three key principles. 
 
Principle 1: Managing internal rate of change 
The role of environment in organizational dynamics has long been studied in the 
various streams of organizational theory (e.g., Barnett & Carroll, 1995; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1989; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Perrow, 1979; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Scott, 1992). The traditional premise is that firms seek to align 
organizational resources and capabilities with external opportunities and challenges 
(cf. Andrews, 1971; Hofer & Schendel, 1978) and that an effective alignment has 
positive performance implications (Ketchen et al., 1997; Powell, 1992; Van de Ven 
& Drazin, 1985; Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990).  
Organization-environment coalignment process that entails the need to scan 
and assess the environment for subsequent matching of opportunities with 
organizational capabilities and managerial discretion is at the heart of the 
adaptation of organizations over time. It delineates strategic actions a firm, through 
its managers, undertake by scanning the firm’s environment to seek opportunities 
that could be matched with the firm’s capabilities.  
To stimulate further empirical development and understanding of the 
concepts of strategy and environment, Porter (1991, p. 97) refers to strategy as “the 
act of aligning a company and its environment”. This line of inquiry propounds 
that long-lived organizations have to cope with acceleration of change in the 
business environment in order to adapt to the environment and to stimulate renewal 
and innovation processes. This implies that there is a need for organizations to 
match their internal rate of change with the external rate of change of environments 
within which the organizations are embedded. This is the first key principle of self-
renewing organization (Volberda and Lewin, 2003). The principle implies a keen 
awareness that organizations regulate their internal rate of change to equal or 
exceed the external rate of change over time for their long-term viability. 
By definition, organizational change itself involves a transformation of an 
organization between two points in time that is triggered by a substantial internal 
or external event. Barnett and Carroll (1995) conceptualize organizational change 
in terms of both its process and its content. Process refers to how change occurs. 
Content describes what actually changes in the organization and what key events 
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trigger the changes. On the basis of content, major changes consist of 
transformations that involve many elements of structure or those that entail radical 
shifts in a single element of structure. Most scholars regard the key aspect of 
change comes from comparing the organization before and after the 
transformation. Making such a comparison constitutes an analysis of the content of 
organizational change. It assesses what actually differs in the organization at the 
second point in time. 
Changes, however, have various kinds of definitions depending on the level 
of strategy one focuses on. On one research stream, those focusing on changes in 
corporate-level strategy define strategic change as a realignment of a firm’s 
selection of product/market domains and allocations among them (Ansoff, 1965). 
On another research stream, those focusing on changes in business-level strategy 
define strategic changes as alterations in competitive decisions within particular 
product/market domains, for instance alterations in price, or quality associated with 
a product (Rumelt, 1974).  
With respect to environmental changes, every firm has an environment that 
places constraints on the way it operates – e.g., an industry group has certain 
technical characteristics that must be attended to. The external environment in 
which success and failure are ultimately evaluated is a highly variegated 
environment. Organizations are required to find a way of mapping the rich 
multidimensionality of the external environment onto the organizationally-
legitimated internal environment. Timely and swiftly matching organizational 
transformation to environmental shifts is therefore key to organizational survival. 
The key question in this case is that how firms should regulate the internal rate of 
change with respect to the external rate of change. Not only is this questioned in 
the academic world, but also in the business world. For instance, Jack Welch (GE’s 
2000 annual report, p. 4) – the CEO of General Electric – is among the others who 
has long believed that: “when the rate of change inside an institution becomes 
slower than the rate of change outside, the end is in sight.” 
Likewise, Volberda and Lewin (2003) propounded that a firm should 
regulate its internal rate of change to match or exceed the external rate of change. 
This, according to them, is consistent with idea that organizations must maintain 
requisite variety (Ashby, 1964). The principle of requisite variety states that the 
internal regulatory mechanisms of a system must be as diverse as the environment 
with which it is trying to deal. Ashby (1964) further contended that for only by 
incorporating required variety into internal controls can a system deal with the 
variety and challenge posed by its environment.  
By the same token, Volberda and Lewin’s (2003) argument was that this 
principle recognizes the need for organizations to match or exceed the coevolution 
rate of the external systems (society, institutions, and industries) within which the 
firm is embedded. The internal variety of firm routines and capabilities must match 
the external variety of the environmental landscape on which the firm is 
prospecting. In short, self-renewing organizations develop routines, capabilities, 
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and measures which monitor and track rates of change in all aspects of their 
environment (e.g. rate of new product improvements made by competitors, 
changes in customer expectations, etc.) and adjust the applicable internal processes 
to match or exceed these rates.  
 
 
Principle 2: Optimizing self-organizing 
The term "self-organizing" seems to have been first introduced in 1947 by the 
psychiatrist and engineer named W. Ross Ashby. Self-organization as a word and 
concept was used by those associated with general systems theory in the 1960s 
(Ashby, 1964), but did not become commonplace in the scientific literature until its 
adoption by physicists and researchers in the field of complex systems in the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
Since then, the concepts of emergence and self-organization have been used 
to explain various elements of strategic decision-making (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; 
Stacey, 1995; MacIntosh & MacLean, 1999), entrepreneurship (Stevenson & 
Harmeling, 1990; Gartner, 1993), organizational learning (Nonaka, 1988, 1994), 
leadership (Senge, 1990; McKelvey, 2000), and organizational change and 
transformation (Leifer, 1989; Dooley, 1997). The concept of self-organizing is also 
mentioned in the complexity theory. Complexity theory suggests that self-
organization is the natural “default” behavior. Maguire and McKelvey (1999), for 
instance, argued that when organizations move away from stability and into the 
“region of complexity,” adaptive tensions give rise to emergent self-organization. 
In fact, most argue that it is only as organizations move into far-from-equilibrium 
states (Kauffman, 1995; Prigogine and Stengers, 1984) that emergent ideas are 
possible, giving rise to innovation and creativity (Anderson, 1999a; Chiles et al., 
2004; McKelvey, 1999). 
Self-organization is the process by which organizations always find order no 
matter how complex or convoluted the structure of the organization (Nonaka, 
1988; Volberda and Lewin, 2003). This principle encourages the idea of delegating 
decision making to the lowest possible level and it implies maximizing capabilities 
of scope at every level of the organization (Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2003). In 
self-organizing systems, order comes from the actions of interdependent agents 
who exchange information, take actions, and continuously adapt to feedback about 
others’ actions rather than from the imposition of an overall plan by a central 
authority (Chiles et al., 2004).  
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In the same line of thought, Volberda and Lewin (2003) conjectured that 
guided self-organization is a primary process by which organizations find fitness 
on rugged landscapes. They further propound that self-organization, however, does 
not mean that individuals or units can pull in all directions at will or break all rules. 
It does not mean that managers are not necessary or that they have diminished 
roles. It means that no central controller is necessary and it requires fundamental 
departure from command and control philosophy of traditional hierarchical 
bureaucratic organizations.  
At the related vein of research, Van den Bosch and Volberda (2006) studied 
the condition of self-organization at the Shell Research and Technology Centre in 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands. In particular, they investigated how the knowledge 
integration capacity may contribute to the development of self-organization in a 
knowledge-intensive firm like Shell. Their results indicate that the knowledge 
integration capacity contributes to self-organization. Furthermore, their results 
indicate that self-organization requires key enablers such as a transformational 
leadership (Edmondson et al., 2003, Smith and Tushman, 2005) that can guide the 
self-organization processes rather than traditional hierarchical structure.  
Guided self-organization also implies that managers function as stewards of 
the evolutionary process and focus their managerial role on devising and 
articulating critical values and on establishing boundary conditions that enable and 
guide decision making at lower levels of the organization (Nonaka, 1988; Volberda 
and Lewin, 2003). Guiding and enabling lower level decision-making and action 
also requires substituting process controls (i.e. devising processes that produce 
desired and acceptable outcomes) for outcome controls. In summary, self-
organization is fundamentally different from classical command and control 
management practice. It implies that management commits to guiding the 
evolution of behaviours that emerge in the course of interaction of independent 
agents and invests in implementing process controls whenever possible instead of 
relying on outcome controls. 
 
 
Principle 3: Synchronizing concurrent exploitation-exploration 
The third higher-order principle involves balancing concurrent innovation and 
knowledge creation (exploration) with improvements in productivity, process 
improvements, efficiency and product extensions and enhancements (exploitation). 
Levinthal and March (1993, p.105) further contended that the long-term survival of 
an organization depends on its ability to ‘engage in enough exploitation to ensure 
the organization’s current viability and engage in enough exploration to ensure its 
future viability’.  
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March (1991) introduced the dichotomous concept of exploitation and 
exploration. He described exploitation as ‘the refinement and extension of existing 
competencies, technologies, and paradigms.’ (p.85). Exploitation is needed for 
organizations to achieve short-term order, structure, and stability (Volberda, 1998). 
Exploration is related to ‘search and variation: experimenting with technologies, 
ideas, paradigms, knowledge, and strategies trying to find new ways to age old 
problems’ (March, 1991, p.85). Exploration that is based on a longer-term horizon 
is needed as it provides the basis for new technologies and breakthrough inventions 
(Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). Table 2.3 highlights the key differences between 
exploration and exploitation. 
 
Table 2.3: Key differences between exploitation and exploration 
Attribute Key terms Performance  
Exploration search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, change, play, 
flexibility, discovery, innovation, stress, adaptation 
less certainty,  more 
diffuse, longer time 
horizon 
Exploitation refinement, choice, production, efficiency, stability 
continuity, inertia, implementation, execution, selection 
certainty, speed 
(short-term), 
proximity, clarity 
Source: March (1991) 
 
Although firms are often confronted with balancing exploitation and 
exploration concurrently, most firms seem to exhibit an asymmetric preference for 
short-term exploitation improvements. Studies show that in highly competitive 
environments over exploitation can result in a competence trap (Levitt & March, 
1988, 1993).  The consequence of asymmetric preference for exploitation results in 
the development of core rigidities and highly specialized resources that enhance 
short-term performance at the expense of reduced flexibility (Volberda, 1996, 
1998). Exploration can also have dysfunctional effects. Over sensitivity to short-
term variations and local errors, becoming too responsive to fads and fashions as 
well as never ending tinkering with routines and procedures may waste resources 
on ‘noise’ embedded in environmental signals (Volberda, 2003). The resulting 
chaotic organization cannot retain “a sense of identity and continuity over time” 
(Weick, 1979, p. 215). Random and chronic exploration creates a vicious circle 
that results in a renewal trap characterized by conflict about authority, unclear 
responsibilities, inadequate controls, lack of direction and shared ideology. Thus 
over exploitation of existing opportunities as well as over exploration of new 
opportunities are dysfunctional for the firm and lead to competence trap or renewal 
trap (Volberda, 1998). This is also indicated by March (1991, p.71) who argued 
that “systems that engage in exploitation to the exclusion of exploration are likely 
to find themselves trapped in suboptimal stable equilibria while adaptive systems 
that engage in exploration to the exclusion of exploitation are likely to find that 
they suffer the costs of experimentation without gaining many of its benefits”.   
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Self-renewing organizations synchronize and balance concurrent exploration 
for new opportunities and exploitation of existing capabilities. Both attributes are 
accepted and present. Both operate simultaneously. Existing studies suggested that 
organizations pursuing exploration and exploitation concurrently obtain superior 
financial performance (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; He and Wong, 2004; 
Lubatkin et al., 2006). Over time, balancing exploration and exploitation not only 
helps firms to overcome structural inertia that results from focusing on 
exploitation, but also refrains them from accelerating exploration without gaining 
benefits (Levinthal and March, 1993). 
 
Antecedents of three key principles  
In their study of mobilizing the self-renewing organization, Lewin and 
Volberda (2004) further advanced the three key principles of self-renewing 
organizations by substantiating key antecedents of the three key principles. These 
antecedents, they argue, are considered as enabling heuristics of sustained strategic 
renewal. They help managers to guide strategic renewal trajectories of their firms. 
In this respect, Lewin and Volberda (2004) developed a range of enabling design 
variables or antecedents involving strategies, structures, managerial processes and 
leaderships. Table 2.4 shows the antecedents of the three key principles introduced 
by Lewin and Volberda (2004). We will explain these antecedents in more detailed 
in Chapter 5. 
In conclusion, we conjecture that altogether managing internal rates of 
change to match or exceed external rates of change, nurturing and maintaining self-
organization and sustaining concurrent exploration and exploitation are three 
complementary principles necessary for sustaining strategic renewal (Volberda and 
Lewin, 2003). Chapter 11 of this thesis will further demonstrate how the three key 
principles complementarily contribute to sustained strategic renewal. To achieve 
this complementary result, managers need to pay continuous attention. This is the 
particular feature that distinguishes second-order renewal capabilities of successful 
long-lived organizations from the non-coevolving organizations with short-term 
exploitation focus only.  
There is, however, a paucity of empirical work. By far, cross-sectional 
survey-based studies and economic time series modeling (firm is treated as a black 
box) dominate empirical research landscape (Lewin & Volberda, 1999). More 
long-term studies of how industries and firms coevolve and emerge over very long 
periods of time are ultimately needed. Unfortunately, the number of such studies is 
very small (cf. Barr et al., 1992; Huygens et al., 2001; Jones, 2001; Jenkins & 
Floyd, 2001; Van den Bosch et al., 1999; Van de Ven & Grazman, 1999). By 
employing a longitudinal approach, this thesis aims to contribute to the small 
number of long-term studies. 
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Table 2.4: Three key principles and antecedents as enabling heuristics of sustained 
strategic renewal 
Key 
principle 
Enabling strategy Enabling structure Enabling 
managerial 
process 
Enabling 
leadership 
Regulate 
internal rate 
of change to 
match or 
exceed 
external rate 
of change 
• Driving 
momentum, early 
mover 
(Eisenhardt, 
1989a) 
• Escalating 
competition/ 
leapfrogging: 
long jumps 
(Beinhocker, 
1999) 
• Implementing 
modular structures 
that maximize 
external customer 
interactions and 
minimize internal 
customer 
interactions 
(Pascale, 1990, 
1999) 
• Establishing 
rhythms for 
change 
(Eisenhardt, 
1989a) 
• Establishing 
stretch goals 
(Maira & 
Thomas, 
1999) 
• Structure 
benchmarking 
processes 
• Utilize 
dynamic 
selection rules 
• Guiding 
organization 
interpretation of 
environment 
• Detecting 
emergence of 
new dominant 
logics (Prahalad 
& Bettis, 1986) 
• Managing 
adaptive 
tension 
(Pascale, 1990) 
• Selecting 
comparison 
groups; 
benchmark 
Optimize 
self-
organization 
• Managing rate of 
internal growth 
through 
innovation 
• Building 
readiness for 
change through: 
probing future; 
varied low-cost 
experiments; 
scenario planning 
(Eisenhardt, 
1989a; 
Beinhocker, 
1999; Pascale, 
1990, 1999; 
Schoemaker, 
1995) 
• Semi-structures/ 
breaking large 
structures into 
patches/changing 
chargers 
(Kauffman, 1995; 
Eisenhardt, 
1989a) 
• Optimizing cross-
function interfaces 
(Maira & Thomas, 
1999) 
• Implementing 
communication-
centric structures 
• Facilitating 
emergent 
processes 
(Pascale, 
1990, 1999) 
• Balancing 
density of 
strong and 
weak ties 
• Minimizing 
number of 
rules/ 
simplicity 
over 
complexity 
(Eisenhardt, 
1989a) 
• Choosing 
arenas of 
competition 
• Determining 
performance 
criteria 
• Designing 
selection rules 
• Accepting 
equifinality 
• Managing 
dysfunctional 
stress  
• Managing 
agency problem 
• Identifying 
critical values 
(Maira & 
Thomas, 1999) 
Synchronize 
concurrent 
exploration 
and 
exploitation 
• Allocating slack 
to exploration; 
latent potential 
and redundancies 
(Maira & 
Thomas, 1999) 
• Pursuing multiple 
strategies; 
parallel exploring 
(Beinhocker, 
1999) 
• Exploring to 
create real 
options  
• Implementing 
venturing 
structure and 
selection rules 
• Spinning off 
autonomous new 
ventures 
• Incorporating 
venture 
capital 
metrics 
(Beinhocker, 
1999)  
• Adjusting 
rules for scale 
• Articulate 
strategic intent 
of passion for 
exploration and 
exploitation; 
mindfulness 
and intention 
(Pascale, 1990) 
• Avoid 
oscillating 
between 
strategic 
extremes 
(Pascale, 1990) 
Source: based on Lewin and Volberda (2004) 
 
 
51
 Selection and Adaptation Perspectives on Strategic Renewal 35 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Organizations are social inventions (Greenfield, 1973). They exist, at least in part, 
because of the benefits of coordination they provide. Organizations are fluid and 
dynamic: they move in time and in space; they act and react. In this view, we need 
a framework that allows us to integrate both the selection as well as the adaptation 
perspectives. The coevolutionary perspective is viewed as an important 
overarching framework for an enquiry into organizational actions and outcomes as 
a joint function of adaptation due to managerial efforts and selection pressures 
imposed by the environment (Lewin & Volberda, 1999). 
Firms that build organizational capabilities that foster flexibility and change 
may indeed need to invest in a crucial resource for survival in a shifting industry 
context. We need to examine a diverse set of principles that may help top 
management to guide sustained strategic renewal over time. Building on the 
coevolutionary theory in this chapter, we propose to use the three key principles of 
self-renewing organizations (Volberda and Lewin, 2003) to explain the construct 
of sustained strategic renewal. 
The first principle deals with managing the internal rate of change of a firm 
to match or exceed the external rate of change of the firm’s environment. Firms 
through their managers need to better identify the associated challenges and match 
the dynamics of the internal context of strategy making with the dynamics of the 
external ecology in which the company operates. The second key principle is 
concerned with the emergent process of self-organization. Self-organization 
suggests that firms need to depart from command and control philosophy of 
traditional hierarchical bureaucratic organizations and encourage guiding and 
enabling lower level decision-making. The third principle emphasizes the 
importance for firms to pursue exploitation and exploration simultaneously. 
Additionally by building on Lewin and Volberda (2004), this chapter has also 
substantiated key antecedents of the three key principles (Table 2.4).  
Altogether the three key principles are regarded as complementary 
principles that are necessary for sustained strategic renewal, the key construct in 
this thesis. Our studies in this thesis aim at providing a better understanding of the 
three key principles as a means to explain the sustained strategic renewal construct. 
To begin with in the next chapter, we explore the three key principles based on a 
coevolutionary perspective which is a combined selection-and-adaptation 
perspective. 
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3. Exploring Three Key Principles 
from a Coevolutionary 
Perspective∗)  
 
3.1 Introduction: Idiosyncrasy of Long-Lived Firms 
In this chapter, we address the first research question in this thesis, i.e. how firms 
develop their competences to strategically renew themselves. Here we use a 
combined selection-and-adaptation, i.e. a coevolutionary, perspective in studying 
how the environmental selection plays a role on the managerial intentionality and 
vice versa how managerial intentionality influences environment through a 
construct of coevolutionary competence. By doing this, we aim to explore the three 
key principles of sustained strategic renewal from a coevolutionary perspective.  
We start by querying why firms vary so widely in the length and brevity of 
life. This question hardly crosses our minds. Perhaps this is because firms are all 
around us and thus we tend to take their existence for granted (Aldrich, 1979). We 
all have some interest in the survival of commercial firms since such organizations 
are necessary and important in our lives as purposive systems that enable us to 
accomplish collectively what cannot be accomplished by each of us as individuals 
acting on our own (Parsons, 1956; Aldrich, 1979). Hence, the existence of 
organizations plays an important role in our society and well-being.  
However, the following facts regarding the average lifespan of firms 
highlight our research problem: 
• The average life expectancy of Fortune 500 firms, from birth to death, is 
only 40 to 50 years.  Their first 10 year is a period of high corporate ‘infant 
mortality’. In addition, a full one-third of the 1970 Fortune 500 companies 
had been acquired or broken into segments, or had merged with other 
companies by 1983 (De Geus, 1999).  
• In the past two decades, of the 20 largest US companies’ bankruptcies, ten 
occurred in the last two years (Hamel & Välikangas, 2003). 
                                                 
∗) This chapter is based on Kwee, Z., Van den Bosch, F.A.J., and Volberda, H.W. (2008). 
‘Coevolutionary competence in the realm of corporate longevity: how long-lived firms strategically 
renew themselves’. in Sanchez, R. (Ed.), Research in Competence-Based Management, 4, 281-313, 
UK: JAI Press. 
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• Among the companies on the original Forbes 100 list in 1917, 18 remained 
in the top 100 by 1987 and 61 had ceased to exist (Mackey & Välikangas, 
2004). 
• The average life expectancy of all firms investigated, regardless of size, in 
Japan and much of Europe, is only 12.5 years (De Rooij, 1996). 
• In the case of family companies, between first and second generations only 
about one-third of family businesses survive and, of those survivors, only 12 
percent reach a third generation. An exclusive 3 to 4 percent of third 
generation survivors make it to a fourth (O’Hara, 2004). 
Several researchers (e.g. De Geus, 1999; O’Hara, 2004; Kwee, 2004; Van 
Driel et al., 2004) identified a number of long-lived firms, ranging from family 
firms to large firms. Table 3.1 presents a few of these from many different 
countries around the world listed in an ascending order based on their year of 
origin. Two of the aforementioned long-lived firms, The Hudson’s Bay Company 
(HBC) and Royal Ten Cate (RTC), are discussed in detail as the empirical case 
studies in the third section. Both companies are selected as they exemplify how a 
company is confronted with the regulatory, technological and other changes 
throughout their lifetime. They may, therefore, help to illustrate the construct of 
coevolutionary competence in the context of organizational longevity.  
Table 3.1: List of several long-lived firms 
Company Name Year of Origin Country Current Line of Business 
Kongo Gumi* 578 Japan Temple restoration and construction 
Stora (present: 
Stora Enso) 1288 Sweden 
Integrated paper, packaging, and  forest 
products 
Cambridge 
University Press 1534 U.K. Printing and publishing 
Royal Pakhoed 
(present: Vopak) 1600 
The 
Netherlands 
Transport, logistics (warehousing), and 
distribution 
Van Eeghen 1662 The Netherlands Food products and food ingredients 
Saint-Gobain 1665 France Producer, processor, and distributor of materials (glass, ceramics, plastics, and cast iron) 
The Hudson’s Bay 
Company 1670 Canada Department store retailer 
Royal Ten Cate 1704 The Netherlands Technical textiles and technical components 
The Royal Bank of 
Scotland 1727 U.K., Scotland Bank and Financial Services 
DuPont 1802 USA Chemicals, materials, energy, and science-based solution provider 
* In January 2006, after almost 1,428 years of existence, Kongo Gumi went bankrupt. The company was 
acquired by Takamatsu Corporation. Prior to that, it had over 100 employees and annual revenue of ¥7.5 billion 
($70 million) and had still specialized in building temples. 
55
 Exploring Three Key Principles from a Coevolutionary Perspective 39 
 
 
How can these companies live for such a long time? Do they coincidentally 
pass the tests of survival through some Darwinian process of natural selection? 
Aldrich (1979) argued that the notion of “survival of the fittest” in natural selection 
is unable to explain what makes firms long-lived. The natural selection model 
refers to a tendency for those species and organizations most fit vis-à-vis their 
environments to survive. Equating organizational “fitness” with “survival” would 
rob the model of any claim to scientific status and reduce it to a tautology in that it 
would provide only a post hoc explanation of why a firm failed but no a priori 
predictive base for assessing which ones will not in the future. However, in terms 
of likelihoods and probabilities, the presumption remains that a thriving 
organization is adaptable to its environment.  
Evolution in Biology is often adopted as an approach to understanding 
corporate longevity just as the former is used to ascertain the longevity of human 
and other living organisms (e.g., Meyer & Zucker, 1989; De Geus, 1999; Konz & 
Katz, 1996, 2000). Analogously, many researchers (such as De Geus, 1999) regard 
firms as living entities. A firm has a life, with birth, all kinds of changes and death. 
The date of birth is the date of founding, and death or exit is considered to be the 
dissolution of the organization (Meyer & Zucker, 1989: 70). Figure 3.1 illustrates 
our interpretation of a firm’s life cycle. With respect to this cycle, long-lived firms 
are considered to be idiosyncratic: they seem to be able to relentlessly and 
reflectively renew themselves and thus make their life cycles last for centuries. 
 
Figure 3.1: Firm’s life cycle 
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Within this framework, the foregoing research places a major emphasis on 
ascertaining which factors explain the longevity of firms (Collins & Porras, 1999; 
De Geus, 1999; Hall, 1997; Huygens et al., 2001; Kwee, 2004). Their approach has 
been to a large extent inductive (except for Hall) and was performed by including 
multiple companies and subsequently investigating processes mainly inside the 
organizations. Their work pointed out common organizational characteristics that 
enable these long-lived firms to strategically renew themselves and adapt to the 
environment. However, these characteristics encompass, in particular, internal 
dimensions and are less clearly related to the environmental context.  
Understanding the idiosyncrasy of long-lived firms requires a more 
comprehensive analysis than this analysis of their internal characteristics. 
Environmental factors have to be embedded in the analysis. In fact, explaining 
longevity demands a dynamic perspective to study how a particular firm develops 
over time through its capability to adapt to and influence the environment, 
including the role played by managerial intentionality (Lewin & Volberda, 1999).  
 
 
3.2 From Selection to Coevolutionary Perspective: 
Principles of Self-Renewing Organizations 
How do long-lived firms sustain their existence over time? Under which conditions 
do firms adopt strategies for survival (and even, quite often, fail) as circumstances 
change? And how are disruptive or unwanted influences dealt with? These 
illustrative questions are the extended version of the early research like De Geus’s 
(1999) that posed the question of ‘what makes long-lived firms?’ They are also 
formulated since many scholars and business practitioners have observed that 
environmental change outstrips organizational competence change. Barnett and 
Hansen (1996) elaborated such conditions known in evolutionary theory as the 
‘Red Queen’ effect, a principle which was introduced by Van Valen (1973) 
suggesting: "For an evolutionary system, continuing development is needed just in 
order to maintain its fitness relative to the systems it is co-evolving with.". Very 
often, organizational transformation or adaptation is derailed due to difficulty in 
making strategic transitions. Bate (1994), for instance, pointed out that although 
organizations are always changing, the natural pace of change may be too slow, 
particularly in a hypercompetitive environment or one facing technological shifts 
(D’Aveni, 1994). 
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Several theories have been introduced by researchers in the context of 
studying the long-term transformation of organization. We briefly elaborate on a 
few of them. In the first place, the population ecology theory suggests that 
management makes little if any difference and firms should focus on what they do 
best until they are selected out (Aldrich, 1979; Lewin & Volberda, 1999) as the 
market selects out firms which have the wrong competencies (Barnett et al., 1994; 
Barney & Zajac, 1994). The idea here is that for the most part, organizations act on 
a simple principle: “If a given routine works, let’s do more of it; if it does not 
work, let’s do less” (March, 1999). Next, the resource-based view of the firm 
supports the idea that idiosyncratic resources are the basis of a sustained 
competitive advantage and management should maximize unique core 
competencies (Lewin & Volberda, 1999). Alternatively, organizational learning 
theory states that variation in performance results from environmental changes and 
from the firm’s ability to adapt through learning (Lane et al., 2001; Crossan and 
Bedrow, 2003). The Royal Dutch Shell’s scenario planning (Schoemaker et al., 
1992; Schoemaker, 1995), for instance, is viewed as a strategic learning media to 
help the company discern the relevant signals for (future) change and to understand 
how innovations were generated and how the transitional period was managed. 
The increasing turbulence of the business environment has also changed the 
competitive game substantially and focused attention on knowledge as a dominant 
source of competitive advantage (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995). Firms should access new outside knowledge, integrate it flexibly 
across different firm boundaries, and apply it to commercial ends (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). This dynamic capability, referred to as absorptive capacity, is 
seen as a promising explanation of innovation (Jansen et al., 2005; Stock et al., 
2001; Tsai, 2001), the exploration / exploitation trade-off (Jansen et al., 2009; 
Lewin, Long & Caroll, 1999; March, 1991), business performance (Lane et al., 
2001; Tsai, 2001), intra-organizational transfer of knowledge (Szulanski, 1996) 
and inter-organizational learning (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998).  
Firms with higher levels of absorptive capacity tend to outperform other 
firms in that they are more proactive and exploit current opportunities (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Van den Bosch et al., 1999). However, inability to opportunely 
adapt to the changing environment is one of the big hurdles of firms. Ossified firms 
have difficulty in facing the new challenge with their ill-fated strategies that tend to 
routinely maintain what they have been doing well. Hence, to absorb new 
knowledge and to develop new skills are important requisites for firms facing 
changing environments. 
Moreover, there is also a need to reconcile the paradox of conflicting forces 
for change and stability (Volberda, 1998). These conflicting pressures have also 
long been recognized (e.g., Burns & Stalker, 1961) and many scholars have 
explicitly discussed the dilemma (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; Handy, 1995; 
Kanter, 1988; Hampden-Turner, 1990). On the one hand, organizations tend to 
preserve their core competencies. But they should realize that if they preserve the 
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stability, core competencies can become core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992; 
Burgelman, 1994; Barnett et al., 1994) or a ‘competence trap’ (Levitt & March, 
1988; Levinthal & March, 1993).  On the other hand, although adaptation is 
needed as the pressure to change comes not just from threats to survival but also 
the desire to grow and be more successful, too much change will lead to chaos, loss 
of cultural glue, fatigue and organizational break-down (Volberda, 1996) or the 
‘renewal trap’ (Levitt & March, 1988; Levinthal & March, 1993). Freeman et al. 
(1983) pointed to the fact that learning and adjusting structure enhance the chance 
of survival only if the speed of response is commensurate with temporal patterns of 
relevant environments. In Lewin’s (1951) terminology, there is a cycle of unfreeze, 
move, refreeze, which is often repeated.  
Furthermore, Lewin and Volberda (1999: 526) emphasized the importance 
of the coevolution perspective defining coevolution: ‘as the joint outcome of 
managerial intentionality, environment, and institutional effects’. Coevolution 
assumes that change may occur in all interacting populations of organizations. In 
other words, change can be recursive and need not be an outcome of either 
managerial adaptation or environmental selection but rather the joint outcome of 
managerial intentionality and environmental effects. Hence, coevolution 
incorporates the premise that adaptation and selection are not orthogonal forces but 
are fundamentally interrelated.  
Correspondingly, Volberda and Lewin (2003) proposed three key principles 
of self-renewal that suggest how organizations can manage sustained strategic 
renewal. These key principles are elaborated in Chapter 1.4 (Table 1.2) and 
Chapter 2.4. The three key principles, which we consider as a prerequisite of 
corporate longevity, reiterate that adaptation and selection are not completely 
opposite forces but are fundamentally interrelated: organization and environment 
coevolve (Lewin & Volberda, 1999). Besides, long-lived firms have adapted to the 
environment and have shaped the environment through their actions over a long 
period of time. The appropriateness of the adaptation, or a dynamic fit with the 
environment, is found in the right proportion of exploitation and exploration 
actions that change with the environment. Additionally, the coevolutionary 
perspective has the potential to bridge the selection-variation-adaptation chasm to 
further develop insights into the mutation process of firms. This perspective 
addresses the less frequently examined questions of how organizations 
systematically influence their environments and how organizational environments, 
in turn, influence those organizations. In short, coevolution demonstrates how the 
interplay between managerial intentionality and environmental role may reinforce 
the renewal process in organizations. This concept, therefore, contributes to an 
encompassing understanding of corporate longevity. 
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3.3 Competence-Based Management and Construct of 
Coevolutionary Competence 
Sanchez, Heene and Thomas (1996) introduced a competence-based management 
framework that aims to incorporate and integrate dynamic, systemic, cognitive, and 
holistic aspects of organizations. Extending the model of the firm as an open 
system (Sanchez et al., 1996) recently Sanchez and Heene (2002) and Sanchez 
(2004) develop a taxonomy of five competence modes, each of which is 
distinguished by specific forms of flexibility it brings to an organization to respond 
to the changing circumstances in the environment. Each mode is further 
distinguished by the kinds of strategic options it creates for an organization.  
The left hand side of Table 3.2 provides a summary of the five competence 
modes in which competence is defined as ‘the ability to sustain the coordinated 
deployment of assets in ways that help a firm achieve its goals’ (Sanchez et al., 
1996: 8). This definition was derived by taking into account the four aspects of 
organizational competence: dynamic, systemic, cognitive, and holistic. We briefly 
reiterate these four aspects of organizational competence as follows: 
1. Dynamic: for a firm’s competence to be sustainable, it must respond to the 
dynamic changes of the external environment and of its own internal 
processes. To explain the essential feature of such sustainability, Sanchez 
(2004: 521) introduced the notion of organizational entropy which suggests 
that managers provide continuous inputs of energy and attention to maintain 
or improve the order and structure in a firm’s value-creation process. 
2. Systemic: a firm’s competence must be able to manage the coordination of 
the firm-specific assets (within the boundaries of the firm) and the firm’s 
addressable assets (assets that are beyond the boundaries of the firm through 
the interactions with other firms). 
3. Cognitive: a firm’s competence in enabling managers to be able to ascertain 
and assure that the deployment of a firm’s assets needed to carry out the 
strategies of the firm and to create value in targeted markets are managed 
effectively and efficiently. 
4. Holistic: a firm’s competence in recognizing a firm’s goal achievement 
through the collective coordination of the interest of its multiple 
stakeholders. 
 
Built upon the above competence notion and the framework of five 
competence modes, this section highlights how the environmental selection 
influences the managerial intentionality, how the managerial intentionality in turn 
influences the environmental selection, and how these combined forces influence 
the five competence modes (the right hand side of Table 3.2). The measures of 
competences are built upon the five competence modes developed by Sanchez and 
Heene (2002) and Sanchez (2004). The arrow of managerial intentionality, for 
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instance, suggests that the impact of managerial intentionality on building a firm’s 
coevolutionary competence increases from competence mode 5 (operating 
flexibility) to competence mode 1 (cognitive flexibility regarding alternative 
strategic logics). Due to the nature of the first competence mode i.e. cognitive 
flexibility to define alternative strategic logic, managerial intentionality is most 
clearly associated with competence mode 1. Likewise, the arrow of the impact of 
environmental selection on the respective competence modes indicates the 
increasing impact of environmental forces in selecting organizational competence 
from competence mode 1 to competence mode 5. Environmental selection 
pressures are most clearly revealed in, and will have the most direct impact on 
competence mode 5. The interplay between both impacts (arrows) will enable the 
development of coevolutionary competence over time. 
Table 3.2: Coevolutionary competence and a firm’s competence modes 
 
Note: 
• H (high): increasing influence of either the managerial intentionality or the impact of environmental 
selection on respective competence modes. 
• L (low): decreasing influence of either the managerial intentionality or the impact of environmental 
selection on respective competence modes. 
 
 
Still in the context of the competence-based approach, Sanchez and Heene 
(2002) and Sanchez (2004) highlighted the importance of using an adaptive open 
system – a system that promotes strategic options of how competences are built or 
can be changed within an organization. It also results in a form of flexibility that 
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allows an organization to respond to the changing opportunities and threats in its 
environment. As we shall see later in the discussion of the empirical case studies, 
long-lived firms seem to exhibit such characteristic of an adaptive open system 
through their dynamic adaptability.  
Similarly, Thompson (1967) pointed out that a truly open- or natural-system 
model does not take the environment as given, and does not assume a completely 
known or controllable internal structure. Instead, organizations are loosely coupled 
systems and thus it is possible for them to change at the level of specific activities 
or components. Sometimes organizations merely react to environmental selection, 
whereas in other instances organizational members are active in managerial 
intentionality with the purpose of challenging the environment and perhaps even 
reshaping it.  This is the key notion of coevolution which is defined as “the joint 
outcome of managerial intentionality, environment, and institutional effects” 
(Lewin & Volberda, 1999, p. 526). 
Altogether, long-lived firms need not only possess competences as defined 
by Sanchez et al. (1996). To understand these firms, we suggest extending the 
definition of competence as a result of a distinctive kind of organizational 
flexibility to respond to changing and diverse environmental conditions, such as 
evolving market demands, technological change and competitive developments in 
an industry. The extended definition also has to address how collective action on 
the part of the firms molded the social and institutional environment in which firms 
operate (Murmann, 2003). The interaction between managerial intentionality and 
environmental selection as depicted in Table 3.2 in combination with the definition 
of competence introduced by Sanchez et al. (1996: 8); inspires us to coin the 
construct of coevolutionary competence defined as: the ability to sustain the 
coordinated deployment of assets aimed at achieving a firm’s goals by coevolving 
with the environment. In a sense, a coevolutionary competence enables sustained 
strategic renewal i.e. longevity. Figure 3.2 depicts a coevolutionary competence 
framework. 
Coevolutionary competence includes the ability to respond to the dynamic 
nature of an organization’s external environment and of its own internal processes. 
Firms must carefully manage their activities that collectively contribute to 
achieving organizational competence, interactions of different kinds and levels of 
these activities that are critical to the process of competence building (exploration) 
and leveraging (exploitation). To achieve this, they can use various organizational 
means, among others strategic architecture, concepts, tools, techniques and models 
a firm uses in combining resources and capabilities to build and leverage 
organizational competences  (Hamel & Heene, 1994). Accordingly with respect to 
these arguments, we suggest that firms developing coevolutionary competence use 
the joint impact of both managerial intentionality and environmental selection on 
their competence modes to implement the three key principles of self renewal 
(Volberda & Lewin, 2003). 
 
62
46 Chapter 3 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The coevolutionary competence framework 
Developing a coevolutionary competence enables a firm to continuously 
balance the adequate strength of each competence mode. This ability is of 
paramount importance since as suggested by Sanchez (2004, p.528) any 
competence mode whose flexibility is not actually used is likely to diminish over 
time to a level that can cause a potential bottleneck. This bottleneck may limit the 
overall competence of the organization. To illustrate this bottleneck effect, we 
recaptured one figure from Sanchez (2004: 529 - Figure 2(b)) in Figure 3.3 below.  
 
Figure 3.3: Competence profile with “bottleneck” in competences modes I and II 
Source: based on Sanchez (2004, Fig. 2(b), p.529) 
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As depicted in Figure 3.3, firms having cognitive inflexibility at the top 
managerial level in competence modes I and II are confronted with bottlenecks that 
constrain the firm's overall potential for creating value. We assume, therefore, that 
in long-lived firms, due to the joint impact of both managerial intentionality and 
environmental selection on the competence modes, they are likely to be able to 
overcome such bottlenecks limiting their overall competence. This suggests that 
firms developing coevolutionary competence are able to decrease bottlenecks in 
organizational flexibility in their competence modes. 
 
 
3.4 Illustrating Coevolutionary Competence: How Two 
Long-Lived Firms Strategically Renew Themselves 
We conducted two case studies of The Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) and Royal 
Ten Cate (RTC) to exemplify how long-lived firms develop and deploy a 
coevolutionary competence as part of their life-sustaining and sustained strategic 
renewal strategy. Among the long-lived firms mentioned in the introductory part of 
this chapter, we eventually selected these two companies as our case study since 
they epitomize the long-lived firms that have confronted fundamental changes 
throughout their lifetime, such as regulatory changes or technological changes. In 
dealing with such changes, they are confronted with the two aspects of 
coevolution: managerial intentionality and environmental selection (refer back to 
Table 3.2). Nevertheless, the experience of both companies is not impeccable. 
Obviously, there were frictions between environmental selection forces and the 
firms’ adaptation, but management took the lessons and reshaped their firms to 
refit with the dynamic changes in their environments.  
 
Case Study Method 
The case study method has been selected because in this chapter, we do not test 
existing theories and want to highlight the process dimension and the multi-
directional causalities. This research approach aims at preserving the chronological 
flow to see which historical events are likely to lead to which consequences. By 
doing so, we illustrate how coevolutionary competence may contribute to new 
integrations beyond the initial conceptions. The two case studies of HBC and RTC 
have resulted from our study of the longitudinal historical data of the two 
companies ranging from 1800 to 2000 (Kwee, 2004). Both companies were 
established before the year 1800. However, we considered the wide range of the 
period (1800-2000) as substantial enough for our early attempt to retrieve the long 
list of historical data that is either unavailable or incomplete during some of the 
periods. To start with, we briefly present the company profile of HBC and RTC as 
shown in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3: Brief company profiles of HBC and RTC 
Company 
Year of 
Origin 
Brief Profile 
The Hudson’s Bay 
Company (HBC) – 
www.hbc.com 
1670 Founded in 1670 as a fur trading company, HBC is Canada’s 
oldest corporation. Today, it is also Canada's largest department 
store retailer. The Company provides Canadians with the widest 
selection of goods and services available through numerous 
retail channels including more than 500 stores led by the Bay 
and Zellers chains. Hudson's Bay Company is Canada's fifth 
largest employer with 70,000 associates and has operations in 
every province in Canada. Its 2003 annual revenue was USD 
4,830.5 million. 
Royal Ten Cate 
(RTC) – 
www.tencate.com 
1704 The earliest written announcements concerning the activities of 
Royal Ten Cate date from 1704 as one of the Dutch textile 
producers. Today, Ten Cate is active in two sectors: Technical 
Textiles and Technical Components. Operating in 15 countries 
and four continents, the company creates textiles and materials 
that people use for a wide range of purposes, from strong and 
light aerospace materials to antiballistic fabrics and flame-
retardant fabric coatings. The company also manufactures 
textiles and other materials used in civil engineering, agriculture, 
fashion, and artificial turf. As of the fiscal year which ended in 
December 2002, the company had around 3,278 employees and 
USD 631.1 million of annual sales.  
 
At first, the historical data was mainly collected from the archive section of 
the company’s website. For a cross-check and verification purpose, this is then 
followed by a contact with the archive departments at HBC and RTC. Our contact 
persons at the archive departments at both HBC and RTC then read and verified 
the existing data as well as provided us with additional historical data. The 
subsequent analyses are thus based on the historical case studies, guided by the 
five competence modes.  
 
Strategic Renewal of The Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) 
The Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) states explicitly in its Corporate Statement 
that it exists to provide Canadians with the widest selection of goods and services. 
HBC, which just celebrated its 338th anniversary on May 2, 2008, has been a name 
Canadians can trust. It has a unique position in the country and a unique 
relationship with its customers. It is committed to building that relationship and 
earning that trust every day.  Figure 3.4 below presents the company’s timeline. 
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Figure 3.4: HBC’s company time line  
Note: Italic fonts: firm-specific historical events; regular fonts: global historical events 
 
Early Years 
For many centuries since its incorporation on May 2, 1670, the Hudson’s Bay 
Company (HBC) enjoyed the stability of its monopoly. With the fur trading going 
well and its monopoly secured, HBC had settled into somewhat complacent daily 
routines – trapping, shipping and selling (its core competence at that time) – it no 
longer had ambitions in the field of exploration. This complacency caused the 
company to become less sensible to business signals from the environment in its 
early years (Competence trap). The company could not, for instance, take 
cognizance of the threat of other parties who were not satisfied with its privilege of 
the Royal Charter and could not adopt a good approach of negotiation and 
compromise. This situation continued until the company was forced to change by 
the Deed of Surrender in 1870 where it had to transfer much of its lands back to the 
Crown. HBC was forced to make the transition from being “absolute Lords” with 
exclusive trading rights to merchants in a newly opened pioneer land. The Deed of 
Surrender opened the company’s eyes to the many new opportunities that it could 
exploit, such as the increasing demands from the Canadian settlers that opened up 
many channels to supply and deliver goods to them. Being able to learn from this 
situation, HBC took the appropriate action to fulfill this new demand. 
 
The 1800s 
The company’s situation in the 1800s was changing since there was an emerging 
need to cooperate with external parties. One example is the union of HBC and the 
North West Company (previously HBC’s most vigorous competitor), which later 
resulted in a merger in 1821. This union brought about a stronger and more 
complete Hudson’s Bay Company with the additional valuable resources from the 
North West Company: its traders and voyageurs. 
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In the 1840s, a series of problems foreshadowed the beginning of the end for 
the HBC Charter. Despite being under the attack of pressures and protests, the 
company still showed its willingness to cooperate with the British Parliament for 
the review of its Charter that began in May of 1859. This situation persisted until 
the Deed of Surrender in 1870. 
Immediately after the Deed of Surrender, the Hudson’s Bay Company 
established a Land Department to sell its land holdings to settlers, farmers, and 
developers. This is an indication of the company’s willingness and ability to start 
building its network of cooperative relationships and further co-evolve with these 
stakeholders (cf. Sanchez, 2004) in the changing circumstances of Canadian 
inlands at that time. From the 1870s period onwards, HBC collaborated with 
Canadian Pacific Railway to build better delivery nodes to reach its customers in a 
step towards the realization of its ambition to be a closely-linked, stable 
commercial enterprise. This gradually caused HBC to begin to evolve into its 
present form as a consumer retailer. This started with the company’s emergence 
into the early telecommunication business, as when over two million people settled 
to the west of the Great Lakes, Canada used the telegraph wires provided by HBC 
and the famous Canadian Pacific Railway. This strategic movement stretched 
HBC’s way across the country through the former rich fur-trading lands of the 
company. Furthermore, the described changing signals also made it realize that it 
needed to expand its interests to meet the demands of a new breed of customer – 
the settler. It then began a wholesale department along with a large chain of HBC 
retail stores that became an important part of the daily lives of the settlers in the 
Canadian west.  
 
The 1900s onwards 
With the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the Hudson’s Bay Company was called 
upon to engage in the most important duties in its history. This call made the 
company adjust its business models to become a vast system of steamship services 
for the transportation of food and munitions to France and later Russia.  
When the War ended in 1918, HBC resumed its plans and actions 
exceptionally well in establishing a network of cooperative relationships. Some 
evidence: in 1925, HBC opened the great fur trade headquarters and auction house 
named Beaver House in London England; it opened wholesale offices in Paris and 
New York and accordingly built more supply chain partners; in 1927 the HBC 
collaborated with Continental Oil to investigate the very profitable business of oil 
exploration, via shared and received intelligence. 
In the 1940s, HBC’s adaptability decreased. This was mainly because of the 
inability of the company to sense the changing environment of the Depression in 
the 1930s and hence it decided not to be too aggressive as in the previous benign 
period. The outbreak of the Second World War, however, did not influence the 
company as much as in the first war as it had gained experience from the previous 
war. After the war ended and the situation was restored to normal, HBC continued 
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to undergo major changes. The evidence showed, for instance, that it exploited its 
experience in interpreting the demand for fur outside Canada and consequently 
formulated its strategy to open the Company’s auction houses in Montreal, New 
York and London. The auction houses enabled the large quantities of furs, which 
were collected by the Fur Department, to be sold on consignment. 
The jarring recession of 1981 derailed the company’s ability to reinvent its 
business model as required by the signal of change it received. Nevertheless, the 
company was able to recover from the recession. Since then, it has managed to 
build a strong supply chain with its partners to support its largest department store 
retail chains and specialty stores. The other lesson the company kept in mind is not 
to be too aggressive in expansion as it could be both costly and risky. In the twenty 
first century, HBC is a thriving company, as it was back in the seventeenth century. 
 
HBC’s Strategic Renewal Trajectory: Interactive Forces of Managerial 
Intentionality and Environmental Selection 
Reflecting on the chronological history of HBC, we summarize the strategic 
renewal trajectory of HBC in terms of the company’s coevolutionary competence 
as the dual role of managerial intentionality and environmental selection as 
presented in Figure 3.5. The diagram in the figure shows how HBC has developed 
its coevolutionary competence over time as a joint outcome of intentional 
adaptation directed by its management and environmental selection.  
 
Figure 3.5: HBC’s strategic renewal trajectory snapshot 
 
 
In the early 1800s, for instance, when the company was still operating under 
the Royal Charter, through the initiative of its management, HBC made a 
significant decision to merge with its strongest competitor – the North West 
Company – in 1821. This was then followed by the managerial movement to 
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cooperate with the British Parliament to review its Royal Charter which led to the 
Deed of Surrender in 1870. Soon afterwards, HBC’s top management collaborated 
with the Canadian Pacific Railway to explore the big potential demand of the new 
inhabitants in the Canadian inland and this signifies its first managerial movement 
after the company gave up its Royal Charter. In realizing this initiative, however, 
the company experienced a bottleneck effect at the operating flexibility level 
(please refer to Figure 3.6) in using its resources to cater for the new demand.  
 
 
Figure 3.6: Bottleneck in the operating flexibility level during the HBC’s management 
initiative in exploring new market through the collaboration with the Canadian Pacific 
Railway in the 1870s 
 
 
Nevertheless, the company’s management eventually managed to solve this 
bottleneck issue through the gradual improvement it made due to its experiential 
learning throughout the partnership periods with the Canadian Pacific Railway. 
This brings us back to one of the essential feature of coevolutionary competence 
that a firm developing the coevolutionary competence realizes the importance of 
balancing each competence mode over time to decrease the bottleneck effects 
when dealing with changes in the environment. 
In the 1900s, HBC managed to navigate through the ebb and flow of 
external selection forces related to the First and Second World Wars, the Economic 
Depression in 1930s, and the Jarring recession in 1981 through the strategic 
directions of its management such as the collaboration with Continental Oil in 
1927, exploring fur markets outside Canada by opening auction houses in the 
1950s that further led to the company’s transformation into a retail chain 
nowadays. Such success, however, was not easily achieved. If we take a closer 
look at HBC’s renewal trajectory by zooming in on the joint outcomes of 
managerial intentionality and environmental selection from 1930 to 2000 as 
depicted in  Figure 3.7, we can notice that the crises happened when HBC did not 
perform well in balancing its managerial intentionality with the environmental 
forces. The scales in Figure 3.7 are based on the five competence modes. As 
depicted in Figure 3.2 previously, due to the nature of the first competence mode, 
the impact of managerial intentionality is increases from the competence mode 5 
(low) to 1 (high). On the contrary, the impact of environmental selection increases 
from competence mode 1 (low) to 5 (high). 
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 Figure 3.7: Zooming-in on HBC’s renewal trajectory (1930-2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For instance, during the Economic Depression in the 1930s and the Jarring 
recession in the 1980s when the environment became disruptive, HBC encountered 
turbulences that were difficult to counterbalance with its strategies. By almost the 
same token, during the 1970s HBC was in a vulnerable situation where it was too 
aggressive in its strategic acquisitions that exacerbated the crisis of 1981. 
Noticeable is that other than the crises and vulnerable periods, i.e. when HBC 
managed to balance its managerial intentionality with environmental forces, it 
experienced positive changes and growth. From the 1990s onwards, for instance, 
HBC continued to strategically establish strong supply chains with its partners and 
the efforts seem to have paid off as HBC nowadays has become one of the largest 
retail chains in Canada. 
 
70
54 Chapter 3 
 
 
 
In conclusion, our analysis indicates that during significant changes 
bottlenecks (Sanchez, 2004) occurred in HBC’s competence modes when the firm 
was not able to streamline the strategic initiatives at each level of the competence 
mode. Balancing the level of flow at each competence mode is of importance in 
helping the company to sustain its survival and its renewal trajectory. Moreover, 
when the environmental changes became disruptive there were periods when 
HBC’s management restrained its intentionality or, when the level of its 
managerial intentionality was too aggressive in times of less turbulent 
environment, the company were in a critical or vulnerable situation. This situation 
suggests that it is essential that the company balance its managerial intentionality 
with environmental selection over time. 
Strategic Renewal of Royal Ten Cate (RTC) 
In its Corporate Statement, Royal Ten Cate states that it seeks to achieve 
international leadership in niche markets on the basis of technological commitment 
and innovative capacity. The company focuses on materials with functional 
characteristics in the field of safety and protection (people and the environment), 
durability and specific technological and/or quality features. It values its 
employees by investing in their development potential for the transfer of expert 
knowledge (Kwee, 2004). The company timeline is presented in Figure 3.8. 
Figure 3.8: RTC’s company timeline  
Note: Italic fonts: firm-specific historical events; regular fonts: global historical events 
 
 
Early Years 
The historical archive of RTC in the early years is incomplete. Thus, the 
explanation of the company’s experience during its early years is very limited. 
However, it is indicated that the company started with a small steam weaving mill 
with a trial-and-error method, do-first-and-see-what-will-happen approach. This 
helped it learn to become stronger as it moved forward. 
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The 1800s 
The period of 1800-1820 was still an explorative period for RTC in which it was 
only a commercial agent in the linen industry. At that time, the company was 
uncertain of the boundaries of its existence and even its raison d'être.  It kept 
trying and using the traditional and conventional methods of the textile business 
without having a clear long-term vision. The operation was more or less static – it 
purchased yarns, distributed them among peasants (who processed them at home) 
and then sold the linen fabrics both at home and abroad. Such a pattern of 
repetitive actions suggests that the company simply presumed that its business 
environment was more or less static. During this period, the company’s 
cooperative relationships were limited only to the peasants, a few trading partners, 
and the local authority such as the Provincial Council of Overijssel. This network 
was a narrow one with no commitment to sharing knowledge. Thus, being in the 
routine daily operation, the company was not very keen on learning. 
The period after 1830 was the beginning of change for RTC. In 1834, it was 
named H. ten Cate Hzn. & Co and in 1841 the firm switched to industrial textile 
production. During this early development, the company learned a lot (from the 
past) about weaving mills and further started up the Holland Steam Weaving Mill 
in 1860 (took effective actions based on past lessons).  
The period 1840-1860 was a period of increasing sensibility at RTC. 
Specifically in 1841, the firm was able to receive a signal regarding the potential 
need for industrial textiles with the advancement of weaving equipment at that 
time. Based on this signal, the firm switched to industrial textile production when it 
took over the almost bankrupt weaving mill of J.P. Lorey. Beginning around the 
1850s, RTC became more cooperative with other stakeholders. The company 
joined forces with Twente entrepreneurs to eliminate the disadvantages of their 
region’s geological barriers to trade and expansion. Together they contributed 
money for building canals (1855) and a rail network (1866) in their region.  The 
company also joined the lobbying forces in the NV Twentsche Stoombleekerij 
(Tweente Steam Bleaching Works) in Goor (1857) to cut out the bleaching plants 
in Haarlem. Eventually, these partnerships did not continue and were not very 
relevant for its next phase of development.  
The first mechanical weaving mill was set up in 1852 and RTC (at that time, 
its name was H. ten Cate Hzn. & Co.) was conferred with the designation of 
‘Royal’. With this progress, it had a stronger resolve to forge ahead. This was then 
followed by the creation of Koninklijke Stoomweverij (KSW) or Royal Steam 
Weaving Mill in Nijverdal in 1872. Later on, the industrial textile initiative was 
expanded into the Holland Steam Weaving Mill (with about 160 power looms) the 
building of which had begun earlier. In 1891, the Tubantia Weaving Mill was 
opened and in 1898, the Java Weaving Mill was taken over.  
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The 1900s onwards 
In 1912, when the Indië (East Indies) complex was started up, the company was 
adapted to the industrial textile environment in Almelo which was indicated by its 
opening of the Tubantia Weaving Mill and Java Weaving Mill.  However, in the 
period after 1910 to the second half of the 20th century (1950s), the decline of the 
Dutch textile industry went unnoticed by RTC. At this time, markets became more 
demanding and a number of formidable competitors appeared on the scene. Cut-
throat competition grew both at home and abroad, mainly as a result of 
international supply capacity.  There was also the need to increase work 
productivity by means of ongoing automation and to conquer new markets. Due to 
being less sensitive, RTC suffered as a result. In the 1950s, RTC became less 
adaptable because it could not learn from the changing environment of tougher 
competition. The company was not fast enough to adopt ongoing automation to 
increase its work productivity and conquer new markets.  
Fortunately, at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the 
company was able to create a new perspective through the extensive restructuring 
of its industry. RTC made a timely switch-over to other technologies, raw 
materials and applications which enabled it to manage the entry to new markets. 
Moreover, prior to that, RTC demonstrated a fairly new ability to benefit from 
interdependencies in the 1950s when its partnerships with KSW became stronger 
which further led to the merger in 1957. At that time, the businesses of both KSW 
(Koninklijke Stoomweverij) and H. ten Cate Hzn. & Co. resembled each other, in 
both production processes and products. Therefore, their paths kept crossing. The 
co-evolution at this stage was not yet fully apparent since it had just begun. 
In 1977, the divisional structure was introduced and later even transformed 
to a decentralized group structure in 1990. Although the company continued to 
face a turbulent period in the industrial textile business environment, through 
ongoing internationalization and differentiation, it grew in the 1980s and 1990s 
into an industrial company in technical textiles and technical components. One of 
its technical components named Bryte materials was later used in NASA’s satellite 
for the Beagle II and the Mars Exploration Rover missions.  
 
RTC’s Strategic Renewal Trajectory: Interactive Forces of Managerial 
Intentionality and Environmental Selection 
Likewise the previous summary of HBC’s strategic renewal trajectory,  illustrates 
the strategic renewal trajectory of RTC as a result of both managerial intentionality 
and environmental selection which shows the development of its coevolutionary 
competence.  
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Figure 3.9: RTC’s strategic renewal trajectory snapshot 
As we can see in the diagram, when RTC was still operating under the 
traditional environment of the Dutch steam weaving mills industry in the early 
1800s, to a large extent its management took the initiative to experiment with 
various conventional methods of textile production. The workers became very 
skillful and could produce textiles in an efficient way. The management, however, 
faced the limitation and continued to perceive strategic opportunities to create new 
product offers as the company was operating in a relatively stable and even 
stagnant environment. As a result, the bottleneck occurred at the top management 
level in terms of the cognitive flexibility to define strategic logics. Figure 3.10 
below illustrates this bottleneck effect.  
 
Figure 3.10: Bottleneck in the cognitive flexibility at the RTC’s top management level 
due to the Stagnancy of the Dutch Industrial Textile Growth during 1800s-1900s 
 
When the company underwent changes in the development of Dutch 
industrial textiles in the 1800s to 1900s, RTC subsequently took strategic action to 
switch to industrial textile production and establish three weaving mills – the 
Holland Steam Weaving Mill, the Tubantia Weaving Mill, and the Java Weaving 
Mill. This is an indication of the timely adaptation of RTC to the changing 
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circumstances in the Dutch textile business and the potential textile demand when 
the Indie complex was opened. Simultaneously, such strategic adaptation also 
enabled the company to tackle the previous bottleneck effect and thus managed to 
move the company to the next stage of development. 
Starting from 1910, the Dutch textile industry experienced declining growth 
and turbulent competitive environment. By zooming in on the period 1910 to 1990 
(as shown in Figure 3.11), we can see that RTC started experiencing difficulties at 
the end of the 1910s as the environment became harsh. The situation worsened 
when it could not increase the level of its managerial intentionality. This led to a 
crisis from 1930s until the end of 1950s. Starting at the end of the 1960s the 
company managed to counterbalance the environmental forces with its strategic 
actions. Among other reasons through its management initiative, RTC merged with 
KSW, adopted new technologies to extend its competence to the manufacturing of 
technical textiles and technical components. This reiterates the importance of a 
firm to dynamically balance its managerial intentionality with environmental 
forces to its sustained strategic renewal. 
 
Figure 3.11: Zooming-in on RTC’s renewal trajectory (1910-1990) 
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To sum up, the abovementioned analysis leads to the conclusion that like 
HBC, RTC also encountered a period when bottlenecks (Sanchez, 2004) occurred 
in its competence mode flows, i.e. during the stagnancy of the Dutch industrial 
textile growth. The difference here is that RTC experienced the bottleneck in the 
cognitive flexibility (i.e. competence mode 1) rather than operating flexibility (i.e. 
competence mode 5) as in HBC’s case. The experience of RTC afterwards 
reiterates that streamlining the flow at each competence mode is crucial for the 
firm’s strategic renewal. In comparison to HBC, whose environmental turbulence 
is more varied across periods, RTC was in a relatively constant turbulent 
environment during the 1900s. Due to the slow adjustment of its level of 
managerial intentionality with the level of environmental selection, RTC 
experienced critical situations during longer periods (Figure 3.11: 1920s-1960s) 
than HBC. However, when the company managed to match the level of 
environmental selection, it emerged to move to the new renewal stage. 
 
 
 
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The idiosyncrasy of long-lived firms lies in their puzzling ability to strategically 
renew themselves over time. Conjoining the three key principles of self-renewal 
from the coevolutionary framework (Lewin and Volberda, 2003) and the five 
competence modes in the competence-based management framework (Sanchez et 
al., 1996; Sanchez & Heene, 2002; Sanchez, 2004), this chapter contributes to a 
more encompassing perspective on corporate longevity that takes into account both 
internal and external aspects of long-lived organizations and how these 
organizations cope with the forces in their environments.   
Focusing on the competence of long-lived firms, we coin the construct of 
coevolutionary competence in this chapter. We define this construct as ‘the ability 
to sustain the coordinated deployment of assets aimed at achieving a firm’s goals 
by coevolving with the environment.’ Based on a coevolutionary framework 
(Figure 3.2), we propounded two major themes. The first one deals with the 
importance of the interaction between managerial intentionality and environmental 
selection for firms to develop coevolutionary competence in the implementation of 
the key principles of self-renewal. Second, we also suggest that firms developing 
coevolutionary competence are able to decrease bottlenecks in the organizational 
flexibility of their competence modes.   
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To illustrate the coevolutionary competence construct, we employed two 
longitudinal case studies: The Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) and Royal Ten Cate 
(RTC) in the period 1800-2000. Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.9 illustrate how both 
companies have developed their coevolutionary competence through the interactive 
forces of managerial intentionality and environmental selection. In investigating 
and illustrating bottlenecks in organizational competence of both firms, Figure 3.6 
and Figure 3.10 show, for example, that when HBC encountered a bottleneck 
regarding its operating flexibility in the 1870s or when RTC encountered a 
bottleneck regarding its cognitive flexibility during the 1800s-1900s, both 
companies managed to solve the bottleneck problems by re-balancing each 
competence mode over time.  
In this chapter, we have also looked at the five competence modes 
introduced by Sanchez & Heene (2002) and Sanchez (2004) from the 
coevolutionary perspective (Lewin & Volberda, 1999). The levels of analysis, 
however, can take place beyond the firm-level analysis as demonstrated by what 
we have done in this chapter. While this chapter presents two longitudinal case 
studies, we have not fully addressed the influence of the institutional environment 
or other macro-level environmental forces. This requires research examining the 
macro environmental influences on the coevolutionary competence of long-lived 
firms (cf. Flier et al., 2003). We will incorporate the analysis of environmental 
dynamism in chapter eight when we investigate the first key principle, i.e 
managing the internal rate of change to match or exceed the external rate of 
change. 
In sum, we have demonstrated that the construct of coevolutionary 
competence can be useful for investigating sustained strategic renewal of long-
lived firms. The longitudinal illustration of the two long-lived firms (HBC and 
RTC) posits that firms that continually renew themselves have a better chance to 
last for a long time. What is more, coevolutionary competence empowers firms to 
undergo significant internal long-term transformations. As a result, long-lasting 
firms stay vital by resisting decay. Coevolutionary competence raises the 
awareness of management to focus on the three principles of self-renewal. This is 
because the construct suggests that firms developing coevolutionary competence 
use the joint impact of both managerial intentionality and environmental selection 
on their competence modes to implement the three key principles. To achieve this, 
firms need to focus on managing requisite variety by regulating internal rates of 
change to equal or exceed relevant external rates of change. This will be discussed 
in Chapter 8. Furthermore, firms should constantly strive to optimize self-
organizing. Chapter 9 will investigate the self-organization construct. Finally, 
coevolutionary competence also means that firms are required to manage the 
tension between innovation (exploration) and adaptation (exploitation) through a 
dynamic adaptation to the changing environments, i.e. maintaining a balance 
between both. We will investigate this in Chapter 10. Lacking managerial 
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intentionality to cope with such challenges will result in not being able to coevolve 
with the environment. Obviously, these challenges are not easy. 
To conclude, in this chapter we have addressed the first research question of 
how firms develop their competences to strategically renew themselves over time 
by illustrating the coevolutionary competences in the two long-lived firms. In the 
next chapter, we explore the three key principles of self-renewing organizations 
from an adaptation perspective. In this case, we focus in more depth on the 
organizational learning perspective to understand how large incumbent firms learn 
and adapt over time through learning stages and processes within the context of 
changing knowledge environments. 
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4. Exploring Three Key Principles 
from an Adaptation Perspective∗)  
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, we have explored the three key principles of self-renewing 
organizations from a coevolutionary perspective. In this chapter, we further explore 
the three key principles by focusing in more depth on an adaptation perspective, 
i.e. through the organizational learning perspective. By the same token, we also 
address the second research question in this PhD research of how firms learn and 
adapt in the context of changing knowledge environment. We start with a brief 
discussion of the prior research on organizational learning. 
The diverse theories of organizational learning (e.g. Cyert & March, 1963; 
Duncan, 1974; Argyris & Schön, 1978; Jelinek, 1979; Miles & Snow, 1978; 
Shrivastava, 1983) demonstrate that learning has been an extant concept. As 
pointed out by Fiol and Lyles (1985), no theory or model of organizational 
learning has widespread acceptance. The subject is studied from different 
perspectives, leading to more divergence and confusion. Apparently, several 
constructs such as distinctive competence (Selznick, 1957), organizational routines 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982), absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Van den 
Bosch et al., 1999; Jansen et al., 2005), architectural knowledge (Henderson & 
Clark, 1990), combinative capabilities (Kogut & Zander, 1992), dynamic 
capabilities (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 2000; Jansen et al., 2009), competence-
based management (Sanchez et al., 1996), and coevolutionary competence (Kwee 
et al., 2008) are among others introduced in this related line of research.  
Furthermore, scholars’ examination of organizational learning literature 
shows that this research landscape is “sparsely populated” (Huber, 1991, p. 107), 
“fragmented and multidisciplinary” (Shrivastava, 1983, p. 9) and has not led to 
“research-based guidelines for increasing the effectiveness of organizational 
learning” (Huber, 1991, p. 108). The prior review of Levitt and March (1988, p. 
327) also adds that “relatively little is known about the details by which 
organizational experience is accumulated into a structure of routines”. 
 
                                                 
∗) This chapter is based on Kwee, Z., Van den Bosch, F.A.J., and Volberda, H.W. (2006). 
‘Conceptualizing learning principles of long-lived firms’. Paper presented at the 2006 Academy of 
Management Conference. 
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Despite the various approaches in studying organizational learning and 
adaptation, the results of the foregoing studies indicate that organizational learning 
is, to a large extent, vital to the long-term survival of firms particularly in the 
emerging and turbulent knowledge-intensive environments. Quite paradoxically 
though, Levinthal (1991) pointed out that only a small number of possible 
exemplars of research linking models of organizational learning with ecological 
analysis of organizational survival have been discussed. This issue indeed merits 
thorough investigation as the research on firm survival or corporate longevity has 
also increasingly drawn scholars’ attention to the quest for understanding how 
long-lived firms have managed to sustain renewing themselves over time (e.g. 
Meyer & Zucker, 1989; Hall, 1997; Collins & Porras, 1999; De Geus, 1999; 
Huygens et al., 2001; Kwee, 2004; Stadler, 2007; Burgelman & Grove, 2007; 
Kwee et al., 2008).  
This chapter attempts to address and mitigate the two abovementioned 
underexplored area in research on organizational learning resulting in two main 
contributions. First, we provide a more comprehensive understanding of learning 
processes and stages. In this respect, we attempt to address the issue of how an 
organization can become adaptive through all the connected learning behaviours 
and activities that it professes with respect to its environment (Fiol and Lyles, 
1985; Huber, 1991). Second, building on this line of thought, we develop a 
framework that incorporates the contexts of knowledge environment and the types 
of action learning. By doing this, we focus on an adequate repertoire of learning 
that may provide a clearer linkage between organizational learning and 
organizational longevity.  
This chapter is structured as follows. We start the first section with the 
purpose to clarify the issues of definitions by providing sound definitions of 
organizational learning and organizational longevity particularly since we refer to 
long-lived firms in this study. Chapter 4.3 captures the key contextual factors of 
time and environments as the interfaces between organizational learning and 
organizational longevity. In Chapter 4.4, we expound theories of organizational 
learning and the related notions of absorptive capacity, dynamic capabilities, 
competence-based management and coevolution. This is followed by a study of 
stages of organizational learning processes in Chapter 4.5. Subsequently, Chapter 
4.6 discusses how firms learn and adapt over time considering the types of 
knowledge environment and action learning. Finally, we conclude this chapter by 
summarizing key findings and indicating possible directions for further study. 
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4.2 Organizational Learning Re-defined 
Organizational scholars (e.g. Pfeffer, 1982; Mohr, 1982) view learning as holding a 
great theoretical promise in the organization science. They also hold the same 
assumptions that learning will improve future performance (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). 
By then, numerous definitions of organizational learning have been put forward in 
foregoing studies. For instance, Duncan and Weiss (1978, p. 84) define 
organizational learning as “the process within the organization by which 
knowledge about action-outcome relationships and the effects of the environment 
on these relationships is developed.” Likewise, Fiol and Lyles (1985, p. 803) 
suggest that organizational learning means “the process of improving actions 
through better knowledge and understanding”. 
In an attempt to moderate the diverse definitions of organizational learning, 
which are too a large extent analogous, we propose the following definition of 
organizational learning: the process by which an organization takes into account 
environmental and its internal conditions to abstract, create, and develop 
knowledge and subsequently assimilate, implement, evaluate, and reconfigure the 
knowledge based on the action-outcome relationships.   
The notion of knowledge is profound in the definitions of organizational 
learning. Organizations accumulate knowledge by learning from their members, 
their customers, their suppliers and business partners, and even in some cases from 
their competitors (March, 1991) which, to re-emphasize, demonstrates a process. 
The accumulated knowledge is stored as organizational sources/stocks of 
knowledge in the format of procedures, norms, rules, and forms. 
 
4.3 Temporal and Environmental Contexts of 
Organizational Learning and Adaptation 
Explaining both organizational learning and longevity demands a dynamic 
perspective to study how a firm learns and develops over time to adapt to the 
environment (cf. Lewin & Volberda, 1999). The content of learning is profoundly 
connected to the timing and environmental conditions when and in which it is 
learned. Therefore, time and environments are inseparably linked as two contextual 
factors that are also essential for understanding organizational longevity across 
different historical periods and different social and physical environments. 
Temporal Context 
Penrose (1959) points out that “history matters”; growth is essentially an 
evolutionary process and based on the cumulative growth of collective knowledge, 
in the context of a purposive firm. Over time, firms age. Organizational age 
represents, on the one hand, accumulated stocks of knowledge and experience 
(Aldrich, 1999) and on the other hand, the increased organizational inertia (Hannan 
& Freeman, 1977; 1984; 1989). Inertia is a two-edged sword: (1) it is a prerequisite 
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for intelligent adaptation (Holland, 1975); and (2) it is a potential causality of firm 
rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). In short, the temporal dimension implies long-
lived firms are experienced but are also exposed to challenges of overcoming 
inertia and sustaining renewal.  
To sustain renewal and increase the likelihood of survival, learning plays a 
crucial role. This assertion, according to Levinthal (1991), may stem from two 
basic properties of organizational learning. First, learning is typically reflected in 
the enhancement of an organization’s competence at its current activities and in the 
accumulation of skills and knowledge (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). Over time, greater competence and knowledge should lead to a 
lower risk of mortality. Second, learning reduces variation in performance and 
increases a firm’s reliability. Reliability, in turn, forms the basis of continuity in an 
organization’s behavior over time (Nelson & Winter, 1982). This is also the basis 
of Hannan and Freeman’s (1984, 1989) argument for the declining of 
organizational mortality with age due to the increasing reliability of organizational 
behavior over time.  
The significance of time is also emphasized by Romanelli and Tushman 
(1986) in which they argue that if past organizational strategies have bearing on the 
present, the logical place to begin an investigation of the determinants of strategic 
change is the earliest phase of an organization’s existence: its founding. The 
problem here is to map the past experience of long-lived firms into actions 
appropriate to the novel present. Organizational learning studies focus on this 
mapping process and provide structure insight into how a sequential stream of 
experience becomes the basis for action (Cohen & Sproull, 1991).  
Environmental Context 
Besides the temporal context, the sources of learning and longevity also lie on the 
interface between organizations and their environments. The amount of 
environmental change experienced by a firm, which is roughly coincided with its 
age, enhances the firm’s learning experience (Caroll, 1983). Furthermore, to the 
extent that environmental changes are temporal, the age of a firm offers some 
indication of the amount of environmental variation it may have experienced 
(Boeker, 1989). Learning occurs in relation to the structuring resources of local 
conditions (Lave, 1988). Exogenous environmental change makes adaptation 
essential, but it also makes learning from experience difficult (Weick, 1979). 
Again, time is the challenge here: in particular the challenge to conjecture the right 
timing of changes in environmental characteristics like uncertainty, munificence, 
and concomitant changes (Boeker, 1989). To deal with this issue, learning tools 
such as environmental scenarios planning are introduced to create perception and 
differentiation and to see new environmental patterns (Van der Heijden, 1996). 
Equally important, environmental dynamics is one of the key determinants 
in understanding the idiosyncrasy of long-lived firms since a more comprehensive 
analysis than the analysis of internal organizational characteristics is required. The 
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metamorphosis of long-lived/ self-renewing firms brings not only a different firm 
context but also a different environmental context (cf. Penrose, 1959). Thus, 
environmental factors have to be embedded in the analysis to lend a dynamic 
perspective on the subject of how a particular firm develops over time through its 
capability to adapt to and to influence the environment, including the role played 
by managerial intentionality (Lewin & Volberda, 1999). 
 
4.4 Adaptation Perspective on Organizational Learning 
In the context of learning, organizations are repositories of knowledge and can be 
explained as communities of shared knowledge and identity (Grandori & Kogut, 
2002). A major rethinking of the sources of firm heterogeneity and 
competitiveness has also been endorsed based on the related theories of learning 
such as capabilities, competence, and knowledge (Coase, 1937). These 
characteristics are mentioned to make organizations become flexible and adaptive 
to changes (Volberda, 1998), even in turbulent conditions, and hence increase the 
likelihood of survival. Contemporaneously, mounting research on these integrated 
constructs of capabilities, competence and knowledge-related has proliferated, 
diverged at some issues and converged at other issues. Based on the review of the 
literature, we discuss three important theoretical constructs.   
 
Absorptive Capacity and Dynamic Capabilities 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) define absorptive capacity as the firm’s ability to 
recognize the value of new external knowledge, assimilate it and apply it to 
commercial ends. Since then, researchers (e.g. Van den Bosch et al., 1999, p. 551) 
have been intrigued by the question of “how does absorptive capacity influence the 
knowledge environment?” Building upon this question, the construct of absorptive 
capacity is later seen as a promising explanation of innovation (Jansen et al., 2005; 
Stock et al., 2001; Tsai, 2001), the exploration / exploitation trade-off (Lewin et 
al., 1999; March, 1991; Van den Bosch et al., 1999; Jansen et al., 2005; Mom et 
al., 2007), business performance (Lane et al., 2001; Tsai, 2001), intra-
organizational transfer of knowledge (Szulanski, 1996), and inter-organizational 
learning (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Moreover to survive selection pressures, firms 
need to develop and improve its absorptive capacity. Firms with higher levels of 
absorptive capacity tend to outperform other firms in that they are more proactive 
and exploit current opportunities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Van den Bosch et 
al., 1999).  
Following the growing interest in the research of absorptive capacity, a 
conceptual distinction has also been made between potential and realized 
absorptive capacity (Zahra & George, 2002; Jansen et al., 2005). Potential 
absorptive capacity, which includes “knowledge acquisition and assimilation, 
captures efforts expended in identifying and acquiring new external knowledge and 
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in assimilating knowledge obtained from external sources” (Zahra & George, 
2002, p. 189). Realized absorptive capacity, which includes “knowledge 
transformation and exploitation, encompasses deriving new insights and 
consequences from the combination of existing and newly acquired knowledge, 
and incorporating transformed knowledge into operations” (Zahra & George, 2002, 
p. 190). To sum, in their study of absorptive capacity, Van den Bosch et al. (2003) 
conclude that this construct, in both theory building and empirical research, is able 
to bridge and to enrich various related literatures, such as organizational learning 
and knowledge-based view of the firm.  
In addition to the construct of absorptive capacity, scholars such as Teece, 
Pisano and Shuen (1997) and Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), suggest that the 
mechanisms by which firms accumulate and dissipate new skills and capabilities 
are crucial for their survival and are also the source of competitive advantage. They 
further propose the construct of dynamic capabilities defined as the firm’s latent 
abilities to renew, augment, and adapt its core competence over time. This idea 
leads to the view that knowledge is the most strategically distinctive resource of 
the firm (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Grant, 1996). Sharing the same line of thought, 
Lewin and Volberda (1999) propound that variation in performance results from 
environmental changes and from the firm’s dynamic ability to adapt through 
learning (Lewin & Volberda, 1999). 
In an attempt to capture the richness and multidimensionality of the above 
concept, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) emphasized the importance of organizational 
mechanisms. These mechanisms may link dynamic capabilities with absorptive 
capacity (Jansen et al, 2005). Kogut and Zander (1992) proposed the construct of 
combinative capabilities which are path-dependent in their emergence and 
idiosyncratic in detail while simultaneously exhibit common features (Eisenhardt 
& Martin, 2000) that provides specific ways of dealing with dimensions of 
absorptive capacity. Jansen et al. (2005) discussed three types of combinative 
capabilities: (1) coordination capabilities; (2) system capabilities; and (3) 
socialization capabilities (cf. Van den Bosch et al., 1999, p. 556). Besides the 
absorptive capacity construct, the related construct of dynamic capability will be 
used in the subsequent analyses of this chapter. 
 
Competence in Sustained Strategic Renewal Context 
Senge (1990) and Hamel and Prahalad (1994) were among the first to define 
capability as a core competences of the learning organization. Competence is 
further defined by Sanchez, Heene and Thomas (1996, p. 8) as “the ability to 
sustain the coordinated deployment of assets in ways that help a firm achieve its 
goals”. They also introduce a competence-based management framework that aims 
to incorporate and integrate dynamic, systemic, cognitive, and holistic aspects of 
organizations through taxonomy of five competence modes (Sanchez & Heene, 
2002; Sanchez, 2004). The model of the firm, in this case, is regarded as an open 
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system distinguished by specific forms of flexibility to respond to the changing 
circumstances in the environment. Analogously, long-lived firms seem to exhibit 
such characteristic of an adaptive open system through their dynamic adaptability.  
Building on the competence-based management construct, Kwee, Van den 
Bosch, and Volberda (2005) coin the construct of coevolutionary competence 
defined as: the ability to sustain the coordinated deployment of assets aimed at 
achieving a firm’s goals by coevolving with the environment. They argue that 
coevolutionary competence enables sustained firm renewal or longevity. This 
construct matches the growing need in the field of strategy research that focuses on 
the tension between the internal processes by which firms in their competitive 
regimes of rapid change renew their capabilities and strategies and simultaneously 
have to adapt to meet the challenges for the future (e.g. Baden-Fuller & Stopford, 
1992; Teece et al., 1997; Volberda, 1998). March (1991) conceptualizes this 
tension as the exploration/ exploitation trade-off firms face. He associates 
exploration with search, variation, experimentation and innovation; whereas 
exploitation is associated with refinement, efficiency and application.  
Additionally, Levinthal & March (1993), Lewin et al. (1999), and March 
(1991) suggest that maintaining a balance of exploration and exploitation activities 
in a firm is a primary factor in its survival and prosperity.  The basic problem here 
is “how to engage in enough exploitation to insure the organization’s current 
viability and engage in enough exploration to insure its future viability” (Levinthal 
and March, 1993, p. 105). To address this issue, the theory of coevolution has been 
introduced to bridge the selection-adaptation or exploitation-exploration chasm 
(e.g. Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Murmann, 2003; Volberda and Lewin, 2003). 
Using March’s idea of exploration-exploitation as a metric for progress, 
Volberda et al. (2001b) depict strategic renewal journeys as multi-level 
coevolutionary processes taking place over time and leading to adaptations 
designed to align competencies with the environment and increase competitive 
advantage. Lewin and Volberda (1999, p. 526) further emphasize the importance of 
the coevolution perspective defining coevolution as: “the joint outcome of 
managerial intentionality, environment, and institutional effects”. This perspective 
reiterates that adaptation and selection are not completely opposite forces but are 
fundamentally interrelated: organization and environment coevolve (Lewin & 
Volberda, 1999; Murmann, 2003). Correspondingly, Volberda and Lewin (2003) 
proposed three key principles of self-renewal that are necessary for enabling 
managed selection and coevolutionary adaptation processes (Table 1.2, this thesis). 
We will further explore the three key principles in the subsequent sections. 
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4.5 Stages of Organizational Learning Processes 
More recently, researchers have begun examining the transfer of knowledge across 
different organizations (Argote, Beckman & Epple, 1990; Joskow & Rose, 1985; 
Zimmerman, 1982). Organizations are thought to have learning systems as “the 
mechanisms by which learning is perpetuated and institutionalized in 
organizations” (Shrivastava, 1983, p. 7). Hargadon and Fanelli (2002) further 
suggest that the phenomena of interest in this approach involve how organizations 
and their participants acquire, store, retrieve, process, distribute, learn, unlearn, 
encode, and in other ways replicate existing knowledge. Building on these ideas 
and the definition of organizational learning that we stated before, “the process by 
which an organization takes into account environmental and its internal conditions 
to abstract, create, and develop knowledge and subsequently assimilate, 
implement, evaluate, and reconfigure the knowledge based on the action-outcome 
relationships”, we characterize and develop a conceptual framework of 
organizational learning processes that generate business and social values through 
actionable knowledge of organizations. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the framework 
consists of three main phases. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Phases of organizational learning processes 
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Abstraction Phase 
The existence of learning in organizations starts from the abstraction phase in 
which organizations abstract information and give meaning to the flow of 
experience (Drazin & Sandelands, 1992). The abstraction phase is inextricably 
intertwined with the two processes of environmental scanning and of knowledge 
recognition. While environmental scanning has a more exploratory emphasis, 
knowledge recognition is more exploitative as it utilizes the prior knowledge of an 
organization.  
 
Environmental scanning 
From the environmental dynamics standpoint, learning is prompted by 
environmental complexities and uncertainties (Shrivastava, 1983). In line with this 
thought, learning theorists such as, Lave (1988) and Lave and Wenger (1990), have 
also rejected knowledge or information transfer models which isolate knowledge 
from practice. Instead, they develop a view of learning as social construction that 
puts knowledge back into the contexts in which it has meaning (Brown et al., 1989; 
Brown & Duguid, 1992). From this perspective, ambient historical, social and 
physical circumstances are included as part of the key constructs to understand 
how organizations start conceiving new ideas. 
Depending on the level of environmental complexity in which a firm 
operates, driving forces such as technology, socio-economy, competition 
(competitors and cohorts), and institution need to be taken into consideration 
during the environmental scanning process. Additionally, during the process, 
organizations adaptively learn to attend to some parts of the environment and 
ignore others according to their own selection criteria of which parts of 
environment is important or relevant to their goals, attention rules and search rules 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Sidhu et al., 2004). To help organizations appropriately 
search or scan the environment for knowledge abstraction, the use of strategic 
organizational learning tools may come in useful. Tools such as scenario 
forecasting is one perceived reason for companies such as Royal Dutch Shell to be 
known as a premier learning organization in its pursuit of understanding of trends 
in the global business/economic environment. Through the use of scenario 
forecasting and planning, organizations have even begun to view planning as 
learning and learning as planning (De Geus, 1999; Brenneman et al., 1998). The 
environmental scanning will further stimulate the process of knowledge 
recognition or awareness. 
 
Knowledge recognition 
When interpreted, the results from the environmental scanning prompt 
organizations to recognize potential knowledge that may be absorbed in the 
subsequent stage. As shown in Figure 4.1, this recognition process is also justified 
by organizational prior experiences retrieved from the organization’s memory 
(further explanation is provided in the “Stores of knowledge” subsection). This is 
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coupled with the shared assumptions and cognitive maps (March & Simon, 1958) 
that are formed by organization’s culture. Additionally, organizational structure 
also influences the way it sees, organizes, constructs, and directs the elements of 
knowledge moving towards a shared understanding of them. Effective knowledge 
recognition among new knowledge, past routines or practices is sensitive to the 
links between organizational turbulence and organizational diversity. A challenge 
for organizations, in this case, is to regulate such sensitivity. 
Adoption and Alteration Phase 
The abstraction phase is followed by the process in which new and unknown facts 
or information are acquired and are turn into new knowledge or are re-configured 
into an organization’s existing stores of knowledge. Several dimensions of 
organizational learning, such as the breadth, elaborateness and thoroughness of 
knowledge (Huber, 1991) or the efficiency, scope, and flexibility of knowledge 
absorption (Van den Bosch et al., 2003) may be assessed. Conjointly, hinging on 
the existing organizational stores of knowledge, the previously abstracted 
knowledge may become new sources of knowledge that need to be initiated or may 
become the accumulated or modified version of the existing knowledge. We refer 
to the first possible subprocess as creation of new knowledge and the second one 
as reconfiguration of pre-existing knowledge. It should be noted that new 
knowledge may also be the product of a firm’s combinative capabilities to generate 
new applications from existing knowledge compoenents (Kogut & Zander, 1992). 
In either possibility, the knowledge will be adopted and subsequently be 
assimilated, integrated and implemented (refer to the “Actualization phase”).  
 
Evaluations 
Learning occurs in stepwise, incremental, progression of small adjustments 
(Shrivastava, 1983). This means evaluations must be embedded in organizational 
memory, i.e. the stores of knowledge, for a comprehensive learning to occur. 
Evaluations are also the process that bridge organizational stores of knowledge 
with the knowledge justification and assessment subprocesses occurred at almost 
all learning phases. Following the “Enactment-Selection-Retention model” 
described by Weick (1979), evaluations may as well occur after the new or 
reconfigured knowledge are put into actions in the actualization phase. Under such 
circumstances, the basis of evaluations is focused on monitoring objective 
measures such as assessing the availability of accumulated experiences, adherence 
to prior plans, and the targeted outcomes or performance. Three possible outcomes 
may be resulted from evaluations: 
1. Knowledge retention: In principle, knowledge is retained if it is considered 
to be useful or potentially useful in the forthcoming organizational activities. 
This will add to the organizational stores of knowledge. 
2. Deliberate unlearning: There is no reason to assume that the new 
knowledge and services will be useful all the times (Penrose, 1959); on the 
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contrary, they may well be useless or not suitable for organizations although 
they may still provide a foundation which will give the firm an advantage in 
some entirely new area. However, it may be costly to keep exploring or 
exploiting such knowledge. Another possibility is that some knowledge may 
become obsolete after some time. Thus after going through some 
considerations, organizations may decide to drop such knowledge. We refer 
to this possibility as deliberate unlearning which will decrease the stores of 
knowledge either directly or indirectly. 
3. Knowledge depreciation: Besides deliberate unlearning, organizations may 
also lose knowledge due to inadvertent depreciation. This occurs if, for 
instance, due to the turnover of personnel some knowledge may erode 
possibly because of knowledge is not well communicated, distributed and 
integrated into the working procedures and administrative structures of the 
organization.  
 
Stores of knowledge 
As Levinthal and March (1993, p. 97) argue, “learning presumes interpretation of 
experience”, all organizational experiences resulting from actions must be encoded 
in a kind of cognitive maps, transmitted, and shared to organizational members. 
These encoded cognitive maps are accumulated over time and stored in 
organizational stores of knowledge. The stores of knowledge are, in turn, used by 
organizations to convert their experiences into possibilities for future actions. 
Under this process, organizational knowledge derived from the experiences of 
organizational members is stored in organizational memories and is concretely 
embodied in the ongoing routines, products, processes and other replicable actions 
of the organization (Huber, 1991). 
At the time of founding, the organizational stores of knowledge might not 
start from zero. At least the founders, the individuals or organizations, have 
knowledge about the initial environment and the processes to carry out the initial 
business and they make such knowledge available to the new organization’s 
members (Huber, 1991). Additionally, there is also some prevailing 
institutionalized knowledge (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Both kinds of knowledge 
are referred to by Huber (1991) as the “inherited knowledge.” Moreover, prior to 
organizational birth, some additional knowledge may also be acquired resulted 
from, for instance, the searching of organizational mission and resources. The 
combination of both inherited knowledge and such additional knowledge is called 
“congenital knowledge” (Huber, 1991). Presumably, congenital knowledge has a 
strong influence in determining future directions of organizational learning. 
In short, organizational stores of knowledge are accumulated and modified 
along with the learning processes and are simultaneously used to justify the 
subsequent abstraction and selection of knowledge. The challenge here is to 
facilitate an effective retrieval process, i.e. the retrieval of the right knowledge 
when it is needed. 
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Actualization Phase 
Learning sharpens an organization’s ability to solicit new ideas within and outside 
it. What has been learned by a company will be further translated into effective 
actions that generate social and business values. Knowledge and actions are two 
indispensable elements of organizational learning. On the one hand, by acting, 
reflecting, and interpreting, organizations learn what they are. By observing their 
own action, they learn what they want (Weick, 1979). On the other hand, 
knowledge provides the organization with the potential for novel action, and the 
process of constructing novel actions often entails finding new uses or new 
combinations of previously disparate ideas (Schumpeter, 1934; Weick, 1979; 
Kogut & Zander, 1992).  
Following the above reasoning, action learning is the emphasis of 
actualization phase. During this phase, the key process is the integration of 
knowledge into an organization’s existing routines and procedures through a 
concrete implementation. We refer to this process as knowledge integration and 
implementation. To expedite a transformation of learning process into concrete 
actions, organizational aspects such as communication, strategic directions and 
training plans are essential. First, effective communication through various forms 
of instruction, indoctrination, and exemplification is needed to diffuse knowledge 
to organizations’ members (March, 1991). Second, the growing experiences of 
management shape the strategic directions that have implications to the firm’s 
method in facilitating and maintaining the coherence of the learning process. Third, 
training is thought of as the transmission of explicit, abstract knowledge from 
members who know to members who do not (Brown & Duguid, 1992). 
Through the process of integrating and implementing knowledge, the actual 
experience can be used as a basis for evaluations. It should be noted here as the 
consequences of actual experiences sometimes are not instantaneous; organizations 
need to confirm the pertaining experiences by retrospective sense-making of them 
(Salancik, 1977).  
 
Incorporating Three Key Principles into Stages of Organizational 
Learning Processes 
In the context of sustained self-renewal firms, we conjecture that the three key 
principles of self-renewal are the prerequisites of sustained strategic renewal. 
Furthermore, absorptive capacity and dynamic capabilities are both key constructs 
in learning. Following the above phased analysis of organizational learning 
processes, we aspire to incorporate all of them in the stages of organizational 
learning processes. We present this idea in Figure 4.2.  
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Figure 4.2: Incorporating three key principles into stages of organizational learning 
processes 
 
 
When performing the environmental scanning during the abstraction phase, 
the first key principle rules implying that organizations should regulate internal 
rates of change to at least match the external rates of change. Additionally, the 
discernment of environmental signal into the recognition of knowledge has to do 
with a firm’s potential absorptive capacity. Dynamic capabilities of a firm which 
encompass coordination capabilities, system capabilities and socialization 
capabilities are essential during the adoption, alteration and actualization phases. 
Coordination capabilities are needed to coordinate and manage the concerted 
efforts to put new knowledge and reconfigured knowledge into practice and to 
evaluate the results accordingly.  
Simultaneously when new knowledge is created, the concurrent balance of 
exploitation and exploration (third principle) should be put as a safety valve. The 
reconfiguration of pre-existing knowledge, the use of it and the use of new 
knowledge should also be aligned to the second principle of self-organization 
besides to the third principle. The evaluation process should incorporate the 
principle of self-organization as firms organize what they have known and what 
they have experienced to justify which knowledge should be maintained in the 
stores of knowledge. System capabilities are needed here to organize the stores of 
knowledge.  
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Finally, socialization capabilities may help to create a more stimulating 
atmosphere to expedite managerial efforts in integrating and implementing 
knowledge throughout the firm. When knowledge is put into action and values are 
created, realized absorptive capacity of a firm is also actualized. The visualization 
in Figure 4.2 enhances the systemic way of conceptualizing the learning principles 
that may contribute to the sustained strategic renewal. 
 
 
4.6 How Firms Learn and Adapt over Time in Changing 
Knowledge Environment 
In addition to the conceptual analysis of stages of organizational learning, the 
second purpose of this chapter is to develop a framework that takes into account 
both the contexts of knowledge environment and the types of managerial action. 
The aim of the framework is to provide a link between organizational learning and 
organizational survival. For this purpose, we consider two types of knowledge 
environment: (1) stable knowledge environment and (2) dynamic knowledge 
environment (cf. Van den Bosch et al., 1999) which are analogous to the first and 
second order renewal  introduced in Chapter 1.3 (Table 1.1). Stable knowledge 
environment means that knowledge is in a mature state with systematic orders; 
changes are less often, less intense, and less varied. On the contrary, dynamic 
knowledge environment is more turbulent with knowledge that may still be in a 
disorder state and may change unexpectedly and frequently in a significant degree. 
In a reciprocal way, firms through their managers must actively set the 
proper learning tone for their team to balance the benefits of experimentation, 
innovation and renewal with the goal of sustaining long-term survival. To do so, 
however, is not that easy. Firms have to make explicit and implicit choices 
between exploitative and exploratory action learning. But both exploration and 
exploitation compete for scarce resources and maintaining an appropriate balance 
between exploration and exploitation is a primary factor in system survival and 
prosperity (March, 1991). In studies of organizational learning, the problem of 
balancing exploration and exploitation is exhibited in distinctions made between 
refinement of an existing technology and invention of a new one (Winter, 1971; 
Levinthal and March, 1981). Plotting together the type of knowledge environment 
and the type of action learning enable us to see the possible variety of 
organizational learning approach.  
First, in a stable knowledge environment, organizations have a strong focus 
on exploiting their current knowledge base (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Under such 
conditions, organizations learn to refine their capabilities, apply current knowledge 
and focus on current activities in existing domains (Holmqvist, 2003: 99). 
Exploitation in a stable knowledge environment makes future exploitation in the 
same domain even more efficient (Lant & Mezias, 1992). Considering this 
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potential benefit, the aim is the refinement of existing organizational routines and 
capabilities towards efficiency (March, 1991). Therefore, we propound that when 
the knowledge environment is stable, exploitative action learning drives firm to 
adopt operational learning aiming at regulating and improving their operational 
activities. As a result, operational learning may drive and turn firms to be highly 
routinized firms. 
Second, organizations may alternatively regard a stable knowledge 
environment as a more conducive atmosphere for organizational learning through 
experiments (Huber, 1991). This is because in times of stable condition, firms have 
more motivation to direct their strategic intents to allocate organizational slack for 
experimentations (Cyert & March, 1963). Such activities may involve probing for 
new organizational routines and the discovery of new approaches to technologies, 
businesses, processes, and products (McGrath, 2001). We thus suggest that when 
the knowledge environment is stable, explorative action learning drives firms to 
adopt experimental learning aiming at using their slack resources for 
experimentations. As a result, experimental learning may drive and limit firms to 
first-order renewal only. 
Third, when knowledge environment becomes more turbulent, some 
organizations may still be unaware of the changing condition and continue 
exploiting the existing knowledge from their accumulated experience. This is 
because such organizations perceive the exploitative action learning display 
reliable and accountable structures. The presumption is that the surviving 
organizations are those retain the most stable structures (Aldrich, 1979; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984). Firms increasingly maintain the status quo, exhibit the 
convergence and develop highly specialized competences that may become core 
rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). However, exploitative action learning – that 
tends to routinely maintain things that organizations have been doing well – cannot 
match the environmental dynamism. As a result of the inert learning, they become 
ossified firms (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and have difficulty in facing the new 
challenge with their ill-fated strategies.  Hence, we suggest that when the 
knowledge environment becomes dynamic, exploitative action learning drives 
firms to adopt inert learning that brings out their latent ossified characteristics and 
hampers adaptation. The more exploitative firms learn, the likelihood that inert 
learning drives firms to the competence trap increases. 
Fourth, in contrast to inert learning, some organizations are more flexible 
and adaptable in responding to the dynamic knowledge environment. These 
organizations perceive that the dynamic knowledge environment offers abundant 
opportunities that need to be explored. This leads to preferences for innovations. 
Exploratory action learning under such circumstances is directed towards capturing 
the ability to innovate or to renew the company in the face of environmental 
changes (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) as such ability is 
considered to be an important capability for a firm to live long. Furthermore, these 
innovations also change the competitive dynamics within a market (D’Aveni, 
94
78 Chapter 4  
 
 
1999). In comparison with experimental learning, innovative learning involves 
more radical innovations designed to meet the needs of emerging customers and 
markets (Benner & Tushman, 2003) instead of stable market conditions. In this 
respect, we propose that when the knowledge environment becomes dynamic, 
exploratory action learning drives firms to adopt innovative learning aiming at 
exploring opportunities from emerging conditions for innovative ideas. The more 
exploratory firms learn, the likelihood that innovative learning drives firms to the 
renewal trap increases. 
Finally, as literature on strategic management, organizational change and 
organizational learning has increasingly discussed the need for firms to achieve a 
balance between exploration and exploitation activities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; Levinthal & March, 1993; Teece et al., 1997), there is a higher order of 
organizational learning on top of the previous four types. In either type of 
knowledge environment, be it a stable or a dynamic one, firms are required to 
explore and learn new ways while exploiting what they have already learned 
(Crossan et al., 1999). Accordingly, learning may not only drive organizations into 
dynamics of accelerating exploitation, but it may also force organizations into 
accelerating exploration. Researchers such as Tushman & O’Reilly (1996), Gibson 
& Birkinshaw (2004), and Jansen et al. (2005) refer to firms that are able to 
simultaneously balance the exploitative and exploratory action learning as 
“ambidextrous firms”. Analogously, we refer to this type of learning as 
ambidextrous learning. It should be noted here that organizations are not only 
considered as ambidextrous when they have high levels of both exploratory and 
exploitative innovations but are also considered ambidextrous even when they 
have both low levels ones as long as they are balanced (Jansen et al., 2005). Here 
we propose that in time of either stable or dynamic knowledge environment, action 
learning that concurrently balances exploitation and exploration either in low or 
high levels of balance aligned with the pertaining knowledge environment, drives 
firms to adopt ambidextrous learning. 
Ambidextrous learning has the characteristics implied by the three key 
principles of self-renewal (Volberda & Lewin, 2003). This is because firstly, 
ambidextrous learning incorporates the type of knowledge environment and 
consequently aligns the type of action learning with the type of knowledge 
environment (Figure 4.3). This corresponds to the first principle of regulating 
internal rates of change to align with the external rate of change. Secondly, 
ambidextrous learning encourages the non-hierarchical type of learning through 
self-organization. Mom et al. (2007), for instance, show that managers may engage 
in high levels of exploitation as well as exploration activities through a non-
hierarchical structure. According to them, top-down knowledge inflows from 
persons at higher hierarchical levels than the manager are positively related to 
exploitation. Conversely, horizontal and bottom-up knowledge inflows from peers 
and persons at lower hierarchical levels are positively related to exploration. Mom 
et al.’s (2007) findings thus indicate that the more a manager acquires top-down 
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and horizontal or bottom-up knowledge flows, the higher the levels of exploration 
and exploitation in which the manager engages. This is an indication of the need of 
self-organization. Finally, ambidextrous learning requires firms through their 
managers to concurrently balance exploitation and exploration activities. The 
ambidextrous learning thus positively influences firms’ sustained self-renewal 
efforts and may thus drive firms to second-order renewal. Through an illustrative 
framework, Figure 4.3 summarizes the repertoire of organizational learning and the 
three key principles as discussed above. 
 
Figure 4.3: A repertoire of organizational learning and three key principles 
 
 
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
To contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of learning processes and 
stages, in this chapter we developed a framework of how firms learn and adapt 
over time. We categorize learning processes into three phases: abstraction phase, 
adoption and alteration phase, and actualization phase. These phases encompass 
the flows of several subprocesses stemming from how organizations conceive 
ideas, learn and put them into actions (see Figure 4.1). The framework also shows 
how the stores of knowledge in organizations are accumulated and reconfigured 
over time.  
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Also to investigate organizational learning in the context of long-lived or 
sustained self-renewal firms, we incorporate the constructs of the three key 
principles of self-renewal, absorptive capacity and dynamic capabilities in the 
procedural flows of learning. In this respect, we developed the second framework 
that takes into account both the contexts of knowledge environment and the types 
of action learning (see Figure 4.3). The mapping between types of knowledge 
environment and types of action learning enables us to identify five types of 
organizational learning: (1) operational learning; (2) experimental learning; (3) 
inert learning; (4) innovative learning; and (5) ambidextrous learning. Here 
ambidextrous learning is enabled by the three key principles of self-renewing 
organizations (Figure 4.3). It further equips firms with requisite ability to adapt for 
an effective transition from the first-order to the second-order renewal. 
To conclude in this chapter, we have addressed the second research question 
of this PhD thesis, i.e. how firms learn and adapt over time in the changing context 
of knowledge environment. This chapter also explores the three key principles of 
sustained strategic renewal from an adaptation perspective, in particular the 
organizational learning perspective. Based on the three key principles, we proposed 
the notion of ambidextrous learning. First, ambidextrous learning demonstrates the 
need to align the type of knowledge environment with the type of action learning 
(first principle). Second, Nonaka (1988) propounds that a learning organization 
transforms the flow of information into a stock of knowledge and at the same time 
spreads it to other departments and stimulates the systematic self-organizing of 
information. By the same token, ambidextrous learning requires self-organization 
as a process to transform information into effective knowledge. Third, 
ambidextrous learning signifies the need to balance exploitation and exploration 
simultaneously. 
Contemplating theories discussed in Chapter 2 and explorative studies 
presented in Chapter 3 and 4, in the next chapter we develop our conceptual 
framework and propositions. The framework and propositions further lead us into 
the development of our empirical constructs that we investigate in part IV of this 
thesis.  
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5. Conceptual Framework and 
Propositions of Three Key 
Principles 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In an overview of theoretical foundations that we put forward in the foregoing 
chapters, we have managed to conceptually shape a more insightful focus of the 
research topic. Yet we consider that an extended conceptual framework based on 
the three key principles of self-renewing organizations is required to incorporate 
both selection and adaptation perspectives and to identify important constructs and 
relationships. Accordingly, this chapter is organized as follows. We present our 
conceptual framework in Chapter 5.2. The framework also facilitates the 
development of propositions of the three key principles in Chapter 5.3 that are 
necessary for charting directions of our empirical studies. Chapter 5.4 is the 
conclusion of this chapter. 
 
5.2 Conceptual Framework 
To keep things in perspective, we propose to capture and portray the connection 
between theoretical foundations and empirical studies of the three key principles. 
On the basis of this idea, we develop a framework for a foundational 
conceptualization. Embodied in this manner, we aim to identify and map 
demonstrable constructs into quantifiable indicators.  
As demonstrated in Chapter 3 and 4, there are respectively two main 
conceptual constructs that we explored: (1) from a coevolutionary perspective, we 
looked at the coevolutionary competence construct; and (2) from an adaptation 
perspective, we built upon the organizational learning construct. Behind these two 
constructs lay deeper prerequisites that bring together both selection and adaptation 
perspectives.  
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On one research stream, in view of a combined selection-and-adaptation 
perspective, the construct of coevolutionary competence corresponds to an 
empirical inquiry of both environmental as well as dynamics and how these two 
dynamisms play a role on sustaining strategic renewal over time. On the other 
research stream, the construct of organizational learning appears to draw on the 
role of managerial intentionality in adapting the firm dynamics to the 
environmental dynamics. This signifies that an empirical inquiry of firm dynamics 
needs to be taken into account as well. As the research literature in Chapter 2 
suggested, both research streams coalesce into the three key principles (Volberda 
and Lewin, 2003) that are essential to a firm’s sustained strategic renewal.  
Figure 5.1 shows the conceptual framework that we developed based on the 
previous line of thoughts. Rooted in this framework, we draw on measuring the 
external rate of change for our empirical inquiry of environmental dynamics. For 
this purpose, measurement proxies are developed and analyzed in Chapter 8. For 
our empirical setting, we focus on environmental dynamism of the oil industry and 
the firm dynamism by looking at our two case companies, Shell and BP.  
 
Figure 5.1: Conceptual framework 
 
By the same token, we develop a number of proxies based on firm 
characteristics to measure firm dynamics. First, in connection with external rate of 
change in the oil industry, we analyze and measure the internal rate of change in 
our case companies, i.e. Shell and BP. Besides multilevel (industry and firm levels) 
study method, the analyses are performed both longitudinally and comparatively. 
Second, we examine the second key principle by observing and developing proxies 
for the measurement of self-organization. This will be discussed in Chapter 9. In 
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Chapter 10, we build upon the previous research on exploitation and exploration 
(e.g. Volberda et al., 2001b; Flier et al., 2003) to calibrate the pertaining metrics 
for an extended analysis of exploitation and exploration. Additionally in Chapter 
10, we incorporate the need to study the role of top management team in a firm’s 
sustained strategic renewal trajectories. Altogether, we combine and summarize the 
key findings of the three key principles in Chapter 11.  
In this respect, our central premise is that the ability of a firm to manage 
firm dynamics accounting for environmental dynamics contributes to sustained 
strategic renewal. In sum, sustained strategic renewal is a function of the three key 
principles of self-renewing organizations, i.e. managing internal rate of change to 
keep up or exceed the external rate of change, optimizing self-organization, and 
synchronizing concurrent exploitation and exploration.  
 
 
5.3 Propositions of Three Key Principles 
After circumscribing our conceptual framework in the previous section, we are 
now ready to move on to developing our propositions of the three key principles of 
self-renewing organizations (Volberda and Lewin, 2003). From a research 
standpoint, propositions are useful for crystallizing and exploring our notion to 
calibrate the demonstrable constructs of the three key principles into measurable 
proxies. In the remainder of this section, we develop and pose our propositions 
based on the three key principles respectively. The central premise is that the three 
key principles are antecedents to sustained strategic renewal and accordingly 
sustained strategic renewal is regarded as the dependent variable which is a 
function of the three key principles. 
 
Proposition of the First Key Principle 
Much of the literature in organization theory is fundamentally concerned with 
environmental changes and the resulting organizational changes and adaptation 
(e.g. Aldrich, 1979; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Levinthal, 1991; Miles, Snow and Pfeffer, 1974). In a similar vein, Duncan (1972) 
viewed organizational environments as external factors that managers need to take 
into account in their strategic activities. The central premise of the extant literature 
is that firms that can successfully incorporate the changing environments into their 
internal strategic decision processes may have the brightest prospects for long-term 
survival (Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck, 1976).  
In fact, firms need to respond to the changing contexts of environments in 
which they are embedded. Of particular concern is further investigation of the issue 
of aligning organizational dynamism with environmental dynamism. In his study 
of hypercompetition, D’Aveni (1994) for instance, propounds that organizational 
success is often tied to speed. This suggests that as the external environment of a 
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firm changes, the firm needs to respond to the external forces by altering and 
adjusting its internal environment.  
From the perspective of environmental selection and organizational 
adaptation theorists, the rate of change is a critical construct in addressing both 
environmental and firm dynamism. In an attempt to provide operational clarity to 
the term rate of change, Jurkovitch (1974) suggests that the higher the change rate 
in the environment, the higher the number of organizational internal factors that 
must be altered. He further conjectures that the ability to time organizational 
changes to keep pace with environmental change rates is an important indicator of 
an organization’s coping abilities. All the views discussed above indicate that rate 
of change is an important antecedent in studying sustained strategic renewal.  
Firms need to be careful, however, in adjusting their renewal acceleration 
rate. They may be exposed to either the risk of being drifted into chaos or the risk 
of accumulating inertia. On the one hand, Dumaine (1989) and Stalk (1988) 
caution that overspeeding is counterproductive, as too short a reaction time can 
lead to overreaction and may even result in chaos (Volberda, 1998). In this respect, 
changing the environment by being the first mover to break the rules of the game, 
can be risky (Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985). This is because to initiate and 
implement internal change to beat the external change, large incumbent firms need 
to mobilize the resources that they have accumulated over the years and by the 
goodwill inherent in established long-term relationships with key stakeholders such 
as customers, partners, and suppliers. The results are, however, uncertain in their 
payoffs – they may or may not be advantageous to the firms.   
On the other hand, if managers respond too cautiously that they wait until 
the impact of external turbulence exceeds a threshold (Ansoff et al., 1975), firms 
may run a risk to build up inertia (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988). For a long-term 
survival, it is essential that a firm should be in a well-balanced relationship with its 
environment. This is related to the first key principle of self-renewing organization 
that recognizes the need for firms to match or exceed the external rate of change 
within which the firm is embedded (Volberda and Lewin, 2003). This is to say that 
firms that are able to monitor and track rates of change in their environment and 
adjust their internal rates of change accordingly, they promote their ability to 
sustain strategic renewal over time – which is a proxy of corporate longevity.   
The principal question that remains is that how firms should regulate the 
internal rate of change (IRC) with respect to the external rate of change (ERC). Of 
central issue are antecedents that enable firms to implement the first key principle. 
As discussed in Table 2.4 in Chapter 2, Lewin and Volberda (2004) have advanced 
the three key principles by substantiating fundamental antecedents of the three key 
principles. Referring back to these antecedents, in particular those that relate to the 
first key principle, we attempt to provide a more detailed explanation about what 
kind of generic antecedents that may enable firms to align their internal rates of 
change (IRC) with the external rates of change (ERC). Following Lewin and 
Volberda (2004), we categorize the generic antecedents of the first key principle 
101
 Conceptual Framework and Propositions 85 
                of Three Key Principles 
 
based on strategy, structure, managerial process, and leadership. Table 5.1 
summarizes the enabling antecedents of the first key principle. 
 
 
Table 5.1: Enabling antecedents of the first key principle  
Type of enabling antecedents of the first key principle (IRC ≥ ERC) 
Strategy Pioneer/early mover (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Suárez & Lanzolla, 2007); 
leapfrogging (Beinhocker, 1999; Hackbarth & Kettinger, 2004); focus on 
internal growth (Hitt and Ireland, 1985; Hit et al., 1996) 
Structure Modular/flexible structures (Pascale, 1990, 1999; Volberda, 1998) 
Managerial process Pacing rhythms for change (Eisenhardt, 1989a); seizing benchmarking 
processes, promoting rapid learning, allowing room for experimentation, and 
stretching goals (Maira & Thomas, 1999) 
Leadership Facilitator/ context setter (Pascale, 1999); detector of new dominant logics 
(Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) 
Source: adapted from Lewin and Volberda, 2004 
 
First with regard to the enabling strategy of the first key principle, firms 
need to be able to formulate strategies that can escalate their internal rates of 
change particularly in times of fast changing environments. The strategies can 
range from being a pioneer or an early mover (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Suárez and 
Lanzolla, 2007), for instance by introducing new services, products, or processes; 
to adopting a leapfrogging strategy (Beinhocker, 1999; Hackbarth and Kettinger, 
2004) in times of intensified competition. Also to match or exceed with the 
external rate of change, strategy should be directed to foster internal growth (Hitt 
and Ireland, 1985; Hitt et al., 1996). Internal growth means growth and 
development of a firm through the use of internal resources within the firm’s 
boundary.  
Second to carry out such strategies, firms need to have modular structures 
(Pascale, 1990, 1999). Such structures promote flexibility (Volberda, 1998) to 
interact with their internal and external stakeholders effectively. Third, the first key 
principle also requires managerial processes that can detect and adjust a right 
rhythm for change (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Managers may need to try out dynamic 
processes such as seizing benchmarking processes, promoting rapid learning, 
allowing room for experimentation, and even stretching goals (Maira and Thomas, 
1999).  
Finally to facilitate the proposed enabling strategies, structures, and 
managerial processes, appropriate leadership qualities are needed such as leaders 
that act as facilitators, context setters that are able to guide their organizational 
members to scan and interpret signals from the environment. Leaders need to be 
able to detect emergence of new dominant logics (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986), 
manage the adaptive tension of driving momentum for changes and actually 
engage in changes. Steve Miller, one of the members of Shell’s committee of 
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managing directors in 1996, concurred such leadership characteristics this by 
saying: 
 
“Change your approach to strategy, and you change the way a company runs. The leader 
becomes a context setter, the designer of a learning experience – not an authority figure with 
solutions. Once the folks at the grassroots realize they own the problem, they also discover 
that they can help create and own the answers, and they get after it very quickly, very 
aggressively, and very creatively, with a lot more ideas than the old-style strategic direction 
could ever have prescribed from headquarters”. 
(Interview quote of Steve Miller, a former Shell’s CMD member, taken from Pascale (1999, p.93); 
emphasis in bold italics by the author of this thesis) 
 
Furthermore, Friesen and Miller (1986) propose that the fit between the pace 
of change and external or internal conditions may be critical for the prediction of 
long-term survival. Likewise, Volberda and Lewin (2003) propound that a firm 
should regulate its internal rate of change to match or exceed the external rate of 
change. They base their argument on the notion introduced by Ashby (1964) that 
organizations must maintain requisite variety. In Ashby’s concept, the internal 
variety of firm routines and capabilities must match the external variety of the 
environmental landscape on which the firm is prospecting. This principle 
recognizes the need for organizations to match or exceed the coevolution rate of 
the external systems (society, institutions, and industries) within which the firm is 
embedded. Organizations that are able to monitor, track, and adjust their internal 
rates of change to be in line with their environments are regarded as having an 
innate ability to strategically renew themselves over time. Based on the above 
discussions, we conjecture the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 1:  
Aligning the internal rate of change of a firm with the external rate of change of 
the firm’s environment positively influences sustained strategic renewal. 
 
Propositions of the Second Key Principle 
The observations made by many of the authors writing on corporate longevity echo 
those made by authors who write on the application of complexity theory to 
organizational dynamics (Hall, 1997). By and large according to this line of 
research stream, self-organizing adaptability observed in long-term surviving 
companies is similar to that observed in ecosystems which are typically complex, 
non-linear, dynamic systems whose behavior may be better understood with 
knowledge of complexity theory (Allen, 1988, 1997; Anderson, 1999a; Holland, 
1995; Kauffman, 1995; Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989; McKelvey, 1999; Stacey, 
1995). Nevertheless despite such commonality between the complexity theory and 
organization science, there is a key difference that must be noted. Complexity 
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theory suggests that self-organization is the natural default behavior, while 
organization studies recognize barriers to such freedom in bureaucratic structure 
(Anderson, 1999a, b). More specifically, he notes that social entities always self-
organize as long as their members contribute work; this is why informal structures 
emerge and persist in a way that that is remarkably robust to changes in the formal 
organization structure. 
Built upon the notion of complexity theory, Nonaka (1988, p.57) suggests 
that self-organizing can be seen as “a process of dissolving an existing 
organizational order and creating a new one”. Consequently to create a new order, 
Weick (1987) and Prigogine and Strengers (1984) argues that it may be necessary 
for the organizational process to become chaotic in order to match accurately the 
chaotic nature of the environment for the new order to emerge. Build upon this line 
of thought, Volberda and Lewin (2003, p.2126) suggest that self-organization is 
“the process by which organizations always find order no matter how complex or 
convoluted the structure of the organization.” This implies that self-organization 
strives for autonomy (Kauffman, 1995; Nonaka, 1988).   
The above view on self organization is somewhat in contradiction with the 
traditional view of organizations that is based on bureaucracy (Weber, 1946). 
Bureaucracy represents an organization from which chaos has completely been 
eliminated (Nonaka, 1988) and thus reduces autonomy considerably. The 
traditional view also regards an organization as an entity that consists of highly 
prescribed rule sets, formalized control and hierarchical authority structures, which 
are intended to simplify the organization’s ongoing operations. In this sense, a 
hierarchical authority structure is regarded as key in helping organization leaders 
determine proper actions and deploy instructions to the workforce (Pugh et al., 
1968; Evan, 1963). Hierarchical positions are fundamental to create orders that 
lead to simple, well-defined and predictable responses to a changing yet knowable 
world (Capra, 1996; Stacey, 1995). Furthermore, the inherent hierarchy of 
organizations constrains the extent of variety than can be sustained within them 
(Michels, 1915).  
From the perspective of self organizing, however, traits such as the absence 
of centralized control and bureaucratic hierarchies are shared by all self-organizing 
systems. In self-organizing systems, control of the organization is typically 
distributed over the whole of the system. Order thus comes from the actions of 
interdependent agents who exchange information, take actions, and continuously 
adapt to feedback about others’ actions rather than from the imposition of an 
overall plan by a central authority (Chiles et al., 2004). This is reiterated by 
Volberda and Lewin (2003) in which they describe self-organization as the process 
by which organizations always find order no matter how complex or convoluted 
the structure of the organization.  
The central premise is that a self-organizing system may settle into a 
number of relatively autonomous, organizationally closed subsystems, but these 
subsystems will continue to interact in a more indirect way (Anderson, 1999a; 
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Kauffman, 1995; Nonaka, 1988; Von Foester, 1960; Von Foerster and Zopf, 1962). 
Since the subtle management determines the magnitude of the self organization, 
top management should steer and guide an autonomous self-organizing group in a 
firm. Self-organization also implies that managers function as stewards of the 
evolutionary process and focus their managerial role on devising and articulating 
critical values and on establishing boundary conditions that enable and guide 
decision making at lower levels of the organization. In this respect, guided self-
organization is a primary process by which new orders in firms may emerge.  
As in the first key principle, it is also necessary to substantiate the generic 
enabling antecedents of self-organization. Table 5.2 categorizes the generic 
antecedents of the second key principle based on strategy, structure, managerial 
processes, and leadership.  
 
Table 5.2: Enabling antecedents of the second key principle  
Type of enabling antecedents of the second key principle (self-organization) 
Strategy Focus on internal growth (Hitt and Ireland, 1985; Hitt et al., 1996); long-term 
strategic planning (Schoemaker, 1992, 1995), knowledge integration (Van den 
Bosch & Volberda, 2006) 
Structure Semi-structures/ low hierarchy (Nonaka, 1988; Kauffman, 1995); cross-
functional interfaces (Maira & Thomas, 1999; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000) 
Managerial process Facilitating emergent processes (Pascale, 1990, 1999), reducing number of 
rules (Eisenhardt, 1989a) and encouraging freedom of new ideas (Child, 1984; 
Orton & Weick, 1990) 
Leadership Steward/ guided controller (Volberda & Lewin, 2003; Pascale, 1999), 
facilitator/ context setter (Pascale, 1999; Carroll, 1999), transformational 
leader (Van den Bosch & Volberda, 2006) 
Source: adapted from Lewin and Volberda, 2004 
 
First with regard to the enabling strategies, firms can promote self-
organization by focusing on internal growth (Hitt and Ireland, 1985; Hitt et al., 
1996) and long-term strategic planning such as scenario planning (Schoemaker, 
1992, 1995). While focusing on internal growth may help to create firm distinctive 
competence (Hitt and Ireland, 1985), focusing on long-term strategic planning may 
help to extend the orientation window of firms so that firms can build readiness 
through change through probing future (Schoemaker, 1992, 1995). Our focal firm, 
Shell, is well known for its scenario planning (Schoemaker, 1992). Furthermore 
based on the study at the Shell Research and Technology Centre in Amsterdam, 
Van den Bosch and Volberda (2006) found that knowledge integration capacity 
contributes to self-organization. 
Second in terms of enabling structures, firms need to design their structures 
not in traditional authority forms. Instead, they need to have low hierarchical 
structures to streamline the information flows (Nonaka, 1988; Kauffman, 1995). 
By having such structures, firms can also build cross-functional interfaces (Maira 
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and Thomas, 1999; Jansen et al., 2009) that may help to stimulate a more intensive 
and effective interaction among organizational members.  
Third, self-organization requires managerial processes that are able to 
facilitate emergent processes (Pascale, 1990, 1999). The low hierarchical structure 
also enables the managerial process of reducing or minimizing the number of rules. 
Such process can also help to promote freedom of experimenting with new ideas 
(Child, 1984; Orton and Weick, 1990).   
Finally, in encouraging self-organizing processes, leaders need to act as 
stewards or guided controllers (instead of as central controllers) (Volberda & 
Lewin, 2003; Pascale, 1999). Additionally, like in the first key principle, leaders 
act as facilitators or context setter rather than as authoritative commander (Pascale, 
1999). Such leadership style has an important consequence: “it lets a lot of people 
make individual decisions about their behavior and the ways in which they conduct 
themselves” (Carroll, 1999, p.8). As Carroll (1999, p.11) contended that 
“devolving power is not about becoming undisciplined. Instead, it actually means 
putting strong disciplines in place so that people can act independently at lower 
levels and be clearly responsible for the results of their actions.”; it is necessary to 
let go of the traditional leadership of command-and-control. This is also reflected 
in the following interview quote: 
 
“The properties of self-organization and emergence make intuitive sense to me. … You don’t 
have the same kind of control that traditional leadership is used to. What you don’t realize 
until you do it is that you may, in fact, have more controls but in a different fashion. You get 
more feedback than before, you learn more than before, you know more through your own 
people about what’s going on in the marketplace and with customers than before. But you 
still have to let go of the old sense of control.” 
(Interview quote of Steve Miller, a former Shell’s CMD member, taken from Pascale (1999, p.90,94)) 
 
In fact to facilitate guided self-organization, Volberda and Lewin (2003) 
further propound that self-organization, however, does not mean that individuals or 
units can pull in all directions at will or break all rules. It does not mean that 
managers are not necessary or that they have diminished roles. Contrarily, it means 
that no central controller is necessary. Guided self-organization requires 
fundamental departure from command and control philosophy of traditional 
hierarchical bureaucratic organizations. Therefore instead of acting as a central 
controller, managers function as stewards of the evolutionary process by enabling 
and guiding decision making at lower levels of the organization (Volberda and 
Lewin, 2003). To guide and facilitate lower level decision-making and action also 
requires substituting process controls, i.e. devising processes that produce desired 
and acceptable outcomes, for outcome controls.  
In summary, self-organization is fundamentally different from classical 
command and control management practice (Nonaka, 1988; Volberda and Lewin, 
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2003). It implies that management commits to guiding and implementing process 
controls instead of relying on outcome controls. The efforts of managers to propel 
a process of self-organization in a firm are necessary for the firm to emerge from 
chaos into order. Self-organization is thus an indispensable process to long-term 
survival. Based on these discussions, we suggest the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 2:  
Self-organization positively influences a firm’s sustained strategic renewal. 
 
 
Propositions of the Third Key Principle 
Since the study of March (1991), the constructs of exploitation and exploration 
have emerged as the dual concepts underpinning organizational adaptation and 
renewal research. Exploitation is primarily related to refinement and efficiency, 
which relates to environmental selection perspective. This is different from 
adaptation perspective which suggests that firms are able to explore new 
competencies through their adaptation to the changing environment. Reconciling 
the selection and adaptation perspectives, Levinthal and March (1993, p. 105) 
propounds that the long-term survival of a firm depends on its ability to “engage in 
enough exploitation to ensure the organization’s current viability and engage in 
enough exploration to ensure its future viability”.  
Drawing from the selection and adaptation literature streams, Lewin et al. 
(1999) further conjectures that in order to remain competitive in changing 
environmental circumstances, firms need to seek a balance between exploitation 
and exploration efforts over time. The efforts of balancing exploitation and 
exploration are ongoing processes that are reflected in a firm’s legacy which 
encompasses firm-level knowledge, capital, technological platforms, capabilities, 
as well as characteristics of the industry in which firm is embedded (Lewin & 
Volberda, 1999). In this respect, exploitation and exploration processes are 
complementary means for optimizing organizational resources and design features 
in the face of multiple environmental and path dependent constraints. 
According to Lewin, Long & Carroll (1999), as organizations adapt in 
highly dynamic environments, the successful ones will evolve to a critical balance 
point. This critical balance point, as suggested by Lewin et al. (1999, p.541), is 
processes “that balance between order (the pull of exploitation) and disorder (the 
pull of exploration) that is often called the edge of chaos”. This relates to self-
organization, previously discussed in the second key principle. Yet the key 
question that remains is that how firms should balance their exploitation and 
exploration efforts over time.  
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Literature points out that the answer to this key question is reflected in the 
internal resource allocation process and the extent to which this process is designed 
to support a multiplicity of selection regimes. In other words, to achieve balanced 
exploitation-exploration, firms need to make a trade-off between exploitation and 
exploration. Such tradeoff is subject to both environmental conditions as well as 
management discretion. The exploration/exploitation trade-off captures a 
fundamental tension in evolutionary systems (Holland, 1975) and has become 
central in our thinking about the challenge of organizational learning and 
adaptation (March, 1991). Organizations must make uncertain investments to 
create the possibility of more promising futures while, at the same time, they must 
allocate resources to insure their survival in the face of short-run selection 
pressures (Levinthal & March, 1993).  
The tension of exploration versus exploitation is a challenge for managers to 
justify their decision rights of synchronizing concurrent exploitation and 
exploration. For managers to be able to concurrently balance exploitation and 
exploration, they have to base their decisions contingent upon the environment 
their organization faces (Benner and Tushman, 2003; Gupta et al., 2006; Jansen et 
al., 2006). Nevertheless, in making the trade-off between exploitation and 
exploration, firms through their managers have their own preferences.  
The preferences of the managers seem to draw on their strategic orientations 
(Venkatraman, 1989). On the one hand, exploitation can lead to positive short-term 
performance effects by reducing variety, increasing efficiency and improving 
adaptation to current environments. However, prior studies show that firms that 
focus on short-term exploitation may end up in a competence trap (Levintal and 
March, 1993; Levitt and March, 1988). Although exploitation may enhance short-
term performance, it results in the development of core rigidities and reduced 
flexibility (Volberda, 1996). On the other hand, exploration-oriented activities are 
more concerned with helping a firm to develop new competences and increase 
variety that are directed to long-run performance effects (He and Wong, 2004; 
March, 1991). Studies show that too much focus on exploration may result in a 
renewal trap which is dysfunctional for the firm (Volberda and Lewin, 2003).  
Likewise in the first and the second key principles, it is also necessary to 
substantiate the generic enabling antecedents of the third key principle. Table 5.3 
shows the generic antecedents of the third key principle categorized by strategy, 
structure, managerial processes, and leadership.  
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Table 5.3: Enabling antecedents of the third key principle  
Type of enabling antecedents of the third key principle (exploitation=exploration) 
Strategy Balancing slack resource allocation through ambidexterity (Jansen et al., 
2008; Sidhu et al., 2004; Smith & Tushman, 2005), punctuated equilibrium 
(Burgelman, 2002) 
Structure Internal corporate venturing structure (Burgelmann, 1983; Burgers et al., 
2009), ambidextrous structure (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996; Jansen et al., 
2009), structural differentiation (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Gilbert, 2005; 
Burgers et al., 2009; Jansen et al., 2009) 
Managerial process Incorporating venture capital metrics (Beinhocker, 1999; Burgelman, 1983; 
Burgers et al., 2009), encouraging ambidextrous learning (Gilbert, 2006; 
Westerman et al., 2006) 
Leadership Autonomous entrepreneurs (Burgelman, 1983), transformational leadership 
(Jansen et al., 2008) 
Source: adapted from Lewin and Volberda, 2004 
 
Concerning the enabling strategies of exploitation and exploration, firms 
through their managers need to balance slack resource allocation by establishing 
cross-fertilization across exploratory and exploitative strategic renewal actions 
(Jansen et al., 2008; Sidhu et al., 2004; Smith and Tushman, 2005). This refers to 
ambidexterity, i.e. the simultaneous pursuit and combination of exploratory and 
exploitative innovations within organizations (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996; 
Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). In addition to ambidexterity, Burgelman (2002) 
contends that punctuated equilibrium is another way to balance exploration and 
exploitation simultaneously. To this end, punctuated equilibrium contends that the 
balance can be achieved through a sequential pattern of longer periods of 
exploitation and short bursts of exploration.  
As far as enabling structures are concerned, to balance exploration and 
exploitation simultaneously, firms may benefit from an internal corporate 
venturing structure, ambidextrous structure, and/or structural differentiation. 
Internal corporate venturing structure refers to a structure that stimulates the 
creation of new business within existing firms (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999) 
through the creation of new competencies and capabilities underlying new 
products and services (Zahra et al., 1999).  Through internal corporate venturing, 
scholars have suggested that an ambidextrous structure design by creating separate 
units within the corporate structure to facilitate new venture development 
(Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996; Jansen et al. 2009; Westerman et al., 2006). Such 
design corresponds also to structural differentiation which refers to “the state of 
segmentation of the organizational system into subsystems, each of which tends to 
develop particular attributes in relation to the requirements posed by its relevant 
external environment” (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967, p.3-4).  Structural 
differentiation may help ambidextrous organizations to maintain multiple 
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competences that deal with paradoxical demands such as exploration and 
exploitation (Gilbert, 2005; Burgers et al., 2009; Jansen et al., 2009).  
Third, in consistent with the internal corporate and ambidextrous structures, 
managerial processes such as incorporating venture capital metrics (Beinhocker, 
1999; Burgelman, 1983; Burgers et al., 2009) and encouraging ambidextrous 
learning (Gilbert, 2006; Westerman et al., 2006; Kwee et al., 2006/Chapter 4 of 
this thesis) are very relevant for the efforts of balancing exploitation and 
exploration concurrently. Venture capital metrics help to create relatively robust 
level for venture managers to manage the stages from pre-venture to 
commercialization fruitfully (Burgelman, 1983). Additionally, ambidextrous 
learning enables managers to action learning that concurrently balances 
exploitation and exploration either in low or high levels of balance aligned with the 
pertaining knowledge environment.  
With reference to enabling leaderships, Burgelman (1983, p.241) contends 
that leaders who encourage autonomous entrepreneurial activities “may be one of 
the most important resources for maintaining corporate capability for renewal 
through internal development.” Likewise Jansen et al. (2008) argue that 
transformational leadership increases the effectiveness of senior team attributes in 
ambidextrous organizations through the moderating role of the effectiveness of 
senior team social integration and contingency rewards.  
The need to balance exploration and exploitation concurrently for a firm’s 
long-term viability is also well recognized by Shell. This is reflected through one 
of our interviews with Shell’s top managers. The option theory that was mentioned 
by the interviewee also reflects the idea of requisite variety (Ashby, 1964) that 
relates to the first key principle. 
 
“We recognize that it is fundamental to pay attention to the short-term and long-term 
focuses. On one hand, we are very keen to activities that are very much geared toward 
improving our existing technologies. On the other hand, we also seriously invest in exploring 
something new. I believe that Shell has always been adopting an option theory. In Jeroen van 
der Ver’s, our CEO’s, term, this option theory is called ‘pots on the fire’ basically means 
creating options for future. By generating many options, we direct our strategic orientation 
by thinking ‘what can this company be for the next 100 years?’ instead of thinking ‘what 
would this company be in the next 10 years?’”. 
(Interview with a Shell’s top manager at the planning department, 27 September 2007) 
 
Altogether Levinthal & March (1993), Lewin et al. (1999), and March 
(1991) suggest that maintaining a balance of exploration and exploitation activities 
in a firm is a primary factor in its survival and prosperity  Maintaining a balance 
means that neither exploration nor exploitation should be conducted at the expense 
of the other: firms engaging in exploration at the expense of exploitation are likely 
to find that they suffer the costs of experimentation without gaining many of its 
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benefits, whereas exploitation at the expense of exploration threatens a firm’s 
survival by creating a competency trap; a continual elaboration of increasingly 
obsolete capabilities. As such, this exploration / exploitation tension “takes 
dynamism into consideration by advancing an explanation for why and how 
organizations survive over time or fail to do so” (Lewin et al. 1999, p. 537). 
The above discussions are in line with the sustained strategic renewal 
perspective, in particular from the third principle of self-renewal. In particular, 
Volberda and Lewin (2003) contend that firms should balance concurrent 
innovation and knowledge creation (exploration) with improvements in 
productivity, process improvements and efficiency, and product extensions and 
enhancement (exploitation). Their idea is that self-renewing organizations 
synchronize and balance concurrent exploitation of existing competences and 
exploration for new opportunities. This suggests the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3:  
Balancing exploitation and exploration concurrently over time positively 
influences sustained strategic renewal.  
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5.4 Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter, we have developed an extended conceptual framework 
that links our conceptual studies in the earlier chapters with our empirical studies 
in the upcoming chapters. We elaborated on the three key principles of self-
renewing organizations (Volberda and Lewin, 2003). Additionally, we 
substantiated key antecedents of the three key principles by building on Lewin and 
Volberda (2004) that comprise enabling strategies, structures, managerial 
processes, and leadership associated with each of the three key principles. To sort 
out the potential constructs of the three key principles, we have also put forward 
three propositions related to each of the key principles. Table 5.1 summarizes the 
propositions with the respective chapters for further empirical investigation. The 
empirical studies will primarily focus on the three key principles. Before we 
present our empirical studies, we first explore several research methods that are 
relevant to conduct the empirical studies.  
 
Table 5.4: Summary of propositions of the three key principles 
Key Principle (KP) Proposition Chapter 
KP1: Internal rate of 
change vs. external 
rate of change 
• Aligning the internal rate of change of a firm with the 
external rate of change of the firm’s environment 
positively influences sustained strategic renewal. 
8 
KP2: Self-organization • Self-organization positively influences a firm’s sustained 
strategic renewal.  
9 
KP3: Exploitation and 
exploration 
• Balancing exploitation and exploration concurrently over 
time positively influences sustained strategic renewal. 
10 
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6. Methodology of Empirical Studies 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Edmondson and McManus (2007) argue that a good research project necessitates a 
methodology that is consistent with research questions one poses and theoretical 
contributions one attempts to make. We incorporate their suggestion when 
designing our research methodology. While theoretical foundations we described 
in Chapter 2 advocate us on theoretical ground rules of a conceptual frame of 
reference and a set of sensitizing concepts (Barley, 1990), research methodology 
described in this chapter advocates us on methodological ground rules of how the 
frame of reference can be put into research implementation and how the set of 
sensitizing concepts can be operationalized into measurable proxies.   
On the basis of that, this chapter discusses why we chose a particular 
method in carrying out this PhD study. In outlining our research methodology, we 
focus on questions such as what approaches should be used to study sustained 
strategic renewal over long period of time, what data sources should be used and 
collected, and what type of analyses can be conducted given the approaches and 
data sources.  
This chapter is structured as follows. We start with the research design. In 
this respect, we undertook longitudinal research by means of a comparative case 
study method. Time is embedded in our study through a longitudinal content 
analysis that covers a long period of time. We also chose the multilevel study 
method in doing the longitudinal study which occurs at the industry and firm 
levels. Subsequently, this chapter highlights choices about selection of case 
industry and case companies, data collection, and data analysis techniques. We 
then point out the methodological consequences resulted from the research design 
before we conclude the chapter. 
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6.2 Empirical Research Design 
Methodological Approaches 
There is a broad agreement among organizational researchers that major 
contributions in empirical work in organizations will be made on the basis of 
longitudinal research (Monge, 1990; Pettigrew, 1990). The underlying argument is 
based on the notion that organization science is moving in the direction of studying 
dynamic processes. This implies that organization studies will be dynamic rather 
than static and research will be based on longitudinal designs rather than single 
point-in-time designs. This view of organization studies generally takes a relatively 
long-term perspective and favors longitudinal designs in empirical research. 
On the basis of the upshot of the above discussion, the methodological 
strategy that we chose to conduct our empirical study seems obvious. It is vital for 
us to incorporate a temporal analysis in studying dynamic processes of sustained 
strategic renewal over an extended period of time. In other words, our research 
should attend to longitudinal effects of organizational adaptation within a historical 
context of a firm and its environment. This study is, therefore, built on a 
longitudinal method.  
Furthermore, since our study is built on a coevolutionary perspective, the 
longitudinal research approach also matches some of the requirements of a 
coevolutionary study as suggested by Lewin and Volberda (1999), among others: 
(1) studying organization adaptation over a long period of time by using 
longitudinal time series of microstate adaptation events and measures of rate of 
change or pace of change; (2) examining organizational adaptation within a 
historical context of the firm and its environment; and (3) incorporating changes 
occurring at the level of firm and industry. 
In addition to the longitudinal method, because this study focuses mainly on 
the ‘how’ research questions of strategic renewal that are not yet thoroughly 
researched, a case study is also the logical methodology (Yin, 1984). In principle, a 
case study is a research strategy that focuses on understanding the dynamics past 
and presents drawn from multiple sources of evidence within certain settings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b). Case studies that examine changes in strategy over long 
periods of time (e.g. Miles and Cameron, 1982; Mintzberg and Waters, 1982; 
Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985) indeed provide an important contribution to theory 
development. 
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Also due to the long time span covered in our study, we use a retrospective 
longitudinal approach. Retrospective longitudinal designs that built upon historical 
accounts, however, have been criticized for incorporating potential hindsight biases 
in the findings (Golden, 1992, 1997). Pettigrew (1990) counters this critique by 
arguing that history is not merely past events and retrospective chronology but it 
shows deeper pathways that lead to the present and may shape the future. History 
facilitates a broader longitudinal scope for investigating changes in a firm’s 
strategy over time. We incorporate both concerns through a triangulated method by 
gathering different types of data that can be used as cross-checks. The triangulated 
method is possible here as case studies typically combine data-collection methods 
of qualitative, quantitative or both data from varying sources.  
Finally, we also use a multilevel method when incorporating both selection 
and adaptation perspectives discussed in Chapter 2. In particular to study the 
complex and dynamic interaction among organizational and environmental forces, 
we chose to focus on an industry level as well as on a firm level. We elaborate on 
the selection of industry and case companies in the following section. 
 
Selection of Case Industry and Case companies 
With regard to research settings, selection of a case industry is an important aspect 
as it defines the set of entities from which the sampling firms are to be drawn. It 
also controls extraneous variation and helps to define the limits for generalizing the 
findings (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Yin, 1984). A single case study, in this sense, is 
subject to limits in generalizability and several potential biases such as the 
misjudgment of the representativeness of a single event (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1986). Therefore besides doing our case study on a focal company, we also take 
into account such concern by employing a comparative case study.  
In the first place at the industry level, we selected the oil industry as our 
central case industry. Why is the oil industry then relevant for studying sustained 
strategic renewal over a long period of time? There are at least three reasons that 
we considered during the selection process. First, the oil industry is relevant for 
this PhD study as it has experienced critical events or changes (see Table 6.1) that 
have reshaped its competitive landscape over time (Grant, 2003). More 
specifically, they had experienced a radical transformation of their industry 
environment from one of stability and continuity to one of uncertainty and 
turbulence (Grant, 2003). Consequently, the oil industry provides a propitious 
background for studying organizational transformation and survival (Pettigrew, 
1987; Wischnevsky, 2004). Jacoby (1973) mentions four distinguishing 
characteristics of the oil and gas industry. The industry is characterized by (a) high 
levels of technical, economic, and political risk, (b) the need for continuity of 
operations, (c) a complex environment of governmental regulations, and (d) 
relative difficult conditions to entry. These characteristics are also very relevant for 
studying how changes in key environmental events may influence changes in 
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firms’ internal events (cf. the first key principle of self-renewal). Second, since our 
study focuses on sustained strategic renewal of long-lived firms, we need to select 
a large incumbent industry that has existed for a long period of time. The oil 
industry is one of the very few large incumbent industries that has been in 
existence for centuries (Yeomans, 2004; Yergin, 1993). The oil majors were 
among the world’s largest industrial corporations (Grant, 2003). Third, the 
selection of a single large long-lived industry also allows us to control for industry 
effects that may confound the results (Dess, Ireland, & Hitt, 1990). The oil 
companies were unusual in their complexity; they were vertically integrated, 
diversified, and multinational. They were confronted with complex coordination 
problems (Grant, 2003). Because of the size and complexity of large oil 
companies, we can see that “the transition from a stable to turbulent environment 
in this industry sector is more apparent than in any other industries” (Grant and 
Cibin, 1996, p.167).  
 
Table 6.1: Summary of world oil industry critical event 
Year World oil industry critical event 
1928 Red line agreement that marked the creation of an oil monopoly or cartel 
1937 Nationalization of Mexican oil fields  
1951 Nationalization of Iranian oil fields 
1960 Formation of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
1967 Yom Kippur War, Arab oil embargo 
1973 First oil / energy crisis 
1974 Formation of International Energy Agency (IEA) 
1979 Second energy crisis 
1980s Oil glut, a surplus of crude oil due to falling demand following the 1973 and 1979 
energy crises 
1982 First OPEC quotas 
1986 Oil price collapse 
2006-2007 Prices spike on supply disruptions, rapid demand increases, constrained OPEC 
capacity, low inventories 
Source: Yergin, 1997; Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
 
In the second place at the firm level, we selected two large, long-lived firms 
in the oil industry which have experienced transition as the result of technological 
or other environmental changes. As a result, we chose respectively Royal Dutch 
Shell plc (Shell) as our focal firm and British Petroleum plc (BP) as our 
comparative firm.  
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Why is Shell suitable for studying the evolvement of strategic renewal 
trajectories? As far as type of organization is concerned, we based our selection on 
at least three main reasons. First, the long history of Shell’s company records 
provides us with a rich data set and a full account to observe the firm’s longitudinal 
strategic renewal trajectories. Second, until 2004 Shell embodied a dual-ownership 
structure through the board compositions of “Committee of Managing Directors” 
(CMD). The CMD composition was in existence from 1959 until 2004. This dual 
ownership structure matches with our intention to study the role of top 
management in influencing a firm’s strategic renewal (Chapter 10). Third, Shell’s 
competitiveness in the oil industry (Brenneman et al., 1998; De Geus, 1999; Grant, 
2003; Schoemaker and Van der Heijden, 1992) increases the accessibility to rich 
sources of publicly available information (e.g. Cummins and Beasant, 2005; 
Gabriels and Jongmans, 1990; Gerretson, 1959; Howarth, 1992, 1998; Jones, 1977; 
Van Zanden et al., 2007; Yergin, 1993). In addition, both retired as well as active 
top managers of Shell provided us with supplementary archival data. Through in-
depth interviews, they also provided us with key historical strategic events that are 
more insightful than the ones reported in the public and archival data. 
Alternatively, we asked why we chose BP as the comparative firm for our 
empirical study. First of all, we chose to have a comparative analysis as it is an 
appropriate initial boundary-setting approach to general organizational theory 
(Udy, 1965). Without it, case studies remain haphazard and generalizations remain 
dubious. Second, Shell and BP have somehow a comparable background. Both 
Shell and BP are big oil majors that were at the top 5 list of the Global 500 four 
years in a row (Source: 2005-2008 Fortune Global 500; see Table 7.2 in Chapter 
7). Both are the major competitors for Exxon, Chevron and other oil majors. And 
both manage to survive as long-lived firms albeit of the intense competition in the 
oil industry over the years. However unlike other big oil majors that have the 
American origins, Shell (founded in 1907) and BP (founded in 1909) both have the 
British origin in combination with the Dutch and Iranian/Persian origins 
respectively. 
Altogether, the selection of oil industry allows us to control environmental 
variation and to clarify the domain of findings, i.e. the specific type of industry 
environment in which these two large oil firms operate. By deciding on this 
research design, we aim to implement a longitudinal comparative case study 
method (Pettigrew, 1990). 
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6.3 Data Collection Methods and Data Sources 
We aimed to collect data, as suggested by Pettigrew (1990), that are processual (an 
emphasis on patterns of strategic renewal actions over time), comparative (two 
case companies in single industry), historical (take into account the historical 
setting of case industry and case companies) and contextual (examine the 
reciprocal relations between processes and historical and industry contexts). This 
means our focus is on case studies and not just case histories.  
Our data sources comprise primary and secondary data sources (cf. 
Ginsberg, 1988). As a primary data source, we used historical data collected from 
internal and external sources of the target organization. The data include the 
organizational annual reports and other internal documents, books, journals and 
databases. As a secondary data source, we used retrospective data collected 
directly from members of the target organization through interviews. 
Besides for cross-checking, the aim of various data collection methods is to 
draw on different strong points of diverse data sources. Archival documents and 
journals, for instance, have the strength of providing facts of the ‘what’ of change 
and quantitative data but suffer from selective deposit and survival (Pettigrew, 
1990). Interviews, or multiple-informant data, can complement the former sources 
as they provide in-depth qualitative data to reveal the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of changes 
(Pettigrew, 1990).  
In the next sections, we are going to discuss the data sources of this study. 
We start with the discussion of the use of archival data from multiple sources both 
at the oil industry level as well as at the level of our case companies, Shell and BP. 
This is then followed by the discussion of the interviews we conducted as a 
complementary source of the archival data sources. 
 
 
Archival Data Sources 
The use of published histories is particularly important for developing longitudinal 
research designs for researching changes in strategy (Ginsberg, 1988). In the first 
place, we used the annual reports of our case companies. There are at least three 
key reasons why annual reports are relevant for this study. First, annual reports that 
provide comparable corporate information through time (Jauch et al., 1980; 
Kabanoff, 1996; Weber, 1990) make it possible to implement our longitudinal 
research design.  
Second, methodologically in comparison to interviews or questionnaires, 
Osborne et al. (2001) notice the reliability of using annual reports as they do not 
suffer from retroactive sensemaking. The validity of annual reports is also 
emphasized by organizational researchers because senior executives “spend 
considerable time outlining the content of the report, sketching out much of it, and 
proofreading and changing most of it to their taste” (Bowman, 1984, p. 63). Also 
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Fiol (1991, 1995), in her comparison of the annual report statements with internal 
company documents, found that annual reports did not differ significantly from 
internal documents in broad strategic issues and strategic facts.  
Third, annual reports provide key information to study interaction of firms 
with their environment (Dirsmith & Covaleski, 1983) and strategic schemas 
(Nadkarni & Narayanan, 2007; Schneider & Angelmar, 1993). For instance, 
organizational researchers have used annual reports to identify corporate strategic 
actions (Barr et al., 1992), to assess casual reasoning within firms (Bettman and 
Weitz, 1983), and to explain differences in joint ventures (Fiol, 1989).  
Also due to the longitudinal nature of the study, our data collection thus was 
conducted through an archival data collection approach. Our main data consists of 
the annual reports of the management board and company documents of the history 
of Shell and BP. For Shell’s case, we digitalized the annual reports and internal 
documents of the company. The data digitalization is only conducted for the 
Shell’s case as the company has very old and vulnerable hard copies of annual 
reports and internal documents of management board, in particular those from the 
early years (annual reports, 1907-1989; internal documents, 1907-1959). It is also 
possible since we were given an access to the company’s archives. The Shell’s 
annual reports from 1990-2008, however, are available online through the 
company’s website and Thomson Research. For data digitalization, we 
electronically scanned 4,594 pages of the annual reports and internal documents 
after compiling them on a chronological basis. Following the data digitalization, 
we coded strategic renewal actions identified from each year of the annual reports. 
As a cross-check during the coding process, we triangulated our coding from the 
annual reports with our secondary data sources. In the “data analysis technique” 
section, we provide a more detailed explanation of how we did the coding. 
For BP’s case, we did not digitalize the data. Unlike the Shell’s case, we did 
not have an access to the company’s archives and thus limited the duration of our 
analysis.  Therefore as a comparative firm in our study, our analysis of BP started 
from 1970. For the purpose of analysis, we managed to get the online sources of 
BP’s annual reports from 1907-2008 from BP’s website and Thomson Research. 
Additionally, we also collected the oil industry data from BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy 2008 that comprises among others data of oil statistics such as oil 
reserves, oil production, oil consumption and oil prices. There are also oil industry 
data based on the appendices from the study of Van Zanden et al. (2007). 
In addition to internal archival documents of Shell and BP, we also used 
secondary data describing the history of Shell and BP, and industry publications. 
These include among others publications on the history of the oil industry (Jacoby, 
1973; Sampson, 1975; Eternad et al., 1991; Yergin, 1993) and the history of Shell 
(e.g., Howarth, 1992, 1998; Van Zanden et al., 2007) and BP (Jones, 1977; Ferrier, 
1982; Bamberg, 1994, 2000). Furthermore, we also use external sources of 
databases such as Thomson One Banker, Energy Information Administration, and 
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Online Derwent Databases. Table 6.2 summarizes the data sources that we used in 
conducting this PhD research. 
 
Table 6.2: Summary of sources of archival data 
Sources of Archival Data 
Oil industry Jacoby, 1973; Sampson, 1975; Eternad et al., 1991; Yergin 1993; Energy Information 
Administration (www.eia.doe.gov); BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008; 
Appendices from Van Zanden et al. 2007; Thomson One Banker; Online Derwent 
Databases (www.derwent.co.uk) 
Type of 
data 
sources 
Shell BP 
Internal 
firm’s 
document 
sources 
• Annual reports, 1907-2008 (Shell’s 
archive; company website: 
www.shell.com; Thomson Research) 
• Internal documents of management 
board, 1907-1959 (Shell’s archive) 
• Organizational directory, 1985-1994 
(Shell’s archive) 
• HR archives and Shell’s Who’s Who 
system, 1994-2008 (Shell’s archives 
and Intranet system) 
• Annual reports, 1970-2008 (BP’s 
website: www.bp.com; Thomson 
Research) 
• BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy 2008 
(www.bp.com/statisticalreview) 
 
External 
firm’s 
document 
publications 
• References: Gerretson, 1957; Jones, 
1977; Gabriels & Jongmans, 1990; 
Howarth, 1992, 1998; Yergin 1993; 
Brenneman et al., 1998; Grant, 2002; 
Cummins & Beasant, 2005; Tyler, 
2007; Van Zanden et al., 2007) 
• Thomson One Banker 
• Energy Information Administration 
(www.eia.doe.gov) 
• Online Derwent Databases 
(www.derwent.co.uk) 
• References: Longhurst, 1959; 
Jones, 1977; Ferrier, 1982; 
Bamberg, 1994, 2000; Pettigrew & 
Whittington, 2003. 
• Thomson One Banker 
• Energy Information Administration 
(www.eia.doe.gov) 
• Online Derwent Databases 
(www.derwent.co.uk) 
 
Another reason why we used archival data sources is that the necessity in 
this study of a longitudinal research design relying upon historical data diminishes 
the utility of self-typing and retrospective external assessments (See Golden, 1992, 
for a discussion of the limitations of retrospective external assessments). 
Nevertheless, archival documents such as annual reports have also been criticized 
as suffering from internal bias. Researchers must be aware of the communication 
strategies of senior executives with external stakeholders (Ingram & Frazier, 1983).  
To address this issue, we use multiple sources of data to ensure and to 
augment the soundness of our research through data triangulation from diverse 
sources. Besides annual reports and internal company documents and archives, our 
sources of data stem from other publicly available documents, scholarly journals, 
computerized databases and interviews. The documents from external sources can 
help to mitigate the internal bias and enhance the external validity. 
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Even when archival data are available, a researcher must frequently employ 
retrospective accounts to interpret the data. For instance, Schwenk (1985, p. 501) 
noted that researchers who merely observe organizational decision processes (as 
opposed to also relying on retrospective accounts) may “see decision processes as 
quasi-random simply because they lack the knowledge about the organization 
necessary to find the order that exists in its decision processes”. The next section 
will address how we collected our data through interviews. 
 
 
Interviews 
In retrospective longitudinal research, one can conduct interviews by eliciting 
accounts of the past from key informants (Seidler, 1974) or groups of individuals 
to obtain information about past strategy. Selecting multiple informants at different 
organizational levels helped to mitigate subject biases (Golden, 1992) and to 
provide a broader range of perspectives (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Guba & 
Lincoln, 1989).  
In organizational research, executives’ retrospective accounts have been 
used alone, or in conjunction with other methods, to identify firm strategy (Boeker, 
1989; Feeser & Willard, 1990), planning process (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; 
Mintzberg, Raisinghani & Theoret, 1976; Nutt, 1987) and strategic and 
organizational change (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Smith & Grimm, 1987). 
In many cases, eliciting accounts of the past from key informants (Seidler, 1974) or 
groups of individuals is the only way to obtain information about past strategy.  
As mentioned before, since we only had an internal access to Shell, we 
could only conduct interviews with the top managers of Shell. Interviews were 
semi-structured and were conducted from December 2006 until December 2007. 
The interviews lasted for one to two hours and were conducted with sixteen top 
managers who were still in service with Shell during the period of interviews and 
with five retired executives (previously worked for Shell). All interviewees have 
worked in different functions. The interviews were tape-recorded and the 
transcripts were written (Yin, 2003). The transcription resulted in 316 double-
spaced pages of interview text. In some cases, interviewees were re-contacted after 
the interviews for confirmatory or follow-up questions. Eventually this procedure 
might provide the basis for a more comprehensive instrument of organizational 
assessment on emergent themes such as self-organization. This analytic approach 
is also appropriate for organizing longitudinal data, especially when based on a 
single case of abundant information (Langley, 1999).  
 
 
 
124
108 Chapter 6 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 summarizes the profile of interviewees, the years of service at 
Shell, duration of interview, and the number of pages resulted from the interview 
transcriptions. The interview questions can be found in Appendix A of this thesis.  
 
Table 6.3: Overview of interviews at Shell  
Job function Job title Years of 
service  
Number of 
respondents
Duration 
of 
interview 
(minutes) 
Number of 
pages of 
interview 
transcripts 
Management (Former) Executive >30 1 117 18
Management (Former) Senior manager >30 1 105 16
Planning (Former) Senior manager 30-40 2 228 35
Research (Former) Executive >30 1 98 18
Technology Executive >25 1 107 17
Public Relations Executive >10 1 68 12
Planning Executive and senior 
manager 
25-35 3 276 42
Strategy Executive and senior 
manager 
20-30 3 299 46
Research Senior manager 20-35 2 234 29
Innovation Senior manager 20-35 3 307 46
Patent Manager 25-30 2 112 22
Investment Senior manager >30 1 75 15
 Total 21 2,026 316
 
Interview method may be very time-consuming. In total, we spent 2,026 
minutes (almost 34 hours) for conducting the interviews, excluding the time (more 
than a month) spent to transcribe the interviews. The method, nevertheless, helps 
us to reveal some organizational constructs that do not lend themselves easily to 
quantitative measurement (Strauss and Corbin, 1988). For instance, the construct 
of self-organization in our study to some extent also requires qualitative 
comprehension despite being assessed quantitatively. All in all, the combination of 
quantitative and qualitative data obtained from diverse sources provides rich data 
sources to investigate organizational sustained strategic renewal over an extensive 
period of time. 
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6.4 Data Analysis Method 
To analyze the rich data set, we employed several data analysis techniques that are 
appropriate to investigate each of the three key principles of sustained strategic 
renewal. Table 6.4 shows an overview of data analysis techniques that we used to 
investigate the three key principles along with the associated measures, level of 
analysis and time frame. In the rest of this section, we will discuss the data analysis 
method that we used to study each of the three key principles.  
 
Table 6.4: Overview of data analysis techniques used to investigate three key principles 
Key 
Principle 
Measure Level of 
Analysis 
Data Analysis 
Technique 
Time Frame 
1: 
Rate of 
Change 
• Homogeneous measures 
for internal rate of 
change (IRC) and 
external rate of change 
(ERC) 
• Heterogeneous measures 
for internal rate of 
change (IRC) and 
external rate of change 
(ERC) 
• Differences between 
internal and external 
rates of change (∆RC) 
• Average annual IRC, 
ERC, ∆RC 
• Volatility of annual IRC, 
ERC, ∆RC 
• Industry 
level (oil 
industry) 
• Firm level 
(Shell and 
BP) 
 
• Computation 
of rates of 
change 
• Structural 
change test 
(Chow, 
1960) 
• Content 
analyses of 
archival data 
and 
interviews 
Depending on 
data 
availability, 
analysis of 
each level can 
range from: 
• Oil 
industry 
(1907-
2008) 
• Shell 
(1907-
2008) 
• BP (1970-
2008) 
2: 
Self-
Organization 
• Hierarchical level 
• Chief executive’s span of 
control 
• Administrative intensity 
• Firm level 
(Shell only)
• Computation 
of self-
organization 
measures 
• Content 
analysis of 
interviews 
• Shell, 
1985-2008 
3: 
Exploitation= 
Exploration 
• Exploitation ratio of 
exploitative strategic 
renewal actions 
• Exploration ratio of 
explorative strategic 
renewal actions 
• External ratio of external 
growth strategic renewal 
actions 
• Internal ratio of internal 
growth strategic renewal 
actions 
• Top management team 
(TMT) corporate 
governance perspective 
• Proportion of 
shareholders 
• Firm level 
(Shell and 
BP) 
• Strategic 
renewal 
actions 
(Shell and 
BP) 
• Top 
manageme
nt team 
(Shell 
only) 
• Content 
analyses of 
archival data 
• Computation 
of ratios of 
strategic 
renewal 
actions 
• Correlation 
analysis 
• Shell, 
1907-2006 
• BP, 1970-
2006 
• For the 
study of 
TMT is 
only 
applicable 
for Shell, 
1959-2004 
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Data analysis techniques for investigating the first principle 
To begin with, we put forward the method of how to calculate change over time. 
The rate of change specifies how fast the magnitude increases or decreases per unit 
of time (Monge, 1990). To calculate the rate of change of data from two or more 
points in time, we use the following formula as shown in Table 6.5. The rates of 
change (RC, in percentage) can have a value of minus, zero or plus. While the 
negative resulting number means a decrease of rate of change over time, the 
positive resulting number means an increase of rate of change over time. If the RC 
equals to zero, this means that there is no change in the value between the earlier 
point and the later point in time.  
By the same token, we computed the differences between the annual internal 
and external rates of change (∆RC), the result can also be negative, zero or 
positive. For the measures of RC, they are not additive as the time window changes 
along the timeline. However, for the homogeneous measures we can compute the 
magnitude of the differences of the levels between the annual IRC and ERC (sum 
of ∆RC over the years). While negative ∆RC means that at a certain year the 
annual internal rate of change (IRC) is falling behind the annual external rate of 
change (ERC); positive ∆RC means that the annual IRC exceeds the annual ERC. 
If ∆RC equals to zero, this means that the annual IRC exactly matches the annual 
ERC. For the heterogeneous measures, the measures of ERC or IRC are not 
additive. In this case, to better describe the distribution of the rates of change, we 
use the minimum and maximum values of yearly ERC or IRC instead of the sum of 
the ∆RC. Additionally, we also computed the average and volatility of annual IRC, 
ERC, and ∆RC.  
 
Table 6.5: Computation of rates of change 
Measure Formula or definition Symbol 
• Rate of change 
RC (%) = 100*1
1
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
−t
t
X
X
 
• RC: rate of change (in 
percentage) 
• Xt : value from the later 
point in time 
• Xt-1: value from the earlier 
point in time 
• For homogeneous measures 
only: Magnitude of the level 
differences between annual 
internal and external rates 
of change 
∆RC = IRC – ERC  
• For heterogeneous measures 
only: Minimum and 
maximum values of yearly 
internal and external rates 
of change 
• Min. annual IRC or ERC 
• Max. annual IRC or ERC 
• Average annual  RC Average of annual IRC, ERC, 
or ∆RC 
• Volatility of annual RC Standard deviation of annual 
IRC, ERC, or ∆RC 
• ∆RC: differences between 
annual internal and external 
rates of change 
 
 
 
• IRC: internal rate of change 
• ERC: external rate of 
change 
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As indicated in Table 6.4 before, for the measures of rates of change we 
developed homogeneous and heterogeneous measurement indicators to quantify 
both external and internal rates of change. We develop these two types of 
measurement indicators because of the limitation of the availability of longitudinal 
data that have comparable and sufficient duration for both firm and industry level. 
Additionally, in some cases there are measures that are specific to the industry 
level or specific to the firm level, but not for both industry and firm levels. For 
instance, data such as oil prices and competitive diversity are only available at the 
industry level but not for the firm level. Table 6.6 provides the definition of 
homogeneous and heterogeneous measures. We will delineate the measurement 
indicators for each of the two types of measures in Chapter 8 (see Table 8.1). 
 
Table 6.6: Homogeneous and heterogeneous measures of rates of change 
Type of measures Definition 
Homogeneous measures Measures that are similar and comparable between the industry level 
and the firm level 
Heterogeneous measures Measures that are different between the industry level and the firm level 
Source: Author. 
 
 Regarding the heterogeneous measures, for the firm level, we built upon 
Fine (1998). Fine (1998) introduced the concept of industry clockspeed to capture 
the rate of industry change driven by endogenous factors (technological and 
competitive). He suggested three facets of industry clockspeed: product, process, 
and organizational. Product clockspeed represents new product introduction rates. 
Process clockspeed reflects the rates at which process technologies are replaced in 
an industry. Organizational clockspeed reflects the rate of change in the strategic 
actions (e.g. mergers, acquisitions, internal expansion, interorganizational 
alliances) and structures (e.g., restructuring and changes in top management) of 
incumbent firms in an industry. The results, however, are based on the aggregate 
actions of all incumbent firms in an industry rather than the actions of any 
individual firm. Our study complements Fine’s study by also looking at the firm-
level actions.  
To this end, we built upon the Fine’s (1998) concept of the industry 
clockspeed by translating it into the firm-level concept, respectively: the internal 
rate of change (IRC) of new products and services, process, organizational 
structure, and internal venturing. Fine’s (1998) organizational clockspeed entails 
two aspects: the structure and the strategic actions of venturing. We take these into 
account by separating the change in organization structure with the change in 
venturing. For the venturing activity, we divided into the internal and external 
venturing. Since we have data on external venturing for both the industry and the 
firm levels, we categorize the rate of change of external venturing into the 
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homogeneous measure. While for the internal venturing, since we only have the 
data at the firm level, we categorize it into the heterogeneous measures. Table 6.7 
shows the translation from Fine’s (1998) concept of industry clockspeed into our 
firm-level heterogeneous measurement indicators. 
 
Table 6.7: Measures built on Fine’s (1998) concept of industry clockspeed 
Dimension Fine (1998) This study 
Focus Aggregate actions of all incumbent 
firms in an industry, an indication 
of industry clockspeed 
Individual actions at an individual firm level, 
an indication of firm-level heterogeneous 
measures 
• Product clockspeed: new 
product introduction rates 
Firm-level heterogeneous measures: 
• Internal rate of change (IRC) new 
products and services: rate of new 
product/service introduction 
 
• Process clockspeed: rates at 
which process technologies are 
replaced in an industry 
• IRC process: rate of new process 
technology 
 
Measure and 
definition 
• Organizational clockspeed: rate 
of change in the strategic 
actions (e.g. mergers, 
acquisitions, internal 
expansion, interorganizational 
alliances) and structures (e.g., 
restructuring and changes in 
top management) of incumbent 
firms in an industry 
• IRC organizational structure: rate of 
restructuring in organization, departments, 
and changes in top management 
• IRC internal venturing: rate of internal 
expansion 
Homogeneous measures (due to the 
availability of data in both the industry and 
the firm levels)” 
• Internal and external rate of change of 
external venturing: rate of change of 
mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, and 
interorganizational alliances 
 
Additionally to investigate the first key principle, we used Chow test (Chow, 
1960) in the SPSS software to indicate if there is indeed a change in the industry. A 
time series or longitudinal data can often contain a structural break. The Chow test 
uses an F-test to determine whether a single regression is more efficient than two 
separate regressions involving splitting the data into two sub-samples. In principle, 
the purpose to do the Chow test is to develop a framework that may focus on major 
social breakpoints (Pettigrew, 1985; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) in a firm’s 
history that indicate the end or beginning of periods of continuity or change. 
After that, we used a structured content analysis technique (Jauch et al., 
1980; Weber, 1990) to obtain data on the rate of change related to the rate of 
change of firm-level data of product/service, process, organizational, and internal 
venturing rates of change. Here, our main data consists of the annual reports of 
Shell and BP. We coded and calculated the yearly frequency of new 
product/service introductions, new process/technology, change in organizational 
structure and top management, and internal venturing that are initiated by the case 
firms. We then computed the rate of change of those variables.  
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In principle, the structured content analysis technique (Jauch et al., 1980; 
Weber, 1990) is an approach that uses a set of coding procedures to make valid and 
replicative inferences from text and to move the rich qualitative descriptions of the 
case studies approach beyond the quantification of the qualitative constructs 
(Weber, 1990; Stone et al., 1966; Krippendorff, 1980).  
Why did we choose the longitudinal content analysis technique? We based 
our decision on the argument that content analysis allows rendering the rich 
meaning associated with organizational documents combined with powerful 
quantitative longitudinal analysis (Duriau et al., 2007). Content analysis of 
organizational documents and published histories provides an important way to 
quantify historical data (Ginsberg, 1988). Hence, content analysis, which involves 
coding words, phrases, and sentences in terms of particular constructs, appears to 
hold much promise for researchers interested in going beyond qualitative case 
studies or questionnaire designs in the investigation of changes in strategy 
(Bowman, 1985). Jauch et al. (1980) contrast the case studies through content 
analysis with questionnaires. Questionnaires are particularly susceptible to the 
problems of same source data, single-time collection and lack of depth regarding 
dynamic and comprehensive organizational conditions and processes. Cases 
studies through content analysis, however, can provide data from multiple sources 
over several time periods in considerable depth. The results from content analysis 
can also be used to explore dynamic changes over time. Furthermore while 
questionnaire measures have a number of conceptual and measurement problems 
(e.g. Downey et al., 1975; Tosi et al., 1973; Osborn, 1976), structured content 
analysis can provide an additional quantifiable assessment that is structured and 
replicable. Content analysis method can also provide separate estimates of 
volatility in different parts of a firm’s environment (Jauch et al., 1977). Table 6.8 
contrasts the key differences between questionnaire-type of study and content 
analysis.  
 
Table 6.8: Differences between questionnaire and content analysis 
Characteristics Questionnaire Content Analysis 
Data source Same source data Multiple sources 
Period of data  Single period Multiple time periods 
Level of depth Lack of depth regarding dynamic of 
change processes 
Considerable depth to study dynamic 
changes over time 
Source: based on Jauch et al. (1980) 
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Furthermore, there are several methodological and practical benefits that we 
can achieve by implementing content analysis. First, this technique is considered as 
a reliable methodology because the coding scheme can be corrected and improved 
as the study proceeds (Tallerico, 1991; Woodrum, 1984). Second, content analysis 
requires the specification of category criteria for reliability and validity checks that 
fosters the creation of a replicable database (Lissack, 1998; Woodrum, 1984). 
Third, content analysis can be used in conjunction with other methods for the 
purpose of triangulation (Erdener & Dunn, 1990; Jauch, Osborn, & Martin, 1980; 
Kabanoff, 1996; Smith, Grimm, & Gannon, 1992).   
 
 
Data analysis techniques for investigating the second principle 
In the context of studying the self-organization principle, the issue of measuring 
the construct is still a challenge. A major task is the development of conceptual and 
methodological tools, particularly for dealing systematically with 
operationalization of self-organization construct. From a methodological 
standpoint, the selection of an appropriate measurement and analysis technique is 
certainly of great importance.  
Some scholars (e.g. Krippendorf, 1984; Steier and Smith, 1985) have argued 
that self-organization must be observed and studied through organizational 
characteristics. It follows that self-organization exhibits a close connection with 
bureaucratic structure and control but in a contradictory way (Nonaka, 1988). For 
one thing from the self-organization perspective, dispersion of authority down the 
hierarchy can take place without loss of control. For another thing in the view of 
self-organization, decreased concentration of authority seems to accompany 
increased structuring of activities (Inkson et al., 1970).  
Consistent with the above views in this study, structural concepts drawn 
mainly from the theory of hierarchical structure were conceptualized as a means of 
characterizing concentration of authority and administrative structures of 
organizations and used as variables in the study of self-organization.  
Building on this idea, we translated the previously well-established 
dimensions of hierarchical structure into measurement indicators of self-
organization in an attempt to quantitatively assess the variation of self-organization 
in an organization (in this case, Shell) over time. Table 6.9 shows the measurement 
indicators of self-organization that we built upon the constructs of bureaucracy. 
For more detailed explanation on these measurement indicators, please refer to 
Chapter 9.2. 
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Table 6.9: Measurement of self-organization 
Measurement 
Indicator 
Definition Data Source & Timeframe 
Hierarchical level Number of levels of authority from 
top management to workers (Pugh 
et al., 1968) 
Shell Exploration & Production (EP) 
Organizational Directories, 1985-1994, 
HR archives and Shell’s Who’s Who 
system, 1994-2008 
Chief executive’s 
span of control 
Ratio of a chief executive to 
number of subordinates the chief 
executive has (Pugh et al., 1968; 
Evan, 1963) 
Shell EP Organizational Directories, 
1985-1994 
Administrative 
intensity 
Ratio of administrative staffs to 
exploration and production staffs 
(Evan, 1963; Melman, 1956) 
Shell Organizational Directories (NL & 
UK), 1985-1994; HR archives and 
Shell’s Who’s Who system, 1994-2008 
 
In our study of Shell, after performing the measurement, we will also 
present the quantitative results in a longitudinal chart in Chapter 9.3 to show the 
possible variation of self-organization in Shell over the years. Also in combination 
with the quantitative approach, we employ qualitative method to gain insight on, 
for instance, how important top management teams regard or perceive self-
organization for their firms’ long-term survival (the second key principle). In this 
sense, data were gathered by means of interviews designed to elicit factual 
organizational data from discussions with the top managers of various functional 
activities. Please refer back to Table 6.3 for the overview of the interviews we 
conducted at Shell. The analytic approach of interviews is appropriate for 
organizing longitudinal data, especially when based on a single case of abundant 
information (Langley, 1999). Eventually, the interview procedure provides a basis 
for a more comprehensive instrument of organizational assessment on self-
organization.  
 
Data analysis techniques for investigating the third principle 
According to Kimberley and Miles (1980), historical records of the actions actually 
taken by an organization are often the most accurate sources of the firm’s strategic 
decisions. The method of systematic document analysis has the advantage of 
capturing both a longitudinal and a cross-sectional study approach (Pettigrew, 
1990). Building on the above discussions, we employed the structured content 
analysis technique (Jauch et al., 1980; Weber, 1990) to investigate the third key 
principle, particularly to obtain data of exploratory and exploitative strategic 
renewal actions.  
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In principle, a systematic document analysis is an approach to move the rich 
qualitative descriptions of the case studies approach beyond the quantification of 
the qualitative constructs. Using the content analysis technique, we developed, in 
the first place, a manual that prescribes a structural coding rule and schedule to 
analyze the content of each strategic renewal actions. The coding manual can be 
found in the Appendix B of this thesis. The manual provided a procedure to 
systematically analyze strategic renewal actions of our case companies (Shell and 
BP) and to consistently categorize each of the relevant strategic action based on the 
defined coding rules. The expected bottom line is to uncover longitudinal patterns 
of strategic renewal. This is achieved through the coding of strategic actions 
reported by the top management team in the annual reports. Note also that we 
follow Mintzberg (1978) regarding the realized strategic actions by coding 
strategic actions that are realized (materialized, implemented) for the year in which 
they were reported. For a triangulation purpose, we cross-checked the coding of 
strategic renewal actions with external sources such as books, articles, journals, or 
other publicly accessible documents.  
To address the reliability and validity issues associated with the application 
of content analysis (Huff, 1990; Morris, 1994; Weber, 1990), we developed 
explicit coding rules to ensure reliability and comparability of results across texts. 
Additionally, we need to use multiple coders to ensure high intercoder reliability 
checks (Weber, 1990). To address the intercoder reliability issue, we conducted the 
coding to uncover strategic renewal actions through a team of three researchers. 
For this purpose, one researcher read and coded strategic renewal actions in the 
annual reports for the whole period of study. Using the same coding manual, two 
other researchers respectively coded certain number of years of the annual reports. 
For instance in Shell’s case, the two researchers coded 20 years of the annual 
reports, divided in two periods i.e. 1976-1985 and 1995-2004. The three coders 
agreed on 439 of the 491 strategic renewal actions (89.4%) identified from the 
selected twenty years of annual reports. This resulted in a Cohen’s kappa of 0.82, 
which indicates high intercoder reliability (Weber, 1990). The different coding 
results among the coders are primarily because coder(s) overlooked some of the 
realized strategic renewal actions. These discrepancies were then discussed and 
resolved by using the coding rules in the manual as a guideline. 
Accordingly, we specify the definitions and attributes of each dimension in 
the coding manual. First, regarding exploitative or exploratory strategic renewal 
actions, we adopt the exploitation-exploration dichotomous concepts introduced by 
March (1991). While exploitative strategic renewal actions are defined as actions 
that elaborate on the current range of activities and fall within the current 
geographic scope (expansion, specialization), or that rationalize activities (closure, 
consolidation, downscoping), exploratory strategic renewal actions are defined as 
expanding a firm’s repertoire of activities, making new, innovative combinations 
of current activities, or expanding the geographic scope of a firm’s markets 
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(diversification of activities or geographic regions). For the coding purpose, we 
used binary codes where exploratory strategic renewal actions were coded ‘1’ and 
exploitative strategic renewal actions were coded ‘0’. 
Second, for our second study of the TMT’s corporate governance 
perspective in Chapter 10, we put forward our definitions and attributes of internal 
and external growth strategic renewal actions. This is only done for the Shell’s 
case. Internal growth strategic renewal actions are implemented through one of the 
Royal Dutch Shell Group of Companies; this means through Shell or one of its 
subsidiaries autonomously. Actions that can be categorized as internal growth 
strategic renewal actions include starting up new business, entering new country, 
launching new products/services, obtaining license, reorganizing activities and 
closing offices or product lines. External growth strategic renewal actions are 
undertaken by any of the Shell entity and other external organizations. Actions that 
are grouped as external strategic renewal actions include merger, acquisition, joint 
venture, and other strategic alliances. While external strategic renewal actions were 
coded ‘1’, internal strategic renewal actions were coded ‘0’. To provide a better 
understanding of how we did the coding, we present Table 6.10 to show an 
example of our coding taking the example of Shell’s coding. 
 
Table 6.10: Example of coding of strategic renewal actions  
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1984 10 Netherlands: formation 
of renewable energy 
systems 
“A new company has been established in the 
Netherlands to develop and market solar energy 
systems world wide.”  
1 0 
1987 11 Germany: acquisition 
Celamerck 
“Celamerck, a West German agrochemicals 
company, was acquired.” 
0 1 
1987 14 Netherlands: formation 
phytonova 
“In the Netherlands, Phytonova, a 
micropropagation business, was started.” 
1 0 
1993 1, 10, 
18  
Group companies: cost 
reduction and 
efficiency improvement 
programmes 
“Group companies therefore continued with 
further cost reduction and efficiency 
improvement programmes, particularly in 
Europe and North America.” 
0 0 
Source: Shell’s annual reports, 1984, 1987, 1993. 
 
In addition to archival data collection, we also conducted a series of 
retrospective interviews with sixteen key (active) top managers of Shell from 
different divisions and with four retired executives. This is particularly conducted 
for the study of the TMT’s corporate governance perspective. All interviews were 
taped and were then transcribed. The duration of the interviews ranges from one 
hour to two hours. Please refer back to Table 6.3 for the overview of the 
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interviews. We later used these additional insights to triangulate our initial coding 
as well as our key findings. Subsequently, we used the data that we obtained from 
retrospective interviews to triangulate our key findings.  
To conclude in our empirical research setting, we implemented content 
analysis of organizational documents and published histories to quantify 
retrospective longitudinal data. Our data analysis method is built upon established 
inductive qualitative methods: coding, data categorization, and pattern 
identification (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Miles & Huberman, 1984; Yin, 2003). To this 
end, we followed the basic phases of content analysis: data collection, coding, 
analysis of content, and interpretation of results (Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990). 
 
 
 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Research is an iterative process. In determining the relevant research methodology, 
a researcher needs to consider at least three factors: the research topic, researchers’ 
skills and preferences, and the availability of research sites (Leonard-Barton, 
1990). The methodology described in this chapter is suited for observing and 
exploring organizational processes that involve dynamics of historical and 
evolving patterns of sustained strategic renewal. It guides us to have the wide-
angle lens of the comparative study and the close-up lens of the longitudinal study 
(cf. Pettigrew, 1990).  
Our research questions posed in Chapter 1.4 requires an integrative and 
comprehensive research approach that enables us to investigate the three key 
principles of sustained strategic renewal from multiple methods and levels of 
analysis (cf. Lewin & Volberda, 1999). The longitudinal, comparative and 
multilevel research approaches that we chose are resource intensive and 
intellectually challenging.  
Regarding the longitudinal research design, there are three key points worth 
noting. First, since the longitudinal method requires sufficient duration of analysis, 
it provides us with the opportunity to reveal patterns of temporal changes through 
time-series data. Temporal observations further facilitate a process analysis that 
enables us to examine the origins, development, change and dissolution of strategic 
renewal actions. 
Second, one of the criticisms of the longitudinal content analysis research 
has been that the themes elicited through content analysis may not capture the real-
time dimensions of strategic decision making and that measures such as word 
centrality often do not reflect the hidden intent of the strategist (Huff, 1990). To 
address this issue, we used multiple sources of data (Kabanoff & Holt, 1996; 
Kabanoff, et al., 1995) and to triangulate basic content analysis (Weber, 1990). In 
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particular, we used multiple sources of data consisting of comprehensive archival 
data and interviews that enable us to do quantitative and qualitative data analyses 
(Edmondson and McManus, 2007). Through these multiple sources of data, 
however, we are able to deal with the triangulation issue. 
Finally, since it is very resource-intensive and time-consuming to obtain 
sufficient longitudinal data on each case company, we need to make a tradeoff that 
involves the duration of longitudinal study that is reflected in data collection and 
comparative analysis (Ginsberg, 1988).  In our empirical study, we made this 
tradeoff by conducting a comprehensive longitudinal analysis for our focal firm 
(Shell, 1907-2006) while conducting a more parsimonious longitudinal analysis for 
our comparative firm (1970-2006). As a subsequent consequence, the 
comprehensive investigation of the three key principles is conducted at the focal-
firm level while using the comparative firm at certain aspects of the three key 
principles.   
We also argued in this chapter that the longitudinal content analysis through 
a comparative study best suits the research topic we are pursuing. Regarding the 
content analysis method, we have also ensured the high intercoder reliability by 
using multiple coders and developing coding manual (see page 116). Furthermore 
in this chapter, we also discussed and used diverse data analysis techniques to 
ensure the proper operationalization of the three key principles that resulted into 
valid and reliable measurement indicators.  
In conclusion, this chapter has given a comprehensive sketch of methods for 
research approaches, data collection method, data analysis technique and case-
industry and case-companies selections. In the next chapter, we turn to description 
of our empirical settings of our case companies and our case industry as the 
environment in which the case companies operate.  
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7. Empirical Settings  
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we provide a brief historical account of the oil industry and its 
competitive landscape. Subsequently, we also describe the company history of our 
two case companies, respectively Royal Dutch Shell plc (Shell) and British 
Petroleum plc (BP).  The purpose of this chapter is thus to provide a background 
review of the development of oil industry, Shell and BP over the years. By doing 
so, we aim to highlight the motivation and the contextual relevance of our 
empirical settings for studying sustained strategic renewal.  
This chapter is structured as follows. We start with the description of the 
temporal changes and competitive landscape in the oil industry. Subsequently, we 
highlight the key firm-level events of Shell and BP respectively. Finally, we 
provide an outline of our empirical studies prior to the conclusion of this chapter. 
 
7.2 Oil Industry Outlook 
Oil industry has long been a remarkable prominence that has shaped the world we 
live in today. An early petroleum industry can be traced back to the eight century 
in the Middle-East and continued to the ninth century in Baku (Ajram, 1992). Oil, 
also known as black gold, is vital to many industries and is of importance to the 
maintenance of industrialized civilization itself. This makes oil become a critical 
concern for many nations. Sampson (1975), for instance, propounds that whoever 
controls oil reserves or productions gains in both market and political power. 
Yergin (1993) also asserts that oil is a commodity that has always been intertwined 
with national strategies and global politics and power.  
In fact, with the average yearly consumption of 30 billion barrels, oil 
accounts for a large percentage of the world’s energy consumption, ranging from a 
low 32% for Europe and Asia, up to a high of 53% for the Middle East.1 Figure 7.1 
shows the oil production and oil consumption (in thousand barrels daily) from 
1965 until 20072. We can see here that the oil consumption trend is increasing even 
at a slightly higher rate than the oil production trend, reflecting a very tight balance 
of supply and demand. More specifically in 2007, while global oil consumption 
grew by 1.1% or 1 million barrels per day (b/d), global oil production fell by 0.2% 
                                                 
1 Source: Energy Information Administration (www.eia.doe.gov) 
2 Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008 (www.bp.com) 
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or 130,000b/d. The decreasing of 2007 oil production is partly due to the world’s 
proved oil reserves edged lower in the same year. Although the reserves-to-
production (R/P) ratios of 41.6 years was unchanged in the face of declining oil 
production, the level of reserves fell by 1.6 billion barrels in 2007 due to declines 
in Mexico, Syria, Qatar, and Norway.  
 
Figure 7.1: World oil production and consumption, 1965-2007 (in thousand barrels 
daily)  
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Note: 
• Oil production includes crude oil, shale oil, oil sands and NGLs (the liquid content of natural gas where this 
is recovered separately) 
• Oil consumption is inland demand plus international aviation and marine bunkers and refinery fuel and loss.  
Consumption of fuel ethanol and biodiesel is also included 
 
Operation wise, the oil industry is usually divided into three major streams: 
upstream, midstream and downstream (Yeomans, 2004). Midstream operations are 
normally grouped in the downstream category. The three major operations include 
the global processes of exploration, extraction, refining, transporting (often by oil 
tankers and pipelines), and marketing of petroleum products.  Taken as a whole, 
the three major streams make the oil industry one of the world’s largest industries.  
The importance of oil as a source of energy makes it fundamental for 
producers, consumers and investors to track the world crude oil prices. Due to the 
volatile nature of the supply and demand of the oil industry, crude oil prices 
behave very much as any other commodity with wide price swings in times of 
shortage or oversupply. Major oil price movements can fuel economic growth or 
contrarily drive inflation and kick off recessions (Yergin, 1993). While most 
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industrial firms suffer from higher prices of their supplies, oil producers 
traditionally reap the benefits from rising prices of crude oil as it determines how 
much the company earns for its production and sales (Bloch and Voola, 2002). 
Figure 7.2 shows the time series data of the world’s crude oil prices from 1861 
until 2007 in both dollar values of the year and the dollar 2007 values.  
 
Figure 7.2: World crude oil prices and world key events in the oil industry, 1861-2007 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008 (www.bp.com); Energy Information Administration 
(www.eia.doe.gov)  
 
Figure 7.2 also highlights the world’s key events in the oil industry 
chronologically. The first event can be traced back to 1861 when the first oil well 
in California is drilled manually in Humboldt County3. In 1878, Ludvig Nobel and 
his Barnobel Company revolutionized oil transport by commissioning the first oil 
tanker and launching it on the Caspian Sea (Yergin, 1993; Akiner and Aldis, 
2004). This marked the beginning of Russian oil exports. From this moment on, 
the rush for oil continued in many parts of the world. 
Other key events that worth noting are among others the Second World War 
which was a major shock in the industry. From 1946, companies and nations 
started to compete for economic rewards of oil. Major oil companies continued 
their pre-war cartel as they joined forces to keep prices up. In return, many 
governments nationalized their oil concessions and in 1960 the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed.4 In the 1970s, two major 
events changed the fundamental structure of the industry. The first Energy Crisis 
dates back to 1973, when oil exporting countries decided to raise the price of a 
barrel of crude from $3 to $6 after failed negotiations between the major oil firms 
                                                 
3 Source:  www.sjgs.com/history.html. 
 
4 http://www.opec.org/aboutus/history/history.htm 
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and the OPEC countries. This caused major unpredictability and uncertainty in the 
industry and prices rose further. Prices only stabilized after they quadrupled, and 
when oil companies began looking for alternative supplies. The outbreak of the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979 triggered the second Energy Crisis. Long-term crude 
contracts between nations and multinationals were broken, and speculations on 
spot markets caused prices at the pump to increase fast. The second energy crises 
precipitated the collapse of several firms in the industry and led to the 
disappearance of operational vertical integration of oil companies (Antill and 
Arnott, 2003). In these periods of political instability, engineers and research and 
development departments however did not stand still. Major oil companies 
developed a range of techniques to get cheaper and to transform their supplies in 
more valuable goods through advanced refining and processing techniques (Bloch 
and Voola, 2002; Davis, 2006). During these years, many large oil conglomerates 
diversified into chemicals and even entered into unrelated businesses.  
Following the aforementioned events, high oil prices persisted until early 
1980s. From 1992-1994, the world oil prices had a substantial drop from $19 to 
$15 per barrel. Then from 1997-1998 the oil prices declined from $19 to $12 per 
barrel. This situation however changed when the oil prices started to increase from 
1999 until 2007. On October 19, 2007, the price of a barrel of crude oil reached the 
$ 90 per barrel record mark,5 and stock prices of oil companies rose benefit from 
this trend.6  
At present, oil companies face emerging concerns that need to be seriously 
addressed. Besides political, economic and technological disturbances, changes in 
society largely affect the way companies do business including the oil industry. For 
instance, the rising global energy demand, a reduction of carbon dioxide emission7, 
and the increased awareness of global warming has created a sense of unity among 
people to demonstrate against self-destruction of their planet and for energy 
conservation. 
Considering the long period of existence of the oil industry, some scholars 
attempt to study the underlying factors that enable the longevity of the oil industry. 
Table 7.1 summarizes prior studies that try to explain the long existence of the oil 
industry. In this respect, prior studies use samples of oil companies either through a 
single longitudinal case study, paired case studies, or cross-case studies with many 
samples. Prior research, however, needs a study approach that moves beyond the 
qualitative, comparative case studies and the focus on financial measures. Through 
this PhD study, we aim to enrich the prior research by looking at the renewal 
context (thus beyond financial performance context) through the operationalization 
and quantitative measurement of the three key principles of self-renewing 
organizations (Volberda and Lewin, 2003).  
 
5 MNSBC. October 19, 2007 
6 Financial Times, October 15, 2007. Short View: reporter John Authers on record oil prices and the 
implications for oil stocks. 
7 International Energy Outlook, 2004. 
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Table 7.1: Prior research on longevity of the oil industry  
Authors Focus Study Sample Period Method 
Grant 
and 
Cibin, 
1996 
An in-depth study of 
strategic and 
structural changes in 
the international oil 
majors  
Eight of the world’s ten 
largest oil companies 
(based on the 1985 sales 
revenue) 
1970-1991 Multiple, longitudinal 
case studies within a 
single industry (the oil 
industry); phased 
analyses of changes 
Grant, 
2003 
Strategic planning of 
oil companies in a 
turbulent 
environment 
Eight leading oil and 
gas majors (based on 
1996 sales revenue) 
1970s-
1990s 
In-depth case studies of 
the planning system of 
the eight oil majors 
Dixon et 
al., 2007 
An examination of 
the relationship 
between exploitation 
and exploration 
learning, and the 
development of 
organizational 
capabilities in 
transition economies 
Four Russian privatized 
oil majors 
1995-2005 Longitudinal and cross-
sectional case studies 
through interviews 
Stadler, 
2007 
Four principles of 
enduring success that 
enable companies to 
perform at a very 
high level over very 
long periods of time 
9 paired case studies; 
one of these are a paired 
case study of BP and 
Shell 
1953-2006 Comparative case studies 
by comparing eight to 
ten key financial 
performance indicators 
for each industry in the 
study 
Van 
Zanden 
et al., 
2007 
Five themes: 
operational spread, 
internal organization 
structure, competition 
and performance, 
innovations, and 
politics to explain 
long-term success of 
Shell 
Single case study on the 
history of Shell 
Periodical 
analysis of 
1890-
1939, 
1939-1973 
and 1973- 
2007 
Qualitative historical 
analysis in combination 
with periodical time 
series analyses showing 
the statistical trend of the 
oil industry, Shell and 
key competitors (Exxon 
Mobil and BP) 
 
 In the next section, we discuss the competitive landscape in the oil industry 
by focusing on the four big oil majors which were transformed from the seven 
sisters, the seven big oil majors in the 1970s. 
 
Competitive Landscape in the Oil Industry: Four Big Oil Majors 
According to Sampson (1975) and Jacoby (1973), the oil industry is a solid 
industry with a few key players. The main factor that inhibits firms to exit the 
market and restricts the entrance of new competitors is the capital-intensity of the 
industry. Furthermore, major technological breakthroughs in petroleum refining, 
chemicals, and exploration techniques, have helped major oil companies to 
strengthen their competitive positions. To describe major oil companies that 
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controlled the Middle East’s oil after the Second World War, Enrico Mattei, an 
Italian oil tycoon, coined the phrase “the seven sisters” (Sampson, 1975). The 
seven sisters were Exxon (Esso), Shell, BP, Gulf, Texaco, Mobil, and Socal 
(Chevron). Until 1960 the oil market was effectively controlled, with great 
stability, by the seven sisters. To that end, they formed a scheme in which they 
shared the profits on their concessions with the host countries, in which the 
countries received 50% of the value of extracted oil less the cost of production 
The beginning of those oil majors can be traced back to 1870 when Standard 
Oil was formed by J.D. Rockefeller. In 1882, several US companies signed the 
Standard Oil Trust, creating a monopoly position. In 1902, major oil discoveries in 
East Texas further led to the formation of Texaco and Gulf. To deal with the 
monopoly issue of Standard Oil, Teddy Roosevelt’s administration launched a 
successful antitrust suit against Standard Oil in 1906. Subsequently in 1911, the 
Supreme Court ordered the company to be broken up, creating indirectly the 
forerunners of Exxon, Amoco, Mobil, and Chevron. These four companies 
together with Gulf later comprised the US oil majors of the seven sisters. Later on, 
Shell and BP, that comprised the European oil majors, joined the seven sisters 
together with those US major companies.  
Important changes due to the merger wave that took place in the 1990s, 
transformed the seven sisters into four big oil majors. These important changes that 
include the mergers between BP and Amoco (1998), between Exxon and Mobile 
(1999), between Chevron and Texaco (2001), and the unification of Royal Dutch 
and Shell Transport and Trading (2005).  Table 7.2 shows the transformation from 
the seven sisters in the 1970s into the present four big oil majors.  
 
Table 7.2: From Seven Sisters to Four big oil majors 
Seven Sisters Oil Major Early Formation, Mergers, Acquisitions, and 
Unifications 
• Esso 
• Mobil 
Exxon-Mobile • Formation Jersey Standard/ Exxon (1882) 
• Formation Socony/ Mobile (1882) 
• Merger of Exxon and Mobile (1999) 
• Royal 
Dutch/Shell 
Group of 
Companies 
Royal Dutch 
Shell  
• Formation Royal Dutch (1890) 
• Formation Shell Transport and Trading (1897) 
• Alliance of Royal Dutch and Shell Transport and 
Trading (1907) 
• Unification Royal Dutch and Shell Transport and 
Trading (2005) 
• BP 
 
BP  • Formation Anglo-Persian (1909)  
• Acquisition Amoco (1998)  
• Acquisition ARCO (2000) 
• Gulf Oil 
• Chevron 
• Texaco 
 
Chevron  • Formation Pacific Coast Oil/ Chevron (1879)  
• Formation Texas Oil Company/ Texaco (1906)  
• Most of Gulf Oil became part of Chevron (1984) 
• Acquisition of Texaco to form Chevron-Texaco 
(2001) 
• Name changed to Chevron (2005) 
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Additionally, Table 7.3 shows how the competitive positions of the four 
largest oil companies have developed since 1980 until 2006.  
 
 
Table 7.3: Competitive dynamics of the four big oil majors based on Global 500 
 Year 
(position): 
1980  # 1985 # 1990 # 1995 # 2000  # 2005  # 2008 #
Exxon 
Mobil  
Total Sales 103  1  86  2 106 2 108 2 206  1  328  1 373 1 
 Total Assets 57  2  69  2 87  2 91  2 149  1  207  2 242 2 
 Market 
Capitalization 
35  1  40  1 64  2 100 2 301  1  344  1 406 1 
               
Royal 
Dutch 
Shell  
Total Sales 81  2  94  1 115 1 109 1 149  2  241  2 356 2 
 Total Assets 68  1  76  1 88  1 118 1 122  3  217  1 269 1 
 Market 
Capitalization 
26  4  28  3 71  1 117 1 210  2  203  3 159 3 
               
BP  Total Sales 49  3  59  3 64  3 56  3 146  3  236  3 291 3 
 Total Assets 22  3  44  3 59  4 50  4 144  2  207  3 236 3 
 Market 
Capitalization 
16  6  14  5 34  3 47  3 181  3  209  2 142 5 
                
Chevron  Total Sales 40  4  41  4 39  5 31  6 47  7  185  4 211 4 
 Total Assets 22  4  39  4 35  7 34  7 41  11  125  5 149 6 
 Market 
Capitalization 
17  5  13  6 25  4 34  4 54  5  127  7  150 4 
Note: Values in billion US dollar; #: Position within the oil industry (SIC-code: 2911) 
Source: Fortune Global 500; www.shell.com, www.exxonmobil.com, www.bp.com, www.chevron.com, 
Thompson One Banker 
 
 
Besides the four oil majors, there are two other big oil companies. They are 
Conoco Phillips that comprises Union 76, Conoco, Jet, and Phillips 66; and Total 
that comprises Total, Mobil and Elf. For our case companies, however, we selected 
Shell and BP. Our selection was based on the fact that both companies have more 
or less the similar background of European companies, not mainly the US 
background. While Shell has the Anglo-Dutch background, BP has the Anglo-
Persian background. In the next sections, we provide a brief company history of 
Shell and BP respectively. 
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7.3 Focal Firm: Royal Dutch Shell plc (Shell), 1907-
2008^) 
Chronologically, Royal Dutch Shell plc was formed in 1907 after a well-known 
historic Anglo-Dutch alliance between the UK-based The “Shell” Transport and 
Trading Company, plc (40%) and the Netherlands-based Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Company (60%) (Howarth, 1998; Van Zanden et al., 2007). Since then both parent 
companies are holding companies which together own, directly or indirectly, 
investments in numerous companies known collectively as the Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group (present: Royal Dutch Shell plc).  
According to Van Zanden et al. (2007), Shell’s initial key success factors 
were the booming and undeveloped nature of the oil industry, and its integrated 
value chain, geographical spread, attention for human resources, and best practice 
technology. Looking at the company’s history, Shell was indeed very active in its 
geographical expansion by acquiring and expanding its producing interests, among 
others in Romania (1906), Russia (1910), Egypt (1911), the US (1912), Venezuela 
(1913), and Trinidad (1914). Furthermore due to their technological innovations in 
product (e.g. rotary drilling), process (e.g. cracking, petrochemicals) and 
exploration (e.g. geophysics, seismic surveying), Shell gradually emerged as a 
market leader.  
At the same time, Shell’s interest for new technology created competitive 
advantages through a diversified product portfolio. The company diversified into 
aviation (1919), chemicals (1929), alternative energy sources such as gas (1959), 
nuclear energy (1973) and coal (1974); metals (1970) and even forestry (1980s). 
Regarding its diversification strategy, the CEO of Shell, Jeroen van der Veer, once 
said:  
 
“We have this beautiful Dutch expression of ‘putting pots on the fire’. Shell has a pot for 
solar energy, a pot for wind, a pot for hydrogen, a pot for biofuels and so on. They are all 
mini businesses. If the pot smells good, we give it more money. And if the pot doesn’t smell 
good, we turn off the gas.”  
(Interview with Jeroen van der Veer in the European Business Forum, 26, Autumn 2006) 
 
His statement indicates that the continuation of the diversified portfolios depends 
on the fruitful outcomes of the portfolios to generate the firm’s competitive 
advantage.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
^) This section is based on diverse sources of the history of Shell, ranging from Gerretson, 1957; Jones, 1977; 
Gabriels and Jongmans, 1990; Howarth, 1992, 1998; Yergin, 1993; Brenneman et al., 1998; Cummins and 
Beasant, 2005; Tyler, 2007; Van Zanden et al., 2007 
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The Second World War was a major environmental disturbance for Shell. 
The company suffered from large tanker losses and loss of production output and 
processing capacity. After the Second World War, the large oil companies created 
market stability through strategic partnering and interlocked directorships. In this 
respect, Shell always kept an open attitude towards the OPEC after its formation in 
the 1960. Internally after the war, Shell also experienced several changes among 
others, the management structure of the parent companies was aligned and the 
general attitude towards staff management changed to more in-house selection and 
training. Furthermore, under the presidency of Loudon in the 1950s, Shell 
approached an external consultant to review its management structure. A review by 
McKinsey led to remodeling of the organization; decentralized operating 
companies were established and responsibilities and authorities were delegated. A 
matrix-organization structure was implemented and a formal Committee of 
Managing Directors (CMD) was established.  
After the 1973 oil shock, the Company diversified into alternative energy 
sources (e.g. nuclear energy and coal), metals and even forestry with varying 
degrees of success. During the 1980s and 1990s when competition intensified and 
the environment changed, Shell stepped back from its diversified and decentralized 
strategy. To be more solid, in 1997 the Shell Oil Company in the US was 
integrated in the group operations of Shell (Van Zanden et al., 2007; Tyler, 2007). 
Prior to that, in 1984 the group had bought the minority interest (30%) of Shell Oil 
followed by buying the remaining 31% of it in the mid 1980s.  
In 2004, Shell’s reputation suffered from the overestimation of oil reserves 
(Cummins and Beasant, 2005). Ultimately, this scandal and other internal 
disturbances led to Shell unification. At two shareholder meetings on June 28, 
2005, a large majority of shareholders voted for the unification proposal of Royal 
Dutch and Shell Transport. Incorporated in England and Wales, and headquartered 
in the Netherlands, Royal Dutch Shell plc was born. Implementation of the new 
structure took place in July 2005, Jeroen van der Veer was appointed as the 
Group’s first Chief Executive to lead the new Executive Committee. Table 7.4 
shows a summary of Shell historical timeline with the key historical contexts of the 
environment at the pertaining periods. 
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Table 7.4: Historical timeline of Shell and oil industry environment 
Main Historical Events of Royal Dutch Shell Period Key Changes in Global and Industry Environment  
Foundation of Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Company (1890);  
Foundation of Shell Transport and Trading 
Company, Ltd (1897) 
19th 
century 
First oil in Titusville, Pennsylvania (1859); US 
Civil War (1861-1965); Foundation Standard Oil 
(1870);  Standard Oil Trust (1882) 
Foundation of Asiatic Petroleum Company 
(1906); 
Merger Royal Dutch and Shell (1907) 
1900s Foundation Texaco Oil and Gulf Oil (1901); 
Foundation Anglo-Persian (BP, 1909); oil industry 
boom 
Foundation of American Gasoline Company 
(1912) 
Establishment of Shell Aviation Services 
(1919) 
1910s Standard Oil declared an illegal monopoly, and split 
up in 34 companies: a.o. Socal (Chevron), Standard 
Oil of New Jersey (Exxon), Standard Oil of New 
York (Mobil); First World War (1914-1918) 
Formation Shell Chemicals (1929) 1920s San Remo Agreement between France and Britain 
(1920); Red Line Agreement (1928); Stock market 
crash (1929) 
 1930s Nationalization of Mexican oil fields (1937); 
Concessions in the Middle East: Bahrein (Chevron), 
Kuwait (BP and Gulf), Qatar (BP), Saudi Arabia 
(Chevron and Texaco); Second World War (1939-
1945); 
Shell’s cooperation with the Allied 
Government with fuel supplies and chemical 
production despite losing some businesses, 
tankers and properties 
1940s Marshall plan (1947); Exxon and Mobile join in 
ARAMCO (1948) 
Investigation McKinsey consultants (1957); 
Formation N.V. Nederlandse Aardolie 
Maatschappij (NAM) after gas was found in 
Slochteren (1959) 
1950s Nationalization of Iranian oil fields (1951); Korean 
War (1951-1953); Suez Crisis (1956); Iraqi 
Revolution (1958) 
Discovery of Leman gas field in the southern 
North Sea (1960, followed by discoveries of 
natural gas in the UK, Dutch, Norwegian and 
Danish sectors 
1960s Formation OPEC (1960); Six Day War (1967) 
Major oil and gas discoveries in the North Sea. 
Move into the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG); 
Formation of Shell Coal International (1974); 
Diversification in Nuclear Energy 
1970s Yom Kippur War, Arab oil embargo and OPEC 
negotiations result in First Energy Crisis (1973); 
Formation International Energy Agency (IEA, 
1974);  Iranian Revolution and speculation lead to 
Second Energy Crisis (1979) 
Sustainable development practices, such as 
exploration of solutions to environmental 
concerns, installation of advanced technology, 
and launching of new products and services. 
1980s First OPEC Quotas (1982); Oil Price Collapse 
(1986) 
Focus on exploiting core businesses: oil, gas, 
and chemicals; Move into renewables; Crisis 
and transformation at Shell Oil; Reporting 
currency changed  into US Dollar (1998), 
increased shareholder focus 
1990s Kuwait Invasion and Gulf War (1990); End of Cold 
War/ fall of Berlin Wall (1990); Asian/ Russian 
Financial Crisis (1997/1998); Global economic 
downturn (1998-2003); Exxon-Mobile (1999) and 
BP-Amoco (1999) 
2005: Unification of Royal Dutch and Shell 2000s Chevron-Texaco (2001); Terrorist attack at World 
Trade Centre, New York (2001); Iraq invasion 
(2003); BP-Amoco-Arco (2005) 
(Source: From document analysis including information from Gerretson, 1957; Jones, 1977; Howarth, 1992, 1998; Yergin, 
1993; Cummins and Beasant, 2005; Van Zanden et al., 2007) 
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Furthermore as of 2004, Shell conducts its business through five principal 
segments: Exploration & Production, Gas & Power, Oil Products, Chemicals and 
renewables as shown in Figure 7.3.  
 
 
Figure 7.3: The business streams of Shell: Upstream and downstream 
 
 
 
At present, the company who still uses the pecten as its emblem, operates the 
five business segments in more than 110 countries with 104,000 employees and are 
subject to changing economic, regulatory and political conditions. By exploiting 
the existing skills and exploring other innovative opportunities, Shell is trying to 
keep their favorable competitive position against competitors such as Exxon 
Mobile, BP, ChevronTexaco, and Total. As Shell is now experiencing a 
challenging period in exploring new growth opportunities and sustaining its 
competitive advantage, the question that remains is whether Shell still possesses 
the capabilities to renew itself in the future. We further investigate this issue in part 
IV of this thesis. 
 
 
148
132 Chapter 7 
 
 
                                                
7.4 Comparative Firm: British Petroleum plc (BP), 
1970-2008^) 
The origin of British Petroleum plc (BP) can be traced back to the time when 
William Knox D’Arcy was granted a concession by the Shah of Iran in 1901 
(Longhurst, 1959; Ferrier, 1982). After the significant discovery of oil in May 
1908, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was incorporated on April 14th, 
1909. In 1935, the company was renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). 
After the Second World War, the AIOC faced the Iranian nationalist 
pressure to reconsider the company’s concession terms (Longhurst, 1959; Meyer 
and Brysac, 2008). In this respect, 1951 was a crucial year as the Iranian 
government decided to nationalize the company’s assets which created a threat to 
the British’s largest single investment overseas back then. Fortunately three years 
later, in 1954, the conflict was resolved thanks to the British government backing 
and the company was renamed the British Petroleum Company (Bamberg, 1994). 
BP continued to operate in Iran until the Islamic Revolution in 1979 (Bamberg, 
2000). It was when the new regime of Ayatollah Khomeini confiscated all of BP’s 
assets in Iran without compensation. This concluded the 70-year of BP’s presence 
in Iran. 
BP’s experience in Iran taught the company to broaden its geographical 
spread. In the following years, BP initiated explorations in other Middle East 
countries, like Kuwait, Libya and Iraq. BP’s most important moves, however, 
occurred in 1960s through its expansion to the North Sea and Alaska. Through 
these two new exploration areas, in the mid 1970s, BP found oil in the British 
offshore and discovered the biggest oilfield in the US at Purdhoe Bay in Alaska. 
These findings strengthened BP’s competitive position and helped the company to 
survive the impact of the two oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979.  
The success drove BP to go slightly overboard. Under the chairmanship of 
Sir Peter Walters (1981-1990), the company made significant investments. As a 
result of the high investments in the 1980s, company’s overheads increased 
dramatically. Worse is that by then the company did no longer had the British 
government backing. Due to the government’s privatization strategy, the 
government sold its last shares in BP in 1987. Unavoidably in 1992, the group 
reported a loss and had to embark on a drastic cost-cutting exercise.  
This situation continued until the leadership of Robert Horton who 
succeeded Sir Peter Walters in 1990. He had to carry out a major corporate 
downsizing by removing various tiers of management within the BP Head Office 
(Roberts, 2004).  The turning point occurred under a new management of Sir John 
Browne in 1995 who set tough targets for debt reduction, profitability and cost-
cutting. Browne’s measures worked well and profits increased. As a result, BP 
managed a turn-around-moving from the bottom of the industry into the top 
 
^) This section is based on diverse sources of the history of BP, among others Longhurst, 1959; Jones, 1977; 
Ferrier, 1982; Bamberg, 1994, 2000; Pettigrew and Whittington, 2003. 
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quarter. Browne’s actions in the late 1990s could be said not just to have 
transformed BP but also the energy industry of which BP was now a critical player 
(Pettigrew and Whittington, 2003). 
BP’s key comparators and competitors are Exxon Mobil and Shell (refer 
back to Table 7.2). BP’s relative positioning with these competitors was 
fundamentally changed in 1998 when BP acquired Amoco (formerly Standard Oil 
of Indiana) for $110 billion. Actually, it is not until 1995 that BP began to overtake 
its major European-based competitor Shell and then in 1996-1998 overlook Exxon 
(Pettigrew and Whittington, 2003). After the merger of BP and Amoco in 1998, BP 
became BP Amoco until 2000. Amoco merger propelled BP into a new dimension 
and is possibly the high point in the history of the company (Pratt, 2000). 
In 2000, BP acquired Arco for $30 billion. These changes in organizational 
boundaries not only affect market share and power, they also represent crucial 
opportunities for cost-driven efficiencies (Pettigrew and Whittington, 2003). By 
the end of 2000, two years after the Amoco deal and only 12 months into the Arco 
acquisition, BP had reduced operating costs for the new group by $6 billion. 
Furthermore, BP also streamlined its businesses. In 2002, BP had four main 
businesses, a reduction from the eleven businesses of the 1980s. The four are 
exploration and production; gas, power and renewables; refining and marketing; 
and chemicals.  
At present operating in 100 countries with 97,600 employees, BP has two 
business segments: (1) exploration and production; and (2) refining and marketing. 
Table 7.5 shows the comparison of key facts and figures between Shell and BP 
(updated December 2007). 
 
 
 
Table 7.5: Comparison of key facts and figures of Shell and BP (2006/7) 
Key Fact and Figure  Shell BP
Number of employees 104,000 97,600
Number of countries 110 100
Market capitalization ($ billion) 269 232
Assets ($ million) 269,470 236,076
Revenue ($ million) 355,782 284,365
Total Shareholder Return (%) 23.8 15.8
2007 Global 500 rank 2 3
2006 Fortune Innovation Score 7.3 8.0
Source: 2007 Shell Annual Report, 2007 BP Annual Report, 2007 Global 500 & 2006 Fortune Innovation Score 
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7.5 Outline of Empirical Investigation of Three Key 
Principles 
We outline the empirical studies on the upcoming empirical chapters (part IV) in 
table 7.5. The table highlights the variables of interest we are going to measure, 
method used, level of analysis, time frame of analysis, and the source of data. In 
Chapter 8, we investigate the first key principle by focusing on operationalizing 
and measuring the magnitude and volatility of the internal rate of change in 
comparison with the external rate of change. For this purpose, we focus on two 
levels of analysis: industry and firm. Regarding the comparative time frame of 
analysis, for data that are comparable between the industry and the firm levels, we 
develop homogeneous measures, i.e. measures that are similar and comparable 
between the industry level and the firm level (Table 6.6). In another case, some 
data are available at different level, for the industry level only or for the firm level 
only. For this purpose, we develop heterogeneous measures, i.e. measures that are 
different between the industry level and the firm level. Depending on the data 
availability, our analyses range from 1907 until 2008. To provide a richer 
understanding of the first key principle, we also conducted interviews with Shell’s 
top managers for gaining an insightful perspective of how the company’s top 
managers perceive the importance of aligning the firm’s internal rate of change 
with the external rate of change. 
 In Chapter 9, we focus on the investigation of the second key principle: self-
organization. To this end, we looked at three variables of interest which are 
developed from the well-established concept of hierarchy: hierarchical level, span 
of control and the interdepartmental structure focusing on the administrative 
intensity (Melman, 1956). Since these variables are very firm specific, we focus 
only on Shell in which we had an internal access to the firm’s archive. Our 
longitudinal analysis is based on the archival sources and interviews. To measure 
the variables of self-organization, we used the data from Shell’s Organizational 
Directories, HR archives, and internal system called Who’s Who. In addition to 
this, we also interviewed Shell’s top managers to assess the importance of self-
organization in their views. 
 The third key principle will be investigated in Chapter 10. Here, we 
operationalize and measure the constructs of exploratory and exploitative strategic 
renewal actions. In addition, we also look at the influence of top management 
team’s (TMT) perspective on a firm’s strategic renewal trajectory. For this latter 
study, we conducted it at Shell’s case only. This is because Shell embodied a board 
composition of Committee of Managing Directors (CMD). This structure allows us 
to look at the TMT’s corporate governance perspective of Anglo-Saxon model and 
Rhine model. Related to this, we also operationalize and measure the external and 
internal growth of strategic renewal actions. The investigation of the third principle 
is done through the use of content analyses of annual reports of Shell and BP, 
diverse databases and documents, and interviews (Shell’s case only). 
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7.6 Conclusion 
Environment in which a firm is embedded and operating is always regarded as the 
main precursor of how the firm should change over the time. In this chapter, we 
described the environmental setting of our study, i.e. the oil industry. Change in an 
industry environment is normally accompanied by change in the firms that operate 
in the industry (Grant and Cibin, 1996). This is also valid for the oil industry. The 
oil companies that operate in this industry thus need to take into account the 
changing condition of the oil industry environment.  
A central feature of the oil industry and oil companies is their long 
existence. Despite the size and complexity of the oil companies, they seem to be 
able to go through a transition of their industry environment from one of stability 
and continuity to one of turbulence and discontinuity. For instance, their 
competitive environment was thrown into turmoil by the oil shocks of 1973–74 
and 1979–80, the nationalization of the reserves, and the growth of competition 
(Grant and Cibin, 1996). This can be seen also at the discussion of our case 
companies, Shell and BP. 
The empirical settings in this chapter have also demonstrated the dynamism 
of the oil industry over the years. Considering such dynamism, the oil firms should 
find a strategic way to renew themselves to match their internal dynamism with the 
external (industry) dynamism. This investigation is the first part of our three 
empirical studies of the three key principles of self renewal. We now move on to 
Chapter 8 to address the issue of managing internal rate of change to match a 
firm’s external rate of change.  
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8. Investigating Principle 1: Internal 
vs. External Rates of Change 
 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
To a large extent, the problematic nature of sustaining corporate longevity has to 
do with management failure in one of these two areas: “a failure in managing the 
internal processes or a failure to adjust interaction in the face of change in the 
external environment” (Krell, 2000, p.9). This concern is actually not new in the 
literature. Environmental influences on organizations and managers have well been 
documented in the industrial organization (Scherer, 1970) and organization theory 
(Thompson, 1967) literatures. Lawrence and Dyer (1983) propound that 
fluctuations or contingencies from the environment are adjusted to by organization 
change. In the same line of thought, contingency theory claims that the manner in 
which the organization is organized and functions must correspond to the nature of 
the environment which it finds itself in (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).  
Since then, researchers are interested in investigating the influence of the 
speed of environmental change on a firm’s strategic management (Bourgeois and 
Eisenhardt, 1988; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; D’Aveni, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989a; 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Williams, 1994). Mounting research on environmental 
change has focused on environmental turbulence (Dess and Beard, 1984; Garg et 
al., 2003) and magnitude (Tushman and Romanelli, 1984; Tushman and Anderson, 
1987). Research examining the “strategic challenges presented by rate of industry 
change is, however, sparse” (Nadkarni and Narayanan, 2007, p.245). The empirical 
study of this chapter aims to contribute to this underexplored area. Furthermore by 
reconciling the selection and adaptation perspectives, this chapter will address our 
third research question, that is how firms regulate their internal rates of change to 
match the firms’ external rate of change. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Chapter 8.2, we start with the 
identification of measurement indicators to quantify both internal rate of change 
and external rate of change. Next we present the results of the analyses and 
highlight the key findings in Chapter 8.3, and finally draw the conclusions in 
Chapter 8.4. 
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8.2 Measurement Indicators of Internal and External 
Rates of Change 
To measure external or environmental change, industry has been considered an 
adequate measure of environment by most researchers (e.g., Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1967; Hrebiniak & Snow, 1980; Porter, 1980). Subsequently, the organization 
literature identifies three distinct dimensions of industry change: rate (frequency of 
changes and span of intervals between changes in the relevant industry variables) 
(Duncan, 1972; Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Fine, 1998; Jurkovich, 1974; 
Tung, 1979; Williams, 1994); turbulence (unpredictability and variation of change 
in industry variables) (Boulding, 1971; Dess and Beard, 1984; Duncan, 1972; 
Fombrun and Ginsberg, 1990; Jurkovich, 1974; Perrow, 1979; Tung, 1972); and 
magnitude (scope or size of change; e.g., incremental vs. radical changes, 
technological continuities vs. discontnuities) (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Jurkovich, 1974; McGahan, 2004; Tushman & Anderson, 1987; Tushman & 
Romanelli, 1984). As our main interest is to measure the rate of change, we focus 
on environmental dynamism that refers to the rate of change and the degree of 
instability of the environment (Dess & Beard, 1984). 
At firm level, strategy researchers conceptualize change as how strategies of 
a firm become different over time as the environment changes, and what effects 
such differences might have for the firm’s competitive advantage. Although 
conceptually change seems straightforward, measuring and testing change involve 
complex issues that are not at all obvious (Bergh and Fairbank, 2002).  Despite 
such complexity, Godfrey and Hill (1995) argue that construct measurement is 
particularly relevant to strategic management research, as the variables of interest 
tend to be complex or unobservable.  
We build upon the aforementioned arguments by developing homogeneous 
and heterogeneous measurement indicators to quantify both external and internal 
rates of change (see Table 6.6). As mentioned in Chapter 6, we need to develop 
these two different types of measurement indicators because of the limitation of the 
availability of longitudinal data that have comparable and sufficient duration for 
both firm and industry level. At certain circumstances, we mitigate the issue of 
limitation in the oil industry data by summing the data that we could obtain from 
the six largest oil firms8 as an aggregate measure of the industry data, such as what 
we did in the homogeneous measures of patents, research and development 
intensity, and external venturing. Additionally, in some cases there are measures 
that are specific to the industry level or specific to the firm level, but not for both 
industry and firm levels. For instance, data such as oil prices and competitive 
diversity are only available at the industry level but not for the firm level. While 
homogeneous measures are concerned with similar measures that are comparable 
 
8 Oil industry in this study is represented by a collection of the biggest six oil companies, i.e. Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch 
Shell plc, BP plc, Chevron Corp., Total SA, and ConocoPhillips. 
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between the industry level and the firm level, heterogeneous measures are 
concerned with different measures between the industry level and the firm level.  
The first type of measure is homogeneous measures, i.e. measures that 
comprise longitudinal data of comparable duration between the oil industry and 
case companies. There are four variables of interest: rate of change of oil 
production, patents, research and development intensity, and external venturing. 
All variables are measured both at the oil industry level and firm level (in our case, 
Shell and BP). The second type of measure is heterogeneous measures. Here we 
distinguish between measures for the industry-specific variables and for the firm-
specific variables. The outcome, however, is still the same, i.e. the comparison of 
the total average of external rates of change (from the industry measures) with the 
total average of internal rates of change (from the firm measures).  
For the industry level, we measured variables that are specific to oil 
industry, i.e. the rates of change of oil prices and competition. We follow Matusik 
and Hill (1998) to measure environmental competitiveness as the extent to which 
external environments are characterized by intense competition. To this end, we 
used competitive diversity (cf. Ferrier et al, 1999) which is computed as the inverse 
of concentration ratio; whereas concentration ratio is computed as the percentage 
of the market share held by the four largest firms in the oil industry (C4).  
For the firm level, our measures are built upon Fine (1998) who introduces 
the concept of industry clockspeed to capture the rate of industry change driven by 
endogenous factors (technological and competitive). He suggests three facets of 
industry clockspeed: product, process, and organizational. Product clockspeed 
represents new product introduction rates. Process clockspeed reflects the rates at 
which process technologies are replaced in an industry. Organizational clockspeed 
reflects the rate of change in the strategic actions (e.g. mergers, acquisitions, 
internal expansion, interorganizational alliances) and structures (e.g., restructuring 
and changes in top management) of incumbent firms in an industry. Furthermore in 
his study, Fine (1998) identifies seven fast clockspeed industries and nine slow 
clockspeed industries. Based on his study of 31 petrochemicals companies, the 
petrochemicals industry falls in the category of a slow clockspeed industry with a 
product clockspeed of 10-20 years, process clockspeed of 20-40 years, and 
organizational clockspeed of 20-40 years. The results, however, are based on the 
aggregate actions of all incumbent firms in an industry rather than the actions of 
any individual firm. Our study complements Fine’s study by also looking at the 
firm-level actions.  
As elaborated in Chapter 6 to this end, Fine’s (1998) organizational 
clockspeed entails two aspects: the structure and the strategic actions of venturing. 
We take these into account by separating the change in organization structure with 
the change in venturing. For the venturing activity, we divided into the internal and 
external venturing. Since we have data on external venturing for both the industry 
and the firm levels, we categorize the rate of change of external venturing into the 
homogeneous measure. While for the internal venturing, since we only have the 
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data at the firm level, we categorize it into the heterogeneous measures. Therefore 
we built upon the Fine’s (1998) concept of the industry clockspeed by translating it 
into the firm-level concept, respectively: the internal rate of change (IRC) of new 
products and services, process, organizational structure, and internal venturing 
(refer back to Table 6.7). Table 8.1 summarizes the measurement indicators for 
both homogeneous and heterogeneous measures. 
 
Table 8.1: Homogeneous and heterogeneous measures of rates of change 
Variable Measurement Source of data 
  Industry Shell BP 
Homogeneous measures 
1 (industry & 
firm): RC oil 
production 
Rate of change of yearly 
oil production 
• Energy 
Information 
Administration 
• BP Statistical 
Review of 
World Energy 
• Eternad et al., 
1991 
• Shell’s annual 
reports  
• Van Zanden et al., 
2007 
• BP’s annual 
reports 
• Van Zanden 
et al., 2007 
• Ferrier, 1982 
• Bamberg, 
1994, 2000 
2 (industry & 
firm): RC 
patents 
Rate of change of annual 
number of patents 
Online Derwent 
Databases  
Online Derwent 
Databases 
Online Derwent 
Databases 
3 (industry & 
firm): RC 
research and 
development 
(R&D) 
Rate of change of R&D 
intensity (R&D expenses 
to sales) 
Thomson One 
Banker 
• Shell’s annual 
reports  
• Thomson One 
Banker 
• BP’s annual 
reports 
• Thomson 
One Banker 
4 (industry & 
firm): RC 
external 
venturing 
Rate of change of 
mergers, acquisitions, 
joint ventures, and 
interorganizational 
alliances 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Content analysis of 
Shell’s annual reports 
triangulated with 
Thomson One Banker 
Content analysis 
of BP’s annual 
reports 
triangulated with 
Thomson one 
Banker 
Heterogeneous measures 
5 (industry): 
ERC oil 
prices 
External rate of change of 
oil prices 
• Energy 
Information 
Administration 
• BP Statistical 
Review of 
World Energy 
- - 
6 (industry): 
ERC 
competition 
External rate of change of 
competitive diversity (the 
inverse of concentration 
ratio) 
Van Zanden et al., 
2007 
- - 
7 (firm): IRC 
new products 
and services 
Internal rate of change of 
new products or services 
introduction  
- Content analysis of 
Shell’s annual reports 
Content analysis 
of BP’s annual 
reports 
8 (firm): IRC 
process  Internal rate of change of new process technology  
- Content analysis of 
Shell’s annual reports 
Content analysis 
of BP’s annual 
reports 
9 (firm): IRC 
organizational 
structure  
Internal rate of 
restructuring in 
organization, 
departments, and changes 
in top management 
- Content analysis of 
Shell’s annual reports; 
Van Zanden et al., 
2007; Grant, 2002 
Content analysis 
of BP’s annual 
reports; Pettigrew 
& Whittington, 
2003 
10 (firm): 
IRC internal 
venturing  
Internal rate of change of 
internal expansion 
- Content analysis of 
Shell’s annual reports 
Content analysis 
of BP’s annual 
reports 
Source: Author. 
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In addition, our interest here is one level higher than the clockspeeds, i.e. the 
rates of change. Firm-level rates of change capture changes that are endogenous to 
a firm. This is important for our research on internal rate of change because 
incumbent firms play more direct roles in shaping endogenous changes than in 
shaping exogenous (e.g., regulations, recession, and political) changes (Ferrier, 
2001; Ferrier et al., 1999; Rindova and Fombrun, 1999; McGahan, 2004; Porac et 
al., 1989).  
 
8.3 Analyses and Results 
Structural Change Test (Chow Test) 
Before we actually compute the internal and external rates of change, we first need 
to see if there is indeed a change. Environmental changes, in particular abrupt 
changes, may occasion structural change by altering roles and relationships. For 
instance, a disruptive change in the environment may alter the competitive 
advantage of key firms in the industry. In the same line of reasoning, Agarwal, 
Sarkar and Echambadi (2002, p. 976) propound that “there appears to be 
convergence on the notion that at a particular point in time in an industry’s history, 
a structural change occurs that changes the resources conditions associated with 
competitive advantage”.  
We conduct the Chow test (Chow, 1960) by using a simple linear regression 
model of rate of change of oil prices which is a function of rate of change in oil 
production and consumption. We are interested if there is any structural change in 
the oil industry due to a certain drastic change event. In this case, we took the year 
1973 when the oil crisis first struck the oil industry. Figure 8.1 shows the two 
separate regression models for the oil prices before and after 1973. 
 
Figure 8.1: Regression model for Chow Test  
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where: yt = rate of change of oil prices (PRICE) 
    pt = rate of change of world oil production (PROD) 
    ct = rate of change of world oil consumption (CONSUMP) 
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We did the Chow test with the data from 1913-2007. We divided this data 
into two groups: group one comprises data from 1913 until 1973 (59 observations) 
and group two comprises data from 1974-2007 (34 observations). Table 8.2 shows 
the ANOVA outcome from the Chow test in the SPSS. The result demonstrates a 
significant evidence to reject the hypothesis of structural stability (equality) from 
the Chow test and to conclude that there is indeed a structural change/break after 
the oil crisis in 1973. Note that we also conducted the chow test to test if there is 
any structural break during the First and the Second World War. The results, 
however, are not significant. This is because we have nonsufficient data points to 
statistically do the Chow test. 
 
 
Table 8.2: ANOVA table from the Chow Test 
Oil Crisis Model  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
0 Before 1 Regression 
Residual 
Total 
1.544 
12.270 
13.814
2 
57 
59
1.544 
.212
7.300 .008
1 After 1 Regression 
Residual 
Total 
558.181 
4634.428 
5392.609
2 
32 
34
279.090 
107.326
6.928 .009
Predictors: (Constant), PROD, CONSUMP 
Dependent Variable: PRICE 
 
 
Our finding on the structural change in the oil industry due to the 1973 oil 
crisis confirms the study of Grant and Cibin (1996). They also demonstrated that 
the 1973 oil crisis marked the transition from a stable to an unstable environment 
for the oil industry. This caused a sharp discontinuity in the development of oil 
companies’ strategies and structures. Furthermore, Grant and Cibin (1996) show 
that the increased industry turbulence due to the 1973 oil crisis was further 
accompanied by adaptation of strategy and structure. We apply this idea to the 
remaining of our analyses of rates of change, in particular for the data that have the 
applicable and sufficient time frames that can be categorized into the periods 
before 1973 and after 1973. For instance, we apply this idea in variable 1 (RC of 
oil production, 1922-2000), variable 5 (RC of oil prices, 1907-2007) and variable 6 
(competition, 1907-2007). 
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Homogeneous Measures 
As indicated in section 8.2 (Table 8.1), there are four variables of interest in the 
homogeneous measures to quantify the internal (IRC) and external rates of change 
(ERC). All variables are used in our comparative study by comparing the oil 
industry with Shell and the oil industry with BP. In the rest of this chapter, we 
show the outcomes of each comparison for each variable respectively. As indicated 
previously in Table 6.5 for the simplicity of notion, we refer to the difference 
between the IRC (of Shell or of BP) and the ERC (i.e. IRC(Shell or BP)-ERC) as ∆RC. 
If the ∆RC is positive, this means that the internal rate of change exceeds the 
external rate of change. On the contrary if the ∆RC is negative, the internal rate of 
change falls behind the external rate of change. Finally, if the ∆RC is equal to zero, 
then it means that the internal rate of change exactly matches the external rate of 
change.  
Additionally, as mentioned previously in Chapter 6, the measures of RC are 
not additive as the time window changes along the timeline. However, for the 
homogeneous measures we can compute the magnitude of the differences of the 
levels between the annual IRC and ERC (sum of ∆RC over the years). Later on for 
the heterogeneous measures, the measures of ERC or IRC are not additive. In this 
case, to better describe the distribution of the rates of change, we use the minimum 
and maximum values of yearly ERC or IRC instead of the sum of the ∆RC. 
Additionally, we also computed the average and volatility of annual IRC, ERC, 
and ∆RC. We start with the analysis of the rate of change of oil production. 
 
 
Variable 1 (Industry & Firm): Rate of Change (RC) of Oil Production 
At the industry level, we used the data from the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) and BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008 for the data 
of oil production. The industry-level data is available from 1907 until 2007. At the 
firm level, we used the data of oil production by Shell and BP from the companies’ 
annual reports and the study of Van Zanden et al., 2007; Ferrier, 1982; and 
Bamberg, 1994, 2000. The oil production data at the firm level for both Shell and 
BP, however, is only available from 1921 until 2000. Based on the oil production 
data, we computed the rate of change by using the formula previously presented in 
Table 6.5 resulting in the RC data of oil production, 1922-2000. 
For a comparable duration, we did the comparative analysis from the 1922 
until 2000. Figure 8.2 shows the comparison of the patterns of the ERC of the oil 
industry vs. the IRC of Shell’s oil production and the ERC of the oil industry vs. 
the IRC of BP’s oil production. From the results, it is possible to compare the total 
magnitude, the average magnitude, and the volatility of ∆RCoil_prod between Shell 
and BP. 
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Figure 8.2: Comparison of the RC of oil production between the industry vs. Shell and 
the industry vs. BP, 1922-2000  
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Source: Energy Information Administration; BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2008, Shell’s and BP’s Annual 
Reports; Eternad et al., 1991;Van Zanden et al., 2007; Ferrier, 1982; Bamberg, 1994, 2000. 
 
In terms of the total magnitude of the level differences of ∆RC, the IRC of 
oil production of both Shell and BP exceeds the ERC of the industry’s oil 
production. Table 8.3 summarizes the total magnitude of level differences, yearly 
average, and volatility of the difference between the internal rate of change of Shell 
and BP respectively with the external rate of change.  
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Table 8.3: Difference between IRC and ERC (∆RC) of oil production, 1922-2000 
Shell – Industry  BP – Industry  ∆RC of oil 
production (%) 1922-1973  1974-2000 1922-2000 1922-1973 1974-2000  1922-2000
Magnitude of 
level differences  
158.96 -67.65 91.31 163.56 -3.55 160.01
Yearly average  3.06 -2.51 1.16 3.15 -0.13 2.02
Yearly volatility  8.29 11.29 18.12 15.90 22.37 18.29
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre; Italic means negative sum or average ∆RC. 
 
As indicated previously, we applied the result of the Chow test that showed 
the structural break resulted from the 1973 oil crisis. To implement this, we divide 
the periods of analysis into three categories, the periods of 1922-1973 (before the 
oil crisis), the periods of 1974-2000 (after the oil crisis) and the full periods of 
1922-2000. The results in Table 8.3 illustrate the structural break finding. They 
showed that before the 1973 oil crisis, both the rate of oil production of both Shell 
and BP exceeds the rate of oil production at the industry level. However, after the 
1973 oil crisis, we saw a negative ∆RC, meaning that the rate of oil production at 
the firm level fell behind the rate at the firm level.  
Additionally, the results in Table 8.3 show there are slight differences in the 
yearly average and volatility between the ∆RC of Shell and the ∆RC of BP. The 
∆RC of Shell was less volatile than the ∆RC of BP. Based on Figure 8.3, we can 
see particularly in the periods of 1972-1979, the Shell’s RC pattern of oil 
production was more aligned to the industry’s RC pattern than the BP’s RC 
pattern. During these periods, Figure 8.3 shows that BP’s RC pattern of oil 
production was more volatile than the Shell’s RC pattern. Nevertheless, the results 
from the full periods of analysis (1922-2000) demonstrate that the RC of oil 
production of both Shell and BP exceed the one of the industry. 
In sum, through these key findings we have illustrated how both long-lived 
firms have managed their internal rates of change to match and even exceed the 
external rate of change of their industry. In sum, with regard to the first variable 
(RC of oil production), the findings confirm the first key principle of self-renewing 
organizations. 
 
 
Variable 2 (Industry & Firm): RC of Patents 
For the patent data, we collected both industry- and firm-level data from the 
Derwent World Patents Index from the Online Derwent Databases, updated on 
January 15, 2009. We obtained the data from 1975-2007. The results of the 
analyses of the rate of change of the patent data are shown in Table 8.4 and Figure 
8.3. Figure 8.3 shows a comparison between patterns of the IRC of Shell and the 
IRC of BP with the ERC of the oil industry regarding the patent data. 
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Figure 8.3: Comparison of the RC of patents between the industry vs. Shell and the 
industry vs. BP, 1975-2007 
RC of Patents % (Industry vs. Shell) 
-30,00
-20,00
-10,00
0,00
10,00
20,00
30,00
40,00
50,00
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
RC_Ind
RC_Shell
RC of patents % (Industry vs. BP)
-40,00
-30,00
-20,00
-10,00
0,00
10,00
20,00
30,00
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
RC_Ind
RC_BP
 
Source: Online Derwent Databases (www.derwent.co.uk), searched in Derwent World Patents Index on January 15, 2009. 
 
Table 8.4 summarizes the total magnitude of level differences, yearly 
average, and volatility of the differences between the IRC of Shell and BP with the 
ERC of the oil industry in terms of patents.  
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Table 8.4: Difference between IRC and ERC (∆RC) of patents, 1975-2007 
∆RC of Patents (%) Shell – Industry BP – Industry
Magnitude of level differences 64.37 -94.61
Yearly average  1.95 -2.87
Yearly volatility  13.01 11.65
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre; Italic means negative sum or average ∆RC. 
 
 
In the case of the ∆RC of patents, Table 8.4 shows that Shell’s IRC pattern 
exceeds the industry’s pattern of the external RC while BP’s internal RC falls 
behind the industry RC. The pattern of the difference between Shell’s and 
industry’s RC patterns, however, seems to be slightly more volatile than the pattern 
of BP’s. This illustrates that in comparison with BP, Shell could more promptly 
manage its internal rate of change of patterns to align with the external rate of 
change. In this case regarding the RC of patents, Shell’s case provides an empirical 
support to the first key principle.  
 
 
 
 
Variable 3 (Industry & Firm): RC of Research and Development (R&D) 
Intensity 
We refer to research and development intensity as the R&D expenses to sales. We 
use R&D intensity as a measure of variety in resource deployment (cf. Fombrun 
and Grinsbert, 1990). For the industry-level data, we aggregated the data of R&D 
intensity from the biggest six oil companies in the oil industry, i.e. Exxon Mobil, 
Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Chevron, Total, and ConocoPhillips. We collected the 
industry- and the firm-level data from Thomson One Banker and the companies’ 
annual reports. The comparable duration for both the industry- and the firm-level 
data is available from 1981-2007. We then computed the rate of change of the 
R&D intensity data. The results of the analysis of the RC of R&D intensity are 
shown in Table 8.5 and Figure 8.4.  
Figure 8.4 shows that with regard to the R&D intensity, the IRC pattern of 
Shell and BP are very much aligned with the patent pattern of ERC.  
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Figure 8.4: Comparison of the RC of R&D Intensity between the industry vs. Shell and 
the industry vs. BP, 1981-2007 
Source: Thomson One Banker, Shell’s and BP’s annual reports 
 
Additionally, Table 8.5 shows that in the case of the RC pattern of R&D 
intensity during 1981-2007, both Shell’s and BP’s IRC patterns exceed the ERC 
pattern of the industry. BP, however, exhibits a faster rate of change pattern than 
Shell. The ∆RC of Shell, however, is slightly more volatile than the ∆RC of BP.  
 
Table 8.5: Difference between IRC and ERC (∆RC) of R&D intensity, 1981-2007 
∆RC of R&D Intensity (%) Shell – Industry BP – Industry
Magnitude of level differences 32.33 110.62
Yearly average  1.20 4.10
Yearly volatility  19.05 18.93
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre. 
 
In conclusion, with reference to the RC of R&D intensity to a various degree, both 
Shell’s and BP’s cases provide an empirical support to the first principle. 
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Variable 4 (Industry and Firm): RC of External Venturing 
According to Fine (1998), external venturing is one of the measures for the 
construct of organizational speed. It comprises strategic actions of mergers, 
acquisitions, joint ventures, and interorganizational alliances. We build upon this 
by computing the rates of change of external venturing at the oil industry level and 
the firm level (Shell and BP).  
We collected the external venturing data from Thomson One Banker and the 
annual reports of Shell and BP. The earliest possible year where the complete data 
exists in both the industry level and the firm level is from 1985. We managed to 
collect the data until 2008 that enables us to compute the rates of change from 
1986-2008. Our analysis is therefore conducted for the period 1986-2008. 
Figure 8.5 shows the RC pattern of external venturing in the oil industry, 
Shell and BP. In comparison with Shell, BP pattern followed the pattern of the 
industry to a closer degree. Particularly during 1999-2004, the BP’s pattern was 
very similar to the oil industry’s pattern. This can be seen as well from the 
volatility dimension in Table 8.6. 
 
Table 8.6: Difference between IRC and ERC (∆RC) of external venturing, 1986-2008 
∆RC of External Venturing (%) Shell – Industry BP – Industry
Magnitude of level differences 265.96 122.85
Average 11.56 5.34
Volatility 23.26 39.06
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre. 
 
More specifically Table 8.6 shows that in the case of the RC of external 
venturing during 1986-2008, both Shell and BP exceeds the RC of external 
venturing at the industry level. The ∆RC of BP, however, is slower but more 
volatile than the ∆RC of Shell. Nevertheless, both Shell and BP managed to 
regulate their IRC of external venturing to exceed the ERC of external venturing at 
the oil industry level. In this respect, the results of the RC of external venturing 
confirm the first key principle. 
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Figure 8.5: Comparison of the RC of external venturing between the industry vs. Shell 
and the industry vs. BP, 1986-2008 
 
Source: Thomson One Banker, content analysis of Shell’s and BP’s annual reports 
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To summarize the results of the homogeneous measures, we present Table 
8.7. The table demonstrates that in general, both BP and Shell could manage to 
regulate their internal RC to exceed the external RC of the oil industry; except on 
the measure of RC patents where the IRC of BP falls behind the ERC of the 
industry. The results illustrate how Shell and BP, to a various degree, managed 
their internal rate of change to match, or in most cases, even exceed the external 
rate of change in the oil industry.  
 
 
Table 8.7: Summary of the results of the homogeneous measures 
 
Average annual RC 
(%) 
Industry Shell BP 
Oil Production, 
1922-2000 
4.90 6.06 6.92 
Patents, 1975-2007 -1.37 0.59 -4.23 
R&D Intensity, 
1981-2007 
-0.37 0.83 3.73 
External Venturing, 
1986-2008 
4.73 16.30 10.08 
Yearly average 1.97 5.95 4.13 
Difference IRC– 
ERC (∆RC) 
∆RCShell = 3.97 ∆RCS\BP = 2.15 
∆RC and Period Magnitude of level Average Volatility 
Oil Production, 
1922-2000 
▪ ∆RCShell (+); ∆RCBP(+) 
▪ ∆RCShell < ∆RCBP  
▪ ∆RCShell (+); ∆RCBP(+) 
▪ ∆RCShell < ∆RCBP 
∆RCShell is less volatile 
than ∆RCBP 
Patents, 1975-2007 ▪ ∆RCShell (+);∆RCBP(–) 
▪ ∆RCShell > ∆RCBP 
▪ ∆RCShell (+);∆RCBP(–) 
▪ ∆RCShell > ∆RCBP 
∆RCShell is more volatile 
than ∆RCBP 
R&D Intensity, 
1981-2007 
▪ ∆RCShell (+); ∆RCBP(+) 
▪ ∆RCShell < ∆RCBP  
▪ ∆RCShell (+); ∆RCBP(+) 
▪ ∆RCShell < ∆RCBP 
∆RCShell is more volatile 
than ∆RCBP 
External Venturing, 
1986-2008 
▪ ∆RCShell (+); ∆RCBP(+) 
▪ ∆RCShell > ∆RCBP  
▪ ∆RCShell (+); ∆RCBP(+) 
▪ ∆RCShell > ∆RCBP 
∆RCShell is less volatile 
than ∆RCBP 
Note: ∆RC (+): Internal rate of change exceeds external rate of change;  
∆RC (–): Internal rate of change falls behind external rate of change 
 
In sum, altogether the results from the homogeneous measures provide an 
empirical illustration and support to our proposition of the first principle (see 
proposition 5.1 in Chapter 5.3): i.e. the internal rate of change of a firm that is 
commensurate with the external rate of change of the firm’s environment 
contributes to sustained strategic renewal. 
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Heterogeneous Measures 
For the heterogeneous measures, we have different measures for the industry level 
and the firm level. This is due to the constraint of data availability with a sufficient 
long duration for both industry and firm level. It is also due to that some measures 
are industry specific (such as competitive diversity). For the industry level, we 
employ two variables to measure the environmental rate of change: the rate of 
change of oil prices and the rate of change of competitive diversity in the oil 
industry. For the firm level, we based our measurement on five variables that are 
built upon the industry clockspeed introduced by Fine (1998) (refer to Table 6.7 in 
Chapter 6). Additionally regarding the heterogeneous measures, the measures of 
ERC or IRC are not additive. In this case, to better describe the distribution of the 
rates of change, we use the minimum and maximum values of yearly ERC or IRC 
instead of the sum of the ∆RC. 
 
 
Variable 5 (Industry): ERC of Oil Prices 
At the industry level, the first measure we used for the heterogeneous measures is 
the rate of change of oil prices. As indicated before from the Chow test (Table 8.2), 
there is a structural break when the oil crisis struck the oil industry in 1973. This 
may provide an explanation to the peak in 1973 show in the pattern of ERC of oil 
prices in Figure 8.6.  
 
Figure 8.6: ERC of oil prices (%), 1907-2007 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2008; Energy Information Administration (www.eia.doe.gov) 
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To incorporate the structural break check, we divided the full periods of 
analysis (1907-2007) into two periods: 1907-1973 (before the oil crisis) and 1974-
2007 (after the oil crisis). The results are shown in Table 8.8.  
 
 
Table 8.8: Summary of the ERC of oil prices, 1970-1973, 1974-2007, and 1907-2007 
ERC of oil prices (%) 1907-1973 1974-2007 1907-2007
Min -40.08 -48.85 -48.85
Max 59.74 217.19 217.19
Yearly average 1.34 10.63 4.47
Yearly volatility 17.88 45.49 30.22
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre 
 
Based on these results, one can see that the structural break or change does 
exist. The magnitude, average magnitude, and volatility of ERC of oil prices 
showed a big difference before and after the oil crisis. The first oil shock of 1973 
indicated by the tripling of oil prices marked the end of the environmental stability 
in the oil industry (Grant and Cibin, 1996). Altogether, during the period 1907-
2007, Table 8.8 shows that the average rate of change of oil prices is 4.47% and is 
considered to be reasonably volatile (30.22%). As mentioned before, the high 
volatility can be partly explained by the disruptions happened in the oil industry 
such as the oil crises in 1973 and 1979. 
 
Variable 6 (Industry): ERC of Competition 
The profile of the oil industry outlined in Chapter 7.2 has indicated that it is a solid 
industry with a few key players (Sampson, 1975; Jacoby, 1973). Figure 8.7 shows 
the pattern of the ERC of competition in the oil industry. We use the competitive 
diversity as a way to measure the ERC of competition in the oil industry. 
Competitive diversity is defined here as the inverse of concentration ratio of the 
four big oil majors (see Table 7.2 and 7.3). As shown in Figure 8.7, the ERC 
pattern with respect to competition concurs that the solid profile of the oil industry 
is concurred by the results of the external rate of change of the industry’s 
competitive diversity.  
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Figure 8.7: ERC of competition (%), 1907-2000 
 
Source: Van Zanden et al., 2007 
 
Figure 8.7 shows that particularly during the period of 1920s until mid 
1970s the industry comprised mainly the existing major oil companies. The low 
diversity in the competition can be explained mainly by the high capital intensity 
of the industry. This main factor seems to inhibit existing firms to exit the market 
and restricts the entrance of new competitors. Additionally, due to major 
technological breakthroughs in petroleum refining, chemicals, and exploration 
techniques, major oil companies manage to strengthen their competitive positions. 
Also in terms of the competitive diversity, our finding shows that the oil industry 
does not exhibit a high rate of change. This reflects the slow industry clockspeed 
based on the Fine’s (1998) finding.  
Additionally, Table 8.9 shows the total magnitude, the average magnitude 
and the volatility of the external rates of change (ERC) of competition in the oil 
industry. Likewise in the ERC of oil prices, we also divided the full periods of 
analysis (1907-2007) into the periods before oil crisis (1907-1973) and after the 
1973 oil crisis (1974-2007). The analysis of the ERC of competition within these 
two periods indicates the existence of structural change, which we also tested 
previously by using the Chow test (Chow, 1960).  
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Table 8.9: Summary of the ERC of competition, 1970-1973, 1974-2007, and 1907-2007 
ERC of competition (%) 1907-1973 1974-2007 1907-2007
Min 3.56 6.10 3.56
Max 24.80 14.54 24.80
Yearly average 6.44 10.99 7.74
Yearly volatility 5.19 1.66 4.91
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre 
 
Our results regarding the ERC of competition also reflect the previous 
findings from the study of Verleger (1991). He indicated that until the early 1970s, 
the world oil industry was dominated by seven major oil companies known as the 
Seven Sisters (refer to Table 7.2). However, they lost their dominant position 
within the oil industry. Verleger’s (1991) study showed that during 1973-1987 
their share of the world crude oil production fell from 29.3% to 7.1% and their 
share of world refinery capacity fell from 25.5% to 17.0%. Competition increased 
in the mid 1970s which was also indicated by the increase of the ERC of 
competitive diversity in Figure 8.7. According to Grant and Cibin (1996) the 
increase of competition in the oil industry starting from the mid 1970s can be 
explained by two factors. The first factor is after 1972, there was a nationalization 
of a large part of the oil assets of the large oil companies. The second factor is 
there was an expansion of small players in the oil industry including state-owned 
oil producers (some was formed from the nationalized oil assets of the majors) and 
domestically-based oil companies (such as Elf Aquitaine, Nippon Oil, and Repsol) 
which grew internationally. 
 
 
Variable 7 (Firm): IRC of New Products and Services 
As defined by Fine (1998), product clockspeed represents new product or service 
introduction. We followed this definition when computing the rate of change (RC) 
of new products and services (refer to Table 6.7). Through the content analyses of 
the annual reports of Shell and BP, we obtained the data on the number of new 
products or services introduced per year. Consistent with previous studies 
examining rates of new product and service introductions (Jones, 2003; Mendelson 
and Pillai, 1999; Nerkar and Roberts, 2004), we did not weigh the new product and 
service introductions. We identified the new product and service introductions 
from the content analyses of the annual reports of Shell (1907-2007) and BP 
(1970-2007). Based on the data collected from the content analyses, we computed 
the internal rates of change (IRC) of new products and services for both Shell and 
BP. Although for Shell’s case it was possible for us to do content analyses of 
annual reports from 1907-2007, our study of BP only ranges from 1970-2007. For 
a comparable duration, our analysis of IRC of new products and services thus 
ranges from 1970 until 2007.  This will also apply to the analyses of the remaining 
IRC variables: process, organizational structure, and internal venturing.  
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Furthermore since the new product and service introduction did not happen 
every year in most cases of the oil companies, this can result in the high 
fluctuations in the computational results of the rates of change. To counter this 
problem, we used a three-year moving average for smoothing out the fluctuations. 
The previous analyses of variable 1-6 were, however, conducted on a yearly basis. 
This is because the yearly data were available. The data of the rates of change 
resulted from the computation of yearly data did not show high fluctuations. This 
means that there was no need to use the three-year moving average for smoothing 
out high fluctuations.  Likewise later on, for the RC of process, we also used the 
three-year moving average to smooth out fluctuations due to unavailability of 
yearly data. Table 8.10 summarizes in which RC variables we used the yearly data 
or the three-year moving average. 
 
 
Table 8.10: Summary of RC variables using yearly data or three-year moving average 
Aspect Yearly Data 3-Year Moving Average 
Availability of 
yearly data 
Yes, the yearly data are then used to 
compute the rates of change; there 
was no high fluctuations 
Not every year so there are high 
fluctuations in the computational 
results of the rates of change 
Data smoothing No need for smoothing out 
fluctuations 
Due to yearly data gaps, there is a 
need to smooth out high fluctuations 
RC variable • All homogeneous measures: 
variable 1-4 
• Heterogeneous measures: 
variable 5, 6, 9, 10 
• Variable 7 
• Variable 8 
 
 
Subsequently, we computed the internal rates of change of the number of 
new products/services introduction in the case of Shell and BP. Figure 8.8 shows 
the result of the computation. Despite the smoothing process by using the three-
year moving average, we can still see that the IRC patterns of new products and 
services for both Shell and BP were still quite volatile.  
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Figure 8.8: IRC of Product Clockspeed (%), 1970-2007 
IRC of new products and services, % (Shell vs. BP)
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Source: Content analyses of Shell’s and BP’s annual reports, 1970-2007 
 
Table 8.11 shows that overall in terms of the total magnitude and the 
average IRC, BP’s IRC however was faster than Shell’s. However in terms of 
volatility of RC, Shell’s RC is more volatile than BP’s RC. Note that we did not 
divide the full periods of analysis (1970-2007) into the categories of before and 
after the 1973 oil crisis. This is because in this respect, the duration for the “before 
1973 oil crisis” category would consist of only four data points (1970-1973).  
 
Table 8.11: Summary of IRC of new products and services, Shell and BP (1970-2007) 
IRC of new products and 
services (%) 
Shell BP
Min -30.53 -39.26
Max 53.33 50.00
Yearly average 7.91 8.32
Yearly volatility 21.53 20.97
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre 
 
 In sum in the cases of Shell and BP, the results of the IRC of new products 
and services show that the rates of new product and service introduction are not 
very high and reasonably volatile. To some extent, our results reflect the findings 
of Fine (1998) that indicate that the new product and service introductions in the 
oil industry occurred once within 10-20 years.  
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Variable 8 (Firm): IRC of Process  
Process clockspeed reflects the rates at which process technologies are replaced 
(Fine, 1998). We built on this definition for our eighth variable: IRC of process, 
defined as the rate of new process technologies. The oil industry is known as an 
industry with major technological breakthroughs in the exploration techniques, oil 
drilling and refining, and chemicals. For a technological breakthrough to happen, 
however, it may take a reasonable time. We performed content analysis of the new 
process technologies from the annual reports of both Shell and BP. Similar to the 
data of new products and services, the data of new process technologies did not 
exist every year or at every regular period. This will result in high fluctuations 
when computing the IRC from such data. To smooth out the fluctuations, we used 
the three-year moving average. Similar to the IRC of new products and services, 
for a comparable duration between Shell and BP, our analysis for the IRC of 
process covers the periods of 1970-2007. Figure 8.9 shows the patterns of IRC of 
process at Shell and BP, 1970-2007. 
  
Figure 8.9: IRC of Process Shell and BP (%), 1970-2007 
IRC of Process, % (Shell vs. BP)
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Source: Content analyses of Shell’s and BP’s annual reports, 1970-2007 
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Table 8.12 provides a summary of the total magnitude, average magnitude 
and volatility of the IRC of process. Magnitude wise, Shell’s IRC of process was 
faster than BP’s. On average, the RC’s of Shell (8.62%) is also faster than the RC’s 
of BP (6.20%). The RC of Shell is also slightly less volatile than the RC of BP 
(24.37% vs. 26.28%).  
 
 
Table 8.12: Summary of IRC of process, Shell and BP (1970-2007) 
IRC process (%) Shell BP
Min -25.32 -34.33
Max 63.89 67.68
Yearly average 8.62 6.20
Yearly volatility 24.37 26.28
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre 
 
 
To conclude, with regards to IRC of process, Shell seemed to introduce 
more new technologies than BP or in other words the Shell’s pattern of IRC of 
process seemed to be faster than BP’s.  
 
 
 
Variable 9 (Firm): IRC of Organizational Structure  
Following Fine (1998), we define the IRC of organizational structure as the 
changes in the structure that consists of several components: restructuring in the 
organizational level, subsidiary or departmental level, and changes in top 
management team of incumbent firms in an industry. Since our measure of IRC of 
organizational structure comprises several structural components, it is possible for 
us to have yearly data. Therefore, it is not necessary to use the moving average 
method to smooth out possible fluctuations. Figure 8.10 shows the patterns of IRC 
of organizational structure at Shell and BP.  
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Figure 8.10: IRC of Organizational Structure of Shell and BP, 1970-2007 
IRC of Organizational Structure, % (Shell vs. BP)
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Source: Content analyses of Shell’s and BP’s annual reports, 1970-2007; Van Zanden et al., 2007; Grant, 2002; Pettigrew 
and Whittington, 2003. 
 
 
 
Additionally, Table 8.13 shows reasonably low values of the magnitude and 
average of IRC and low volatility. The maximum rate of change that these two 
firms have is around 11% (see Figure 8.10) while on average the rate of change is 
around 1.42% (Shell) and 2.44% (BP).  
 
Table 8.13: Summary of IRC of organizational structure, Shell and BP (1970-2007) 
IRC of organizational 
structure (%) 
Shell BP
Min -9.40 -4.34
Max 10.80 9.44
Yearly average 1.42 2.44
Yearly volatility 4.78 3.71
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre 
 
 
The above results imply that if there is a change in the organizational 
structure of both incumbent firms, it was more periodic and reasonably radical 
change rather than constant and incremental adjustment. For instance, the drastic 
change of organizational structure did not happen at a frequent pace but only once 
in many years or decades. In Shell’s case, for instance, there were basically four 
main changes of organizational structure from 1907-2004. The first one is the 
function and market form that existed from 1907 until 1950s before the second 
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form of matrix structure took place in 1959 (the outcome of McKinsey’s study). 
The third change to multidivisional form only happened gradually in 1970s before 
the fourth change happened in the 1990s where Shell slowly moved back to the 
matrix form. In sum, based on the IRC patterns of organizational structure, both 
Shell and BP thus seemed to exhibit a slow rate of organizational structure (cf. 
Fine, 1998 that showed the organizational clockspeed of 20-40 years in the oil 
industry).  
 
Variable 10 (Firm): IRC of Internal Venturing 
Internal venturing represents new initiatives or expansion that a firm instigates 
autonomously without cooperation with parties outside the firm. This includes 
starting up new business, entering new country, obtaining license, reorganizing 
activities and closing offices or product lines. Since this variable comprises many 
components, it is also possible for us to use the yearly data without having to use 
the moving average method for the smoothing purpose. To get the data, we 
performed structural content analysis (Jauch et al., 1980; Weber, 1990) of Shell’s 
and BP’s annual reports. Similar to the previous IRC variables, our analysis of the 
IRC of internal venturing ranges from the year 1970 until 2007. Although for 
Shell, it was possible for us to identify the internal venturing from 1907-2007, for 
BP our study only ranges from 1970-2007. For a comparable duration, our analysis 
of IRC of internal venturing thus ranges from 1970 until 2007. Regarding the 
internal venturing, Figure 8.11 shows the IRC patterns of Shell and BP 
respectively.  
 
Figure 8.11: IRC of Internal Venturing of Shell and BP, 1970-2007 
IRC of Internal Venturing, % (Shell vs. BP)
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Source: Content analyses of Shell’s and BP’s annual reports, 1970-2007 
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Furthermore with respect to the IRC of internal venturing, Table 8.14 shows 
that the magnitude and average of Shell’s IRC are higher than BP’s that shows 
negative values. The IRC of Shell, however, is more volatile than the IRC of BP. 
 
Table 8.14: Summary of IRC of internal venturing, Shell and BP (1970-2007) 
IRC internal venturing (%) Shell BP
Min -16.87 -21.94
Max 35.45 19.18
Yearly average 4.66 -1.05
Yearly volatility 13.08 9.32
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre 
 
We can relate the findings of IRC of internal venturing with the two main ways a 
firm grows: through the use of the firm’s internal resources (i.e. internal venturing) 
or through the cooperation with a party outside the firm’s boundary such as 
through mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and alliances (i.e external venturing). 
From the results shown in Table 8.14, we can thus interpret that in terms of 
growth, in comparison with BP, Shell paid more attention to its internal venturing 
activities in addition to its external venturing activities (see Table 8.6). 
Finally, as a conclusion to the findings of our heterogeneous measures 
(variable 5-10), Table 8.15 summarizes the results of the heterogeneous measures. 
For a comparative purpose, we computed the average external rates of change 
across industry measures and the average internal rates of change across firm 
measures for both Shell and BP.  
 
Table 8.15: Summary of the results of the heterogeneous measures 
Average Annual Rate of Change (%) Industry  Shell BP 
ERC Oil prices, 1907-2007 4.47 - -
ERC Competitive diversity, 1907-2000 7.74 - -
IRC New products & services, 1970-2007 - 7.91 8.32 
IRC New process, 1970-2007 - 8.62 6.20 
IRC Organizational structure, 1970-2007 - 1.41 2.44 
IRC Internal venturing, 1970-2007 - 4.66 -1.05 
Average ERC = 6.10 IRCShell = 5.65 IRCBP = 3.98
Difference IRC– ERC (∆RC) ∆RCShell = -0.45 ∆RCS\BP = -2.12 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre 
 
Comparing the average IRC with the average ERC, it seems that both Shell 
and BP were slightly lacking behind the industry rate of change. It does not 
necessarily mean, however, that the IRC of Shell and BP fell behind the ERC of 
the oil industry. This can be resulted due to the different measures that are used for 
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measuring the ERC and the IRC separately while these measures may not be 
completely comparable. This issue will be discussed and explained in more 
detailed in Chapter 8.4 (see Table 8.17). Nevertheless, in terms of the differences 
between the IRC and ERC (∆RC), ∆RCShell exhibited a faster rate of change than 
∆RCBP. 
 
 
 
8.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
It is well recognized in the literature that organizations have to adapt to their 
environments in order to survive. Accordingly, the heart of most approaches to 
organization-environment research lies on an investigation of how an appropriate 
alignment between a firm and its environment can be achieved. The goal of 
management, therefore, is to maximize an organization’s “fit” with its environment 
(Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985) in various ways (e.g., Lewin, 1936; Thompson, 
1967). Of central concern is the alignment between the internal rate of change of 
the firm and the external rate of change of the environment in which the firm is 
embedded.  
 The question of how fast firms undergo changes relative to environmental 
changes is rooted in a central debate in organizational theory regarding the relative 
influence of inertia forces and environmental forces (selection perspective) and 
strategic choice on activity patterns over time (adaptation perspective) (Romanelli 
and Tushman, 1986). On the one hand from the selection perspective, the 
predominance of inertial forces in organizations may explain the observation that 
periods of changes in magnitude tend to be interspersed with periods of 
discontinuous changes in pattern (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Mintzberg and 
Waters, 1982; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). On the other hand from the 
adaptation perspective, changes can be explained by key external and internal 
conditions that influence the pace of change (Levinthal, 1991; Lewin et al., 2003). 
In this respect, the rate of change is regarded as a function of managers’ continual 
need to adjust the internal rate of change with the external rate of change.  
Combining the two perspectives, we use the first principle of self-renewing 
organizations to allow one to see an organization’s change trajectory in light of a 
coevolutionary perspective. The key issue here is that it is essential that a firm’s 
internal rate of change should match or even exceed the external rate of change in 
the firm’s environment. Understanding how temporal changes in environment 
affect the survival of constituent organizations is of central concern in corporate 
longevity or sustained strategic renewal research. This is reflected in one of our 
interviews at Shell: 
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“In my opinion, there are at least two key aspects in managing the long-term viability of your 
firm. First, you need to understand how the society is developing, including how the business 
environment is developing, and you need to understand how technology and science are 
developing; so basically, an understanding of where the business environment goes, how fast 
it changes, and what drives the changes. Second, with that knowledge, you need to align your 
business and technology strategy with the business environment. This means you should be 
able to understand where and how fast a new business for your firm could evolve.”  
(Interview with a Shell’s top executive in strategy, 8 December 2007) 
 
The previous interview quote was further complemented by another 
interviewee who during our interview, acted as a top manager in the investment 
department. This interviewee mentioned that a robust investment proposal should 
take into account the alignment of firm strategy with the condition at the industry 
level. He also mentioned about the need to balance short-term and long-term 
initiatives, which later relates to our third key principle. 
 
“Based on my experience, I think it is fundamental to scan your business environment before 
you formulate your firm’s strategy. The idea is that you need to have a good match between 
your firm and your firm’s environment. What I understand is that a robust investment 
proposal is the proposal that reflects and incorporates the changing condition of a firm’s 
business environment. In doing so, you will also have an idea that you need to invest both in 
the short-term as well as the long-term initiatives”. 
(Interview with a Shell’s top manager in investment department, 4 August 2007) 
 
In addition to the qualitative insight that was provided from the above 
interview quote, we demonstrated the first key principle quantitatively. To this end, 
we developed measurement indicators in this chapter. We start by investigating if 
there is indeed a structural change at the industry level by using the Chow test 
(Chow, 1960). Through the result from the Chow test (Table 8.2), we found that 
due to a certain drastic change event (e.g. oil crisis in 1973) may result in structural 
change. This finding was reflected when we analyzed the variables of RC of oil 
production, ERC of oil prices, and ERC of competition.  
Additionally we developed measures that comprise homogeneous and 
heterogeneous measures (refer to Table 6.6). Homogeneous measures are 
concerned with similar measures both at the industry as well as the firm level. 
Heterogeneous measures, however, are concerned with different measures between 
the industry level and the firm level. For a comparison, in both homogeneous and 
heterogeneous measures we compare the average external rate of change from the 
industry with the average internal rate of change from the case companies (Shell or 
BP). Table 8.16 summarizes the key findings from both homogeneous as well as 
heterogeneous measures.  
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Table 8.16: Summary of the key findings of homogeneous and heterogeneous measures 
of internal vs. external rates of change  
Homogeneous Measures 
(Industry- & Firm-Level) 
Average Annual 
∆RCShell 
Average Annual 
∆RCBP 
Comparison 
Oil Production, 1922-2000 + + ∆RCShell < ∆RCBP  
Patents, 1975-2007 + – ∆RCShell > ∆RCBP 
R&D Intensity, 1981-2007 + + ∆RCShell < ∆RCBP 
External Venturing, 1986-2008 + + ∆RCShell > ∆RCBP 
Heterogeneous Measures (Firm-
level) 
Average Annual 
IRC Shell 
Average Annual 
IRC BP Comparison 
IRC new products and services, 
1970-2007 
+ + RCShell < RCBP 
IRC new process, 1970-2007 + + RCShell > RCBP 
IRC organizational structure, 1970-
2007 
+ + RCShell < RCBP 
IRC internal venturing, 1970-2007 + – RCShell > RCBP 
Note: ∆RCShell = RCShell – RCIndustry ; ∆RCBP = RCBP – RCIndustry 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre 
 
Delineating the heterogeneous measures, from Table 8.16 we can also make 
the comparison on the firm-level only, i.e. a comparison between Shell and BP for 
the IRC variables. Only at the IRC of internal venturing, BP shows a negative rate 
of change. In comparison with Shell, BP shows faster rates of change in terms of 
IRC of products/services and organizational structure. Conversely, Shell shows 
faster rates of change than BP in terms of IRC of process and internal venturing. 
To move the results shown in Table 8.16 to a more sophisticated analysis, 
we need to do a total comparison of both homogeneous and heterogeneous 
measures. To this end, we took the average of the industry’s ERC across all 
measures from both homogeneous and heterogeneous measures and by the same 
token, the two firms’ IRC. Subsequently, we calculated the average differences 
between the average ERC and the average IRC. This is related to the idea that an 
average, i.e. across various indicators, the average IRC must be equal or higher 
compared to the ERC from our comparative-longitudinal study of oil industry, 
Shell and BP. The results of both homogeneous and heterogeneous measures 
demonstrate that to a large extent the internal rates of change (IRC) of both firms 
are aligned with the oil industry’s rates of change (except at the RC variable of 
patents where BP’s IRC falls slightly behind the industry rate of change and that 
BP showed a negative IRC with respect to the internal venturing measure). Table 
8.17 summarizes the average ERC and the average IRC across all measures and the 
differences between the average ERC and IRC (∆RC). 
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Table 8.17: Summary of the comparison of average annual internal and external rates 
of change across measures 
Measures of RC and Period Industry Shell BP 
Homogeneous measures    
Oil Production, 1922-2000 4.90 6.06 6.92 
Patents, 1975-2007 -1.37 0.59 -4.23 
R&D Intensity, 1981-2007 -0.37 0.83 3.73 
External Venturing, 1986-2008 4.73 16.30 10.08 
Heterogeneous Measures    
ERC Oil prices, 1907-2007 4.47 - -
ERC Competitive diversity, 1907-2000 7.74 - -
IRC New products & services, 1970-2007 - 7.91 8.32 
IRC New process, 1970-2007 - 8.62 6.20 
IRC Organizational structure, 1970-2007 - 1.41 2.44 
IRC Internal venturing, 1970-2007 - 4.66 -1.05 
Average across measures ERC = 3.35 IRCShell = 5.80 IRCBP = 4.05
Difference of average IRC– average ERC 
(∆RC) across measures
∆RCShell = 2.45 ∆RCS\BP = 0.70 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre 
 
Altogether to a various degree, Shell and BP manage to align their internal 
rates of change with the external rates of change of the oil industry. The ∆RC of 
Shell, however, is higher than the ∆RC of BP. This means that although the IRC of 
both Shell and BP exceed the ERC of the oil industry, Shell moves even faster than 
BP with respect to aligning the IRC with the ERC.  
To conclude through our empirical investigation of the first key principle, 
we provide an answer to our third research question (Chapter 1) and evidence on 
the proposition (Chapter 5) to the first key principle of self-renewing organization, 
i.e. at different rates, our case firms (Shell and BP) manage to align their internal 
rates of change with the external rate of change. The alignment of the internal rate 
of change of a firm with the external rate of change of the firm’s environment 
positively influences the firms’ sustained strategic renewal efforts. By illustrating 
this through our empirical analysis, we hope to give top management an 
understanding of the importance to match the dynamics of internal strategy making 
processes with the dynamics of external ecology in which the firm operates. In the 
next chapter, we continue with the empirical investigation of the second key 
principle: self-organization. 
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9. Investigating Principle 2: Self-
Organization 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Self-organization, the key construct of the second principle of self-renewing 
organizations (Volberda & Lewin, 2003),  are derived from many disciplines such 
as cybernetics (Von Foerster, 1960; Ashby, 1962; Beer, 1966; Heylighen and 
Joslyn, 2001), themodynamics (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1977), mathematics 
(Lendaris, 1964), information theory (Shalizi, 2001), synergetics (Haken, 1981) 
and geophysics (Bak and Chen, 1991). Independently of the origination of self-
organization construct, a central principal notion is that self-organizing systems 
achieve order because multiple local agents or members interact and those 
interactions produce unintended outcomes without the intervention of a central 
controller (Chiles et al., 2004). 
 The central premise of self-organization challenges organizational 
researchers to use the construct in organizational studies. Since then, organizational 
theorists have begun to conceptualize organizations as complex adaptive systems 
(Anderson, 1999a; McKelvey, 2001; Stacey, 1995) that give rise to the notion of 
emergent self-organization. Through an empirical case study of Shell in this 
chapter, we aim to contribute to the understanding of self-organization in the 
organization studies, in particular the study of sustained strategic renewal. In this 
chapter, we also aim to address our fourth research question of how large 
incumbent firms manage self-organization to sustain their strategic renewal over 
time. Additionally, this chapter also aims to address the second proposition in 
Chapter 5.3, i.e. self-organization positively influences sustained strategic renewal. 
 The outline of this chapter is as follows. Chapter 9.2 presents some 
measurement indicators that we used to measures the construct of self-
organization. We discuss the method used in conceptualizing and quantifying self-
organization in Chapter 9.3. Chapter 9.4 presents the data analysis and 
subsequently the results from the key findings. We then conclude this chapter by 
summarizing and discussing the key findings. 
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9.2 Measurement Indicators of Self-Organization 
Literature on self-organization (Allen, 1988, 1997; Anderson, 1999a, b; Holland, 
1995; Kauffman, 1995; McKelvey, 1999; Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989; Nonaka, 
1988; Stacey, 1995; Von Foester, 1960; Von Foerster and Zopf, 1962) suggests 
that self-organizing adaptability observed in long-term surviving companies is 
similar to that observed in ecosystems which are typically complex, non-linear, 
dynamic systems whose behavior may be better understood with knowledge of 
complexity theory (Hall, 1997). The difference that is made between the two 
research streams is that organization studies recognize barriers to freedom and 
natural default behavior suggested by complexity theory in the form of 
bureaucratic structure (Anderson, 1999a, b). 
Accordingly, Chiles et al. (2004) propounds that in self-organizing systems, 
order comes from the actions of interdependent agents who exchange information, 
take actions, and continuously adapt to feedback about others’ actions rather than 
from the imposition of an overall plan by a central authority. This is in line with 
Volberda and Lewin (2003, p.2126) who refer to self-organization as “the process 
by which organizations always find order no matter how complex or convoluted 
the structure of the organization.”  
The idea development towards self-organization makes organizational 
scholars to critically contemplate on the traditional, mechanistic view of 
organization that is built upon bureaucracy (Weber, 1946). This traditional view of 
organization is largely based on the idea of regarding an organization as a kind of 
mechanical system in which discernable forces and basic laws of motion are in 
operation (Capra, 1996; Stacey, 1995). From this view, organizations try to seek 
order through highly prescribed rule sets, formalized control and hierarchical 
authority structures. To put it another way, a hierarchical authority structure is 
regarded as an essential element in helping organization leaders determine proper 
actions and deploy central instructions and control to the workforce (Pugh et al., 
1968; Evan, 1963). 
Contradictorily enough in trying to comprehend the mechanisms that give 
rise to self-organization, Bak and Chen’s (1991) study of self-organized criticality 
suggests that organizational researchers think of it as a hierarchical process. This 
view made intuitive sense in understanding why self-organization is observable in 
processes that do not have a top-down, hierarchical structure. In organization 
studies, hierarchical structure means vertical organizational structure and refers to 
the typical way that a business is constructed. In stark contrast to this 
understanding of the term hierarchical structure is its meaning in the biological 
sciences, where it refers to the hierarchical structure as the polar opposite of self-
organization (Brunk, 2000). In self-organizing systems, control of the organization 
is typically distributed not through hierarchy but over the whole of the systems. 
 
187
 Investigating Principle 2: Self-Organization  171 
  
 
 
 
It follows then that from the perspective of self organizing, traits such as the 
absence of centralized control and bureaucratic hierarchies are shared by all self-
organizing systems (Nonaka, 1988). In order to enquire this matter, the task at 
hand now is to develop measures of self-organization. The purpose here is to 
develop some measurement indicators to assess what degree of variation of self-
organization in fact exists in an organizational structure. Since the bureaucratic 
structure influences the magnitude of the self organization, we develop the 
measurement indicators of self-organization built upon the measures of 
bureaucratic tendency that may facilitate this line of inquiry. For this purpose, we 
developed three key measurement indicators that are summarized in Table 9.1 (see 
also Table 6.9 in Chapter 6). Since the study of self-organization requires firm-
specific data in a very detailed level, it is only possible to do this kind of study in a 
firm where one has an access to the firm’s internal archives. In this case, the firm 
in which we have an internal access is Shell only, the focal firm of our study. This 
means that the empirical investigation of self-organization in this study can only be 
done for the case of Shell, and not the case of BP. 
First, of central importance to the concept of bureaucracy is the measure of 
hierarchical structures of organizations. The most readily quantifiable measure of 
the structure of authority is the vertical height of hierarchy. This is defined as the 
number of levels of authority or echelons from top management to workers (Evan, 
1963; Pugh et al., 1968). In relation to self-organization, hierarchical level is 
expected to negatively influence self-organization. As indicated previously in 
Chapter 6 (Table 6.9) for this measure, we collected data from the organizational 
directories of Shell Exploration and Production (EP) from 1985-1994 and the 
Human Resources (HR) archives combining with the Shell’s internal system called 
“Who’s Who” from 1994-2007. We particularly chose Shell EP for the 
investigation of self-organization as Shell has a highly complex structure. In the 
past, Shell comprised four types of company: the parent companies, the group 
holding companies, the service companies, and the operating companies. Due to 
the company’s structural complexity, the company’s organizational chart was 
difficult to be outlined and studied. It was, however, possible to analyze the 
organizational chart of operating companies through the archive of Shell’s 
organizational directories (1985-1994) which are then followed by the archives of 
HR and Shell’s Who’s Who system (1994-2008).  
The second measurement indicator that we used is the chief executive’s span 
of control. While the first measurement indicator relates to the vertical span of 
control, the second indicator relates to the lateral width span of control (Pugh et al., 
1968; Evan, 1963). In this respect, chief executive’s span of control is defined as 
the ratio of the Shell EP chief executive to number of subordinates who report 
directly to the chief executive. For this measure, the data that we obtained from 
organizational directories are, however, only available from 1985 until 1994. 
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Nevertheless, this measure can complement the first measurement indicator of 
hierarchical level. Similar to hierarchical level, the chief executive’s span of 
control is expected to negatively influence self-organization. This can be partly 
explained by the idea that when organizational hierarchy is flattened, managers 
supervise more organizational members than the traditional organizational 
structure with many hierarchical levels. 
 
Table 9.1: Operationalization of measurement indicators of self-organization 
Measure Definition & Reference Source & Duration Self-Organization 
Indication 
Hierarchical 
level  
Number of levels of 
authority from top 
management to workers 
(Pugh et al., 1968) 
Shell Exploration & 
Production (EP) 
Organizational Directories, 
1985-1994, HR archives and 
Shell’s Who’s Who system, 
1994-2008 
The lower the 
hierarchical level, the 
higher the self-
organization 
Chief 
executive’s 
span of control 
Ratio of a chief executive 
to number of subordinates 
the chief executive has 
(Pugh et al., 1968; Evan, 
1963) 
Shell EP Organizational 
Directories, 1985-1994 
The lower the chief 
executive’s span of 
control, the higher the 
self-organization 
Administrative 
intensity 
Ratio of administrative 
staffs to exploration and 
production staffs (Evan, 
1963; Melman, 1956) 
Shell Organizational 
Directories (NL & UK), 
1985-1994; HR archives and 
Shell’s Who’s Who system, 
1994-2008 
The lower the 
administrative 
intensity, the higher the 
self-organization 
 
Finally, the third measurement indicator relates to the hierarchy of 
administrative structure. In this respect, we use the measure of administrative 
intensity (also known as the Melman’s ratio) defined as the ratio of administrative 
staffs to exploration and production staffs (Evan, 1963; Melman, 1956). This 
measure is based on the notion that the number of administrative staffs can be a 
symptom of bureaucratization (Pugh et al., 1968). The central premise here is that 
the hierarchy of the administrative structure is deliberately reduced in order to 
bring about an extensive decentralization of responsibility and devolution of 
authority. This implies that the administrative intensity negatively influences self-
organization. For this last measure, we collected data from the archive of Shell’s 
organizational directories (1985-1994) which are then followed by the archives of 
HR and Shell’s Who’s Who system (1994-2008). It should be noted that the data 
only cover the Shell in the Netherlands and in the UK. The data enables us to 
perform a longitudinal measurement of the administrative intensity ratio from the 
period 1985-2008. 
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With the aid of the above three measurement indicators, it would now be 
possible to study the degree of change in self-organization over time through the 
degree of change in hierarchical structure. In this respect, delayering the 
hierarchical and administrative structure is expected to be a positive indication to 
the self-organization construct. In the next section, we present our methods of how 
to measure and analyze self-organization based on the measurement indicators we 
developed.  
 
 
9.3 Analyses and Results 
Analyses of Measurement Indicators 
Hierarchical Level of Shell EP 
As indicated in the previous section to analyze the self-organization construct, we 
focus on the organizational structure of Shell’s Exploration and Production (EP). 
Following Pugh et al. (1968) the first measurement indicator, hierarchical level, is 
defined as the number of levels of authority from the top manager of Shell EP to 
the lowest level of Shell EP’s members. To measure the hierarchical level of Shell 
EP, our data is based on three sources: Shell EP Organizational Directories (1985-
1994), HR archives and Shell’s internal system called Who’s Who system (1994-
2008). Figure 9.1 shows the pattern of Shell EP’s hierarchical level from 1985-
2008. 
 
Figure 9.1: Shell EP hierarchical level, 1985-2008 
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Source: Shell Exploration & Production (EP) Organizational Directories, 1985-1994, HR archives and Shell’s 
Who’s Who system, 1994-2008 
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As mentioned before (Chapter 9.2) in relation to self-organization, 
hierarchical level is expected to negatively influence self-organization. Table 9.2 
shows the indication of the degree of self-organization assessed from the measure 
of hierarchical level at Shell EP, 1985-2008.  
 
Table 9.2: Indication of degree of self-organization based on the hierarchical level 
measure at Shell EP, 1985-2008 
Indicator Trend 1985-1997 1998-2005 2006-2008 
Hierarchical level – – + – 
Self-organization indication ++ – + 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre 
 
The results from the analysis indicate that to a large extent, the hierarchical 
level decreased starting from 1985 and reached the lowest level 1997. Since 
hierarchical level negatively influences self-organization, this implies a stronger 
indication of self-organization during those periods. However, starting from 1998 
the hierarchical level at Shell EP increased from three to five levels due to the 
changes in organizational structure following the integration of Shell Oil. The high 
hierarchical level continued until around 2005. The increase of hierarchical level 
negatively influences the degree of self-organization. During the last two periods 
(2006-2008), the hierarchical level at Shell EP had a one-level decrease. The 
decrease of hierarchical level positively influences the self-organization resulting 
in a positive indication of self-organization (although to a lesser degree than the 
periods of 1985-1997). In sum, we demonstrated in this section how the measure of 
hierarchical level can be used to assess the degree of self-organization in a firm. 
 
 
Shell EP Chief Executive’s Span of Control 
Following Evan (1963) and Pugh et al. (1968), we measure the chief executive’s 
span of control as the ratio of a chief executive to number of subordinates the chief 
executive has. In this case, we focus on the top manager at the highest level of 
Shell EP and the direct subordinates that the manager has. The data for this 
measure, however, are only available in the Shell EP’s organizational directory 
from 1985 until 1994. Unfortunately, we could not obtain such data in the two 
other data sources of HR archives and Who’s Who system. Figure 9.2 shows the 
pattern of the span of control of Shell EP’s chief executive. 
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Figure 9.2: Shell EP chief executive’s span of control, 1985-1994 
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Source: Shell Exploration & Production (EP) Organizational Directories, 1985-1994 
 
As shown in Figure 9.2 and Table 9.3, the result from the analysis of chief 
executive’s span of control concurs with the previous finding of the hierarchical 
level,  i.e. an indication of the increase of self-organization during the period 1985-
1994. 
 
Table 9.3: Indication of degree of self-organization based on the chief executive’s span 
of control measure at Shell EP, 1985-1994 
Indicator Trend 1985-1994 
Chief executive’s span of control – – 
Self-organization indication ++ 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre 
 
As shown in Figure 9.2, the pattern of the span of control exhibits a decreasing 
trend since 1985 until 1994. As argued before, the span of control indicates the 
strength of concentration of authority. Therefore, the span of control is likely to 
negatively influence self-organization. To conclude as the span of control 
decreased during the period 1985-1994, there is a strong indication that the degree 
of self-organization increased. 
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Administrative Intensity 
The final measurement indicator is based on the notion that the number of 
administrative staffs can be a symptom of bureaucratization (Pugh et al., 1968). 
The notion of self-organization implies that the hierarchy of the administrative 
structure is deliberately reduced in order to bring about an extensive 
decentralization of responsibility and devolution of authority.  To measure 
administrative intensity, we follow the construct of Melman (1956) and Evan 
(1963) which is defined as the ratio of administrative staffs to exploration and 
production staffs. Similar to hierarchical level, data were collected from the 
archive of Shell’s organizational directories (1985-1994) which are then followed 
by and combined with the archives of HR and Shell’s Who’s Who system (1994-
2008). The data, however, only cover the number of staffs in two operating 
locations of Shell, i.e. the Netherlands and the UK. 
Figure 9.3 depicts the pattern of administration intensity of Shell EP from 
1985-2008. From the graph, we can see that the results concur with the previous 
findings of measurement indicators of the hierarchical level and the chief 
executive’s span of control. In particular, the pattern resembles the pattern of the 
hierarchical level and partly also the pattern of span of control. 
 
Figure 9.3: Administrative intensity of Shell in the Netherlands and the UK, 1985-2008 
Administrative Intensity Shell NL and UK, 1985-2008
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igure 9.3 and Table 9.4 also demonstrate that there was a decreasing trend 
of adm
Table 9.4: Indication of degree of self-organization based on the administrative intensity 
997 1998-2005 2006-2008 
F
inistrative intensity from 1985 until around 1997 before it showed an 
increasing trend in 1998 and then followed by a decreasing trend from 2006 
onwards.  
 
measure at Shell NL and UK, 1985-2008 
Indicator Trend 1985-1
Administrative intensity – – + – 
Self-organization indication ++ – + 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre 
ince the administrative intensity negatively influences self-organization, 
the de
5 summarizes the varying degree of self-organization indication 
based 
able 9.5: Summary of degree of self-organization across measures, 1985-2008 
6-2008 
 
S
gree of self-organization in Shell seemed to be high during the period of 
1985-1997 and became low during the period 1998-2005. From 2006-2008, the 
slight decrease of administrative intensity indicates a slight increase of self-
organization.   
Table 9.
on all three measurement indicators during 1985-2008. Since all three 
measures negatively influences the degree of self-organization, when there is an 
increase in any of the indicators it results in a decrease of self-organization and 
vice versa. 
 
T
Indicator Trend 1985-1997 1998-2005 200
Hierarchical level (Shell EP) – – + –  
Chief executive’s span of control (Shell EP) n  n.a. – – .a.
Administrative intensity (Shell NL & UK) – – + – 
Self-organization indication ++ – + 
Note: n.a. = data not available. 
wSource: Erasmus Strategic Rene al Centre 
 particular during the period 1985-1997, all three measurement indicators gave a 
 
In
reasonably strong indication of the increase in the self-organization at Shell. 
During the period 1998-2005, however, the self-organization at Shell decreased 
which is indicated by the measurement indicators of hierarchical level and chief 
executive’s span of control. Finally, during the past two years (2006-2008), there 
was again an indication of an increase in self-organization at Shell although to a 
lesser degree than in the periods of 1985-1998. In conclusion over time, Shell 
depicts the self-organizing behavior to a various degree. 
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nalyses of Interviews 
easurement of self-organization, we also employed a 
“I see that a successful technology is always generated from the bottom to the top level. It is 
 
 
A
In addition to quantitative m
qualitative method through a series of interviews (see Table 6.3). Interviews are 
appropriate here, because organizational constructs, in particular self-organization 
measures investigated in this chapter, do not lend themselves easily to quantitative 
measurement (Strauss and Corbin, 1988). The data that we gathered from 
interviews with Shell’s top managers can also help to gain insights into the view of 
managers of how important they consider self-organization for Shell’s long-term 
survival. 
In particular, the interviews help to obtain insights into among others 
stewardship role of managers in guiding self-organization as a primary process by 
which new orders in firms may emerge. As mentioned in the literature, self-
organization implies that managers function as stewards of the evolutionary 
process and focus their managerial role on devising and articulating critical values 
and on establishing boundary conditions that enable and guide decision making at 
lower levels of the organization (Volberda and Lewin, 2003). To facilitate guided 
self-organization, Volberda and Lewin (2003) further propound that self-
organization, however, does not mean that individuals or units can pull in all 
directions at will or break all rules. It does not mean that managers are not 
necessary or that they have diminished roles. Contrarily, it means that no central 
controller is necessary. Guided self-organization requires fundamental departure 
from command and control philosophy of traditional hierarchical bureaucratic 
organizations. Instead of acting as a central controller, managers thus function as 
stewards of the evolutionary process by enabling and guiding decision making at 
lower levels of the organization (Volberda and Lewin, 2003). The importance of 
guided self-organization process was concurred by one of the Shell’s top manager 
at the research department taking the example of technology context:  
 
 
necessary though that management allow people to create option while simultaneously set the 
context and provide the guidance whenever it is needed.” 
(Interview with a Shell’s top manager at research department, 14 March 2007) 
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The previous statement was reiterated by a former executive of Shell 
planni
“The head office would say, “Listen, I set a context for you. Then at your level, in your 
ng department at the following interview quote. This former executive 
indicated that instead of acting as a central controller, the top managers in the head 
office should act as a facilitator the decision making at the bottom level for 
stimulating experimentation. Top managers who act as a facilitator is key to the 
self-organizing processes (Nonaka, 1988) and experimentation is fundamental for 
maintaining firm’s internal requisite variety (Ashby, 1964) which relates to the 
first key principle. 
 
country, or in your refinery, you take your own decision. But if you need help, you can come 
to talk to me.” It is interesting to see that though this particular structural condition, Shell 
actually facilitated decision taking from the bottom level of the organization. This means that 
at the lower level, at the operating level or service at the company, there is space to do 
experiments and to try out new things.” 
(Interview with a Shell’s former top executive of the planning department, 12 December 2007) 
 
Furthermore to gain insights into how Shell’s managers consider the 
structu
We understand that we should get rid of the corporate and management layer so that we 
re that facilitates the guided self-organization process, we asked them about 
their opinion of hierarchical structure. The following interview quotes indicate that 
the delayering of hierarchical structure positively influences self-organization: 
 
“
could have a very short line between the top and the people working at the bottom. By doing 
so, we expect to have self-managing team. […] We think highly decentralized power 
structure is an asset because it creates a room for diversity, for diverse inputs.” 
(Interview with a Shell’s top manager of strategy in exploration and production, 17 September 2007; 
Emphasis by the author in bold italic) 
 
“Some companies have decided to have “the” company’s strategies from the top level and 
then based on that, they derived the operational strategies enforced to the bottom level. 
However, such idea of military operations is not the way how it works in Shell’s practice.” 
(Interview with a Shell’s top executive in technology, 28 November 2007) 
 
“If I take a perspective of people-related longevity, I think that throughout the 100 years, the 
various bits and pieces of the Shell group have some kind of autonomy to make individual 
decisions. So it is a kind of almost like a federation of companies rather than one company 
where you have really a strong hierarchy, with the top to decide what everyone has to do.” 
(Interview with a Shell’s top executive in public relation, 27 October 2007) 
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Additionally we also asked about how Shell’s top managers consider their 
role in particular their span of control that may encourage guided self-organization 
process. The following interview quote suggests that top managers need to 
incorporate the tolerant management style that is decentralized. High 
decentralization implies a small span of control rather than a big span of control 
(Evan, 1963; Pugh et al., 1968). This implies that span of control negatively 
influences self-organization.  
 
“I gave you my hypothesis: a tolerant management style is very important to improve the 
survivability of a company, in particular in the case of Shell’s longevity. It requires a 
decentralized structure. [...] I am sure that if you observe, you will find that renewal nearly 
always starts as an experiment at the lower level and that renewal rarely succeeds as an 
initiative taken from the top down. So renewal grows from the grassroots upward into the 
organization and is not being planted from the top down. Such renewal that grows 
organically from the bottom up, that is what renews the company.” 
(Interview with a Shell’s former executive of the planning department, 12 December 2007) 
 
We further investigate the relation between the administrative intensity with 
the self-organization. The following interview quote confirms that administrative 
intensity negatively influences the self-organization. More specifically, the quote 
also confirms our finding that there was a decrease in the administrative intensity 
during the period 1985-1997 (Table 9.4) which is a positive indication of self-
organization. 
“If I look at the group’s structure from the 1980s until around 1996, the group was very 
decentralized. The support and administrative structure was very lean and simple, like 
Finance and HR; thus easy accessible – that is of course related to the decentralization. Then 
in around 1997/1998, the group became, in a way, more centralized because the businesses 
has started to run as one business.” 
(Interview with a Shell’s top manager at the patent department, 21 May 2007) 
 
His statement was further reiterated by our other interviewees who have 
worked and still worked at Shell (during the period of our interview) in various 
functions from research to technology and innovation:  
 
“If you look back, up till 1995/1996, we had a country-based organization. At that time, we 
had a few central organizations that supported these countries. In 1996, Shell decided to 
change to get more focuses on businesses. At that time, Shell Research got a lot of criticism 
about the ivory tower and science for science. In the new structure, we had a problem of 
segmentation or silo forms. We started to establish a stronger role for central functions. We 
got central IT, HR, finance, etc. organizations.”  
(Interview with a Shell’s top executive in innovation, 28 November 2007) 
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In conclusion, both our quantitative and qualitative analyses of self-
organization, show that although to a varying degree there was a self-organizing 
process in Shell, the focal company in our study. The additional insights that we 
obtained from the interviews with the Shell’s former and active top managers 
suggest that self-organization is a fundamental principle of the firm’s long-term 
viability, i.e. sustained strategic renewal 
 
 
9.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
Traditionally, organizations as social systems have been seen as essentially 
stable entities (Capra, 1996; Stacey, 1995). In this view, an organization exists in a 
state of equilibrium, the state in which a system has the greatest likelihood of 
retaining its internal order (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995). Self-organization 
perspective, however, suggests an opposed view. To self-organize, it may be 
necessary that organizations deal with chaotic processes in such a way that existing 
orders can be dissolved and new orders can emerge (Nonaka, 1988; Weick, 1987; 
Prigogine and Strengers, 1984).  
With reference to creating new orders, self-organization encourages an 
organizational structure that has limited centralization of authority and low 
hierarchies. By this means, organizational members are expected to become an 
autonomous self-organizing group that is given a guided freedom to stimulate 
creative activities that may contribute to the rejuvenation of their organization. 
The idea of self-organization to flatten the hierarchies of more traditional 
organizations leads us to develop some measurement indicators to assess what 
degree of variation of self-organization in fact exists in an organizational structure. 
Since this type of study requires in-depth data from a firm’s internal archives, we 
focus on the study of our focal firm, Shell in which we had an internal access to the 
company’s archives. Also since Shell’s organizational structure has always been 
very complex, our focus is at the Shell’s operating company level, i.e. Shell 
Exploration and Production (EP) and at the region level, i.e. Shell in the 
Netherlands and the UK. 
As a result, we developed three measures to indicate the degree of self-
organization in Shell over time. More precisely, the three measures comprise the 
hierarchical level, chief executive’s span of control, and administrative intensity 
(for the definition of each measure, see Table 9.1). For the first and third measures, 
our analyses cover the period 1985-2008. The second measure, however, has a 
shorter duration of analysis, i.e. from 1985-1994 due to the data constraint.  
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Nevertheless, the three measure help to indicate the degree of self-
organization in Shell over the years. The indication is that the three measures 
negatively influence self-organization. Table 9.2 summarizes the key findings of 
the three measures. The results show that from the year 1985 until around 1997/8 
the self-organization of Shell increased over the years as the three measures 
showed a decreasing trend. During the period 1998/9-2005, however, the self-
organization of Shell seemed to decrease before it depicted a slight increase in the 
past two years, 2006-2008. In comparison with the past two years, the level of 
increase during the period 1985-1997/8 seemed to be higher, meaning that there 
was a stronger indication of an increase in self-organization during the period 
1985-1998 than in the period of 2006-2008. 
 
Table 9.6: Summary of the key findings of measurement of self-organization 
Self-Organization Indication Measures 
1985-1994 or 
1985-1997 
1998 – 2005 2006-2008 
Hierarchical level ++ – + 
Chief executive’s span of 
control 
++ n.a. n.a. 
Administrative intensity ++ – + 
Note:  ++ = a stronger indication of an increase in self-organization than the sign + 
 – = an indication of a decrease in self-organization 
 n.a = data not available 
 
 In addition to the quantitative measures of self-organization, we also 
conducted interviews with both retired executives and active top managers from 
various functions. By and large, the results of the interviews show that the top 
managers of Shell understand the concept of self-organization. They also 
understand the importance of self-organization for the firm’s business and 
technology strategies that are directed towards the firm’s longevity. The interviews 
also gave some indications of the change of the degree of self-organization. It was 
indicated that in 1995 they saw that the company became more centralized by 
creating more central functions and more segmentations or silos. To a large extent, 
this concurs to the results from our quantitative analyses of the three measures. 
 To conclude, in this chapter we have addressed our fourth research question 
(Chapter 1) of how firms manage self-organization over time through the Shell’s 
case. The results show that there are some degrees of variation of self-organization 
over time, but the company’s top managers consider that it is fundamental for the 
firm’s sustained strategic renewal. The results from our quantitative measures, 
therefore, also provide evidence on our second proposition (Chapter 5) that self-
organization positively influences sustained strategic renewal. 
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10. Investigating Principle 3: 
Exploitation and Exploration∗)  
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
The interplay between exploitation and exploration has emerged as a central 
concept in organizational research on organizational adaptation, organizational 
learning and organizational survival (e.g. Burgelman, 1991; Holmqvist, 2004; 
Burgelman and Grove, 2007). Are exploitation and exploration fundamentally 
interrelated or are they two different orthogonal aspects? Gupta et al. (2006) 
contend that such central research question on this dual concept depends on the 
conceptual definition of exploration and exploitation. 
The conceptual definition can be traced back to the study of March (1991, 
p.71), in which he defines exploration as “things captured by terms such as search, 
variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation” 
whereas exploitation includes “such things as refinement, choice, production, 
efficiency, selection, implementation, execution”. The dominant view in the 
literature (March, 1991, 2006) is that emphasis on exploration and exploitation 
reflects trade-offs made to accommodate organizational limitations. To a large 
extent, the dual concept of exploitation and exploration resembles very closely to 
the selection and adaptation debate.  
In an attempt to tie the two ends of the adaptation-selection continuum, 
Burgelman (1991) applies an intra-organizational ecology view on strategy making 
to contend that organizations can achieve enduring success by balancing inertia 
and flexibility in their strategy making process. The idea is that firms should find a 
delicate balance between induced and autonomous strategic initiatives. Since 
induced strategic initiatives capitalize on current competencies and build on past 
success, they imply exploitation. Autonomous strategic initiatives instead fall 
outside the current competences and strategic scope which correspond to 
exploration.  
                                                 
∗) Part of this chapter is based on Kwee, Z., Van den Bosch, F.A.J., and Volberda, H.W. (2008). ‘How does top 
management team’s corporate governance perspective influence strategic renewal trajectories?: a longitudinal 
analysis of patterns of strategic renewal actions of Royal Dutch Shell plc (1907-2004)’. Working paper 
submitted to the Journal of Management Studies. 
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In this chapter, we too reconcile the selection and adaptation perspectives by 
investigating the central question of balancing exploratory and exploitative 
strategic renewal actions through our study of two large incumbent firms: Shell 
(1907-2006) and BP (1970-2006). This relates to our fifth research question 
(Chapter 1) of how firms balance their exploratory and exploitative strategic 
renewal actions over time. Accordingly, by investigating this question, we also aim 
to provide evidence on our third proposition (Chapter 5): balancing exploitation 
and exploration concurrently over time positively influences sustained strategic 
renewal. 
In this line of inquiry, we follow Mintzberg and Waters’ (1985) distinction 
regarding realized strategies to disentangle managerial intentionality and 
environmental selection effects operating on actions of strategic renewal.  
Additionally building on Weick (1995, p.55), we propose to study exploitation and 
exploration by identifying and analyzing strategic renewal actions of firms, i.e. 
actions that ‘managers do, not what they plan’.  As far as strategy is concerned, we 
thus focus on the realized strategic actions of strategic renewal as they cultivate a 
clearer understanding of the reified concept of strategy introduced by Mintzberg 
(1978, 1990). He proposes that strategy could be perceived as the blend of 
deliberate (intended and planned) and emergent (unintended but realized) strategies 
progressively forming a pattern of realized strategic actions over time. This is 
consistent with the study of Volberda et al. (2001a) that also demonstrates that 
strategic renewal trajectories consist of realized strategic renewal actions. 
Furthermore, this chapter also addresses our final research question of the 
role of top management team (TMT) in influencing the strategic renewal trajectory 
of a firm. Regarding this, mounting research on strategic renewal has largely 
focused on how large established firms manage their strategic renewal trajectories 
over time (e.g. Baden-Fuller and Volberda, 1997; Barr et al., 1992; Flier et al., 
2003; Huff et al., 1992; Volberda et al., 2001a, b). Such a broad research question, 
however, requires a more in-depth examination. For one thing, strategic renewal 
very much corresponds to management discretion. Top management teams are 
particularly important determinants of organizational strategic renewal in that they 
are at the boundary between an organization and its environment (Keck and 
Tushman, 1993). For another thing, strategic renewal embodies managerial 
processes. Top management teams mediate between external environmental 
demands and internal organizational dynamics (Barnard, 1938; Selznick, 1957; 
Thompson, 1967). In the literature, this is somehow an underexplored dimension 
of organizational antecedents of strategic renewal (e.g. Hurst et al., 1986; Lewin 
and Volberda, 1999; Volberda et al., 2001a). 
This implies that research on strategic renewal requires a longitudinal study 
to observe patterns and trajectories of a firm’s strategic renewal over an extended 
period of time, not merely a few years or decades. By far, the number of such 
empirical research is limited (cf. Flier et al., 2003; Huygens et al., 2001; Jenkins 
and Floyd, 2001; Kwee et al., 2008; Volberda et al., 2001b). Contemplating these 
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research gaps, we aim to address the research question of the extent to which top 
management team’s corporate governance perspective matters in shaping a firm’s 
strategic renewal trajectories. To this end, we conducted a longitudinal study of a 
large, long-lived established firm: the Royal Dutch Shell plc (briefly: Shell). For 
this particular investigation, our study covers the strategic renewal trajectories of 
Shell from 1959 until 2004. This is because during the 1959-2004 periods, Shell 
embodied the board compositions of “Committee of Managing Directors” (CMD). 
This CMD structure extends our research focus beyond CEO (cf. Stadler et al., 
2006), i.e. the focus on the top management team (TMT). 
Consequently, the contributions of this chapter are at least three fold. First, 
case studies or cross-sectional studies that are mostly based on surveys or 
modeling still dominate research on strategic renewal of exploitation and 
exploration. Although there are also longitudinal studies, the datasets of these 
studies comprise limited timescales. The long duration of our studies in Shell 
(1907-2006) and BP (1970-2006) enables us to contribute to this research stream 
by providing a much broader scope of longitudinal visualization of strategic 
renewal trajectories. Second, we contribute to the understanding of the role of top 
management team (TMT) in regulating the speed and direction of a firm’s strategic 
renewal journeys over time (Volberda et al., 2001a). Third, our findings in this 
chapter provide empirical evidence on the extant corporate governance literature of 
Anglo-Saxon and Rhine models (Albert, 1993, 1995; Letza et al., 2004; 
O’Sullivan, 2000; Smith, 2003; Tylecote and Conesa, 1999; Whittington and 
Mayer, 2000). The literature, by far, can only provide distinct characteristics of the 
two models conceptually (cf. Stadler et al., 2006). We explicitly demonstrate the 
operationalization of those characteristics and empirically test them.  
This chapter thus comprises two studies. The first study is a comparative-
longitudinal study of exploitation and exploration by using the Shell (1907-2006) 
and BP (1970-2006) as our case companies. The second study is a longitudinal 
study of the role of the TMT’s corporate governance perspective in managing a 
firm’s strategic renewal trajectories. This latter study is only done in the Shell’s 
case. The key reason is that during 1959-2004 Shell embodied the CMD structure 
that matches the requirement of studying the influence of TMT’s corporate 
governance perspective on a single firm’s strategic renewal trajectories. To 
structure our discussion, this chapter is organized as follows. Chapter 10.2 
discusses what measurement indicators we use to quantify exploitation and 
exploration and the theoretical foundations to develop these measures. Here we 
also discuss theoretical foundations of corporate governance for the investigation 
of TMT’s corporate governance perspective followed by presenting a conceptual 
framework for this particular investigation. Chapter 10.3 expounds on research 
methods used to analyze the data collected. This is followed by the data analyses 
and results section (Chapter 10.4). Finally, we draw our conclusion from the key 
findings in Chapter 10.5.  
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10.2 Measurement Indicators 
 
Exploitation and Exploration 
Exploitation and exploration is our focal study in this chapter. With regard to 
measurement indicators of exploitation and exploration, we build upon the studies 
of Volberda et al. (2001b) and Flier et al. (2003) that suggest the dimensions and 
metrics of strategic renewal. They contend that strategic renewal should be studied 
as a three-dimensional construct, consisting of the context, content and process 
dimensions of strategic renewal (cf. Miles and Snow, 1978).  
With respect to the dimensions of strategic renewal, it follows that 
exploitation and exploration constructs are related to the content dimension of 
strategic renewal. The content dimension focuses on the ‘what’ of strategy by 
distinguishing exploratory strategic renewal actions from exploitative ones (March, 
1991). Exploratory strategic renewal actions, indicating initiatives for long-term 
strategic renewal, are actions such as entering new markets and innovating new 
products or services. In other words, exploratory strategic renewal actions add new 
activities to the current repertoire of the organization’s range of activities and 
competences and increase the geographic scope of the firm. By contrast, 
exploitative strategic renewal actions, however, consist of strategic renewal actions 
that focus on the current range of activities and existing competencies, and 
implementing within the current geographic scope of a firm. Exploitative strategic 
renewal actions denote a shorter-term orientation of strategic renewal.  
To measure exploration, we use the exploration ratio which is defined as the 
number of exploratory strategic renewal actions divided by the total number of 
strategic renewal actions over a time period (Flier et al., 2003; Volberda et al., 
2001b). By the same token to measure exploitation, we use exploitation ratio 
which is defined as ratio of the number of exploitative strategic renewal actions to 
the total number of strategic renewal actions. The issue of how to obtain the data 
on exploratory strategic renewal actions is described previously in the methods 
section (Chapter 6.3 and 6.4). 
To investigate and measure the exploitative and exploratory strategic 
renewal actions (the third key principle), we conducted two longitudinal studies, 
Shell (1907-2006) and BP (1970-2006). We discuss the findings later in Chapter 
10.4. 
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TMT’s Corporate Governance Perspective and Strategic Renewal  
In addition to the focal study of exploitation and exploration, in this chapter we 
also study the influence of top management team (TMT) on strategic renewal 
actions. This inquiry is based on the idea that the ability of a firm to manage 
processes guiding strategic renewal trajectories is centered in particular on the 
firm’s top managers. Hambrick and Mason (1984) emphasize the need for studying 
the role of the top management team in making strategic decisions. In the 
literature, however, this aspect is somehow underexplored (Hurst et al., 1986; 
Volberda et al., 2001a; Volberda and Lewin, 2003). In this chapter, we thus aim to 
contribute to this research by investigating the role of top management teams 
through their corporate governance perspectives in managing strategic renewal 
trajectories.   
Our line of inquiry of managerial role requires a view of an organization as a 
complex social construct (e.g. Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Child, 1984; Handy, 
1981). In this respect, an organization is influenced by the values and expectations 
from its society or stakeholders. Top managers play an important role here. They 
are required to use their social skills in and around the organization to pursue their 
firm’s strategy effectively. In this respect, the values and expectations from the top 
managers’ home base (i.e. a country where the top managers reside) may influence 
their perspectives on how firms should be governed and on their strategy making.  
In the organization research stream, the framework for corporate governance 
is either market-based, command and control, or a mixture of the two (Albert, 
1993; Scott et al., 1994). The two most prominent categories of corporate 
governance models are the stakeholder (Rhine) model and the shareholder (Anglo-
Saxon) model (Albert, 1993; Letza et al., 2004; Smith, 2003). While the Rhine 
model is associated with companies operating in the continental European 
countries (such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and The Netherlands) and often 
in Japan; the Anglo-Saxon model is associated with companies operating in the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US).  
As mentioned before during 1959-2004, our focal company, Shell, had the 
board compositions of the CMD structure. Legally, the company was embedded in 
two countries: the Netherlands (a country that is associated with the Rhine model) 
and the UK (a country that is associated with the Anglo-Saxon model). This 
implies that top managers that are based in the Netherlands are more orientated 
towards the corporate governance perspective of the Rhine model. Conversely, top 
managers with the UK as their home base are more likely to have the Anglo-
Saxon-orientated corporate governance perspective. Furthermore during the period 
1959-2004, there were two different board models in the company: a two-tier 
board in The Netherlands-based Royal Dutch and a one-tier board in the UK-based 
Shell Transport and Trading. Accordingly, our study focuses on the TMT’s 
(instead of the CEO’s) corporate governance perspective based on the two 
corporate governance models: the Anglo-Saxon model (one-tier board) and the 
Rhine model (two-tier board).  
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Both corporate governance models tend to result in a different prioritization 
of key issues. The short-termism of Anglo-Saxon model directs the management 
board to focus more on the shareholder value (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; 
O’Sullivan, 2000) through extensive internationalization, dynamic market 
orientation, transactions-based focus and fluid capital investment system. 
Management in this governing body utilizes property or other tangible assets as 
financial performance indicators. Conversely, the Rhine model is associated with a 
long-term orientation with strong emphasis on prioritizing stakeholder values 
(Albert, 1995; Freeman, 1984). As a consequence, boards operating with this 
model have a more limited internationalization and a less dynamic market 
orientation with a dedicated capital investment system. Management also uses 
intangible assets such as investment in knowledge as performance indicators. Table 
10.1 summarizes the main differences between these two models. 
 
 
Table 10.1: Differences between Anglo-Saxon model and Rhine model 
 Anglo-Saxon model (UK, US) 
Rhine model (Germany, 
Switzerland, Austria, The 
Netherlands) 
Orientation Short-termism Long-termism 
Priority Shareholder value Stakeholder values 
Financial performance 
indicators Property, tangible assets Knowledge, intangible assets 
Internationalisation Extensive Limited 
Market orientation Dynamic Less dynamic 
Focus Transactions Relationships 
Investment system Fluid capital Dedicated capital 
(Source: Adapted from Albert, 1993; Clarke and Clegg, 2000; Johnson et al., 2005; Letza et al., 2004; Smith, 
2003)  
 
 
For the purpose of studying the influence of TMT’s corporate governance 
perspective on strategic renewal trajectories, we develop our conceptual framework 
as depicted in Figure 10.1. We operationalize the construct of the TMT’s corporate 
governance perspective into three aspects: time horizon, focus on (stake-)share-
holder value(s), and degree of internationalization. In this case, our focus on the 
TMT comprises the Shell’s CEOs who chaired the Committee of Managing 
Directors (CMD) and the board members. For a refined study, we also incorporate 
the proportion of the shareholders coming from the Anglo-Saxon-model or Rhine-
model background as a moderating variable. In this respect, we look at the 
distribution of Shell’s shareholder ownerships based on country.  
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Figure 10.1: Conceptual framework of the influence of TMT’s corporate governance 
perspective on exploitation-exploration and sustained strategic renewal 
P3*
Note: * P3 = third key principle: balancing exploitation and exploration simultaneously 
 
We then expect that the TMT’s corporate governance perspective may 
influence the content and context dimensions of strategic renewal actions. As 
discussed previously in the measurement indicator of exploitation and exploration, 
the content dimension includes the analysis of exploratory versus exploitative 
strategic renewal actions (March, 1991). This relates to the third key principle. 
Next the context dimension looks at the growth orientation of a firm, i.e. growth 
based on internal firm resources versus external firm resources (Burgelman, 1983; 
Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996). The context dimension refers to the ‘where’ 
question of strategy. External growth strategic renewal actions are strategic 
renewal actions taken in cooperation with parties from outside a firm’s boundaries. 
Examples of such actions include mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, strategic 
alliances and other cooperative agreements. Internal (organic) growth strategic 
renewal actions are actions that are originated from and implemented within a firm, 
for instance launching new products or new services, introducing firm performance 
enhancement programs, and closing product lines or offices. For the measurement, 
we use the external/internal ratio as the corresponding metric which is defined as 
the number of external strategic renewal actions divided by the total number of 
actions over a time period (Flier et al., 2003).  
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10.3 Exploitation & Exploration: Impact of Shell’s Dual 
Ownership Structure, 1959-2004 
From the management literature perspective, Shell’s highly complex structure is a 
puzzling phenomenon. This is because from an ownership and legal perspective, 
Shell comprised four types of company: the parent companies, the group holding 
companies, the service companies, and the operating companies. Considering the 
company’s managerial and operational complexity, how was Shell actually 
structured and managed? Inspired by this question, Armour and Teece (1976) 
investigated developments in organization form for firms in the oil industry for the 
period 1955-1970. They identified and classified Shell’s organization structure as 
one of the first Matrix-organizations. Grant (2002) looked at the structure of Shell 
in terms of different operating and service companies which comprise the Group 
and their links of ownership and control. He identified that the structure through 
which the Group was actually managed did not correspond very closely to the 
formal structure. He further found that the managerial control of the Group was 
vested in the Committee of Managing Directors (CMD) which formed the Group’s 
top management team (TMT). The CMD provided the primary linkage between the 
formal (or governance) structure and the management (or executive) structure of 
the Group. The CMD also linked together the two parent companies and the group 
holding companies. 
Indeed, one of Shell’s distinctive features was its dual ownership structure. 
This structure was initiated under the presidency of Loudon in the 1950s. At that 
time, Shell approached an external consultant, McKinsey, to review its 
management structure. A review by McKinsey in 1959 led to remodeling of the 
organization. It was when decentralized operating companies were established, 
responsibilities and authorities were delegated and a formal Committee of 
Managing Directors (CMD) was established to reach consensus and coordination 
in the TMT. In principle, the CMD was chaired by a Chairman and had members 
of a Vice Chairman and other Managing Directors. These members were referred 
to as the Group of Managing Directors. The chairmanship of the CMD could be 
either the President of Royal Dutch or the Managing Director of Shell Transport 
and Trading.  
Following the incorporation of Royal Dutch Shell plc in 2004/2005, Shell 
merged the Group’s dual-ownership structure. Under this new structure, the CMD 
was abolished. At present, the company holds an annual meeting at the executive 
level (previously at the CMD level), known as the Shell’s Annual General 
Meetings. Consequently, the time periods when the CMD was in existence also 
mark the duration of our investigation of the TMT’s corporate governance 
perspective, i.e. from 1959 until 2004. 
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10.4 Analyses and Results 
 Exploitative & Explorative Strategic Renewal Trajectories of Shell  
As mentioned, we calculated the exploration ratio by dividing the number of 
exploratory strategic renewal actions to the total number of strategic renewal 
actions. Likewise, exploitation ratio is the ratio of number of exploitative strategic 
renewal actions to the total number of strategic renewal actions. From the content 
analysis method, we identified in total 1,537 realized strategic renewal actions for 
the Shell’s case (1907-2006). Note that, however, there is missing data during the 
Second World War (1939-1945). This is because during the Second World War, 
Shell did not extensively document its financial and strategic performances. Table 
10.2 summarizes the results of the content analysis of strategic renewal actions of 
Shell.  
 
 
Table 10.2: Statistics of Shell’s strategic renewal actions, 1907-2006 
Summary Shell (1907-2006)
Number of strategic renewal actions 1,537 
Missing data in years (For Shell only: from 1939-1945 due to the Second 
World War) 
7 
Average number of yearly strategic renewal actions (frequency) 16.36
Volatility (standard deviation of strategic renewal actions) 9.09
Average exploitation ratio 0.41
Average exploration ratio 0.49
Source: Content analysis of Shell’s annual reports, 1907-2006 
Note: n.a. = not applicable 
 
After the extensive coding of the longitudinal data, we subsequently 
computed the three-year moving average of the exploration and exploitation ratios 
for the Shell’s case. The reason is that the ratios have high fluctuations and thus we 
need to smooth out the fluctuations. Next we plot both longitudinal ratios in two 
graphs. Figure 10.2 depicts the exploratory and exploitative strategic renewal 
trajectories of Shell (1907-2006). 
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Figure 10.2: Shell’s exploratory and exploitative strategic renewal trajectories (1907-
2006), three-year moving average 
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(Source: Database created by our own content analyses of Shell’s annual reports 1907-2006) 
 
The third key principle suggests a need to balance exploitation and 
exploration simultaneously. This is achieved perfectly when both the exploration 
and exploitation ratios are equal to 0.5. The exploratory and exploitative strategic 
renewal trajectories displayed in Figure 10.2 depict that the reasonably balanced 
exploitation-exploration state was achieved by Shell around the period 1977-1993. 
Then there was a decreasing pattern in exploratory strategic renewal trajectory 
until around 2004 before it showed an increasing pattern from 2004-2006. 
In sum, over the time, to a varying degree, Shell attempted to balance 
exploration and exploitation simultaneously. Overall during the period investigated 
(1907-2006), Shell had an average exploration ratio of 0.49 (see Table 10.2) which 
indicates a tight close to a balanced exploration-exploitation. 
 
 
Exploitative & Explorative Strategic Renewal Trajectories of BP 
 
By the same token as in Shell’s case, we calculated the exploration ratio and 
exploitation ratio of BP’s strategic renewal actions. From the content analysis 
method, we identified in total 591 realized strategic renewal actions for the BP’s 
case (1970-2006). Different from the Shell’s case, we did not encounter any 
missing data for the BP’s case as the duration of the comparative analysis was 
shorter, and so not covering the periods before the Second World War. Table 10.3 
summarizes the statistics of the content analysis of strategic renewal actions of BP.  
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Table 10.3: Statistics of BP’s strategic renewal actions, 1970-2006  
Summary BP (1970-2006)
Number of strategic renewal actions 591
Missing data in years  n.a.
Average number of yearly strategic renewal actions (frequency) 15.95
Volatility (standard deviation of strategic renewal actions) 8.51
Average exploitation ratio 0.63
Average exploration ratio 0.37
Source: Content analysis of BP’s annual reports, 1970-2006. 
Note: n.a. = not applicable 
 
Subsequently, to depict the exploratory and exploitative strategic renewal 
trajectories we computed the three-year moving average of the exploration and 
exploitation ratios of the two companies. Similar to the Shell’s case, we need to 
smooth out the fluctuations of the ratios data. Figure 10.3 depicts the exploratory 
and exploitative strategic renewal trajectories of BP (1970-2006). 
 
Figure 10.3: BP’s exploratory and exploitative strategic renewal trajectories (1970-
2006), three-year moving average 
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(Source: Database created by our own systematic document analysis of BP’s annual reports 1970-2006) 
 
From Figure 10.3 in BP’s case, the reasonably balanced exploitation-
exploration can be observed around the periods of 1990-2000 as the patterns of 
both exploratory and exploitative strategic renewal trajectories are close to the 
value 0.5 (the ratios that indicate the perfectly balanced exploitation-exploration). 
Throughout the full period investigated (1970-2006), BP had an average 
exploration ratio of 0.37 (Table 10.3 and 10.4). This value is less balanced than the 
one of the Shell’s case.  
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To be more precise, we also made a comparison of the average exploration 
ratio and exploitation ratio based on the comparable duration between Shell and 
BP, i.e 1970-2006. Table 10.4 summarizes the results of the full-period and the 
equal-duration comparisons on the average exploration ratio and average 
exploitation ratio. 
Table 10.4: Summary of full-period (Shell, 1907-2006 vs. BP, 1970-2006) and equal-
duration comparisons (Shell vs. BP, 1970-2006) 
Average ratio Shell (Full period, 1907-2006) BP, 1970-2006 
Average exploration ratio 0.49 0.37 
Average exploitation ratio 0.51 0.63 
Average ratio Shell (Comparable period, 1970-2006) BP, 1970-2006 
Average exploration ratio 0.48 0.37 
Average exploitation ratio 0.52 0.63 
Source: Content analyses of Shell’s (1907-2006) and BP’s (1970-2006) annual reports 
 
In conclusion, our findings illustrate how both large incumbent firms in our 
study attempt to balance exploration and exploitation over time. Since it is difficult 
to be really in a perfectly balanced state, we can see that at some periods firms 
focused more on exploitation while at other periods, they focus more on 
exploration. Nevertheless on average and over time, Shell seems to balance 
exploration and exploitation slightly better than BP (see Table 10.4).  
 
 
 
Influence of TMT’s Corporate Governance Perspective on Shell’s 
Strategic Renewal Trajectories 
To study the influence of the TMT’s corporate governance perspective on Shell’s 
strategic renewal trajectories, we investigate the dual ownership structure of Shell. 
At the country level, the home bases of the two parent companies of Shell, 
respectively The Netherlands-based Royal Dutch (two-tier board, Rhine model) 
and the UK-based Shell Transport and Trading (one-tier board, Anglo-Saxon 
model), represents the societal heritage of each country.  
At the firm level, we consider that the home bases of TMT may influence 
their corporate governance perspectives. The differing corporate governance 
perspectives may further influence the TMT’s orientation in managing the firm’s 
strategic renewal trajectories. Here we argue that The Netherlands-based (Royal 
Dutch) CMD chairmen and the board members from the Continental Europe are 
used to perform strategy within the context of the Rhine-model corporate 
governance perspective. Conversely, the UK-based (Shell Transport and Trading) 
CMD chairmen and the board members from the UK or the US are used to perform 
strategy within the context of the corporate governance perspective of the Anglo-
Saxon model. 
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In the Anglo-Saxon model, top managers are assessed based on criteria 
related to short-term performance and the company’s goals are directed towards 
the near-term focus on the appreciation of shareholder value (Clarke and Clegg, 
2000; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). Operating under such system, top 
management’s strategy tends to focus on measurable company attributes, such as 
return on investment and price-earning ratios. Such a focus drives the company to 
pursue, emphasize and augment its existing range of activities within existing 
geographical scope, i.e. the exploitative type of strategic renewal actions.  
The long-term orientation of the Rhine model, however, indicates that the 
company emphasizes long-term stakeholder values. Although the focus is, to some 
extent, on increasing productivity and upgrading existing capabilities, the strategic 
intent is different. To align with its long-term orientation, strategic renewal 
activities of top management cover a wider range of activities than its current range 
and perform, besides exploitative, exploratory strategic renewal actions. 
Furthermore as indicated in Table 10.1, the “fluid capital” investment 
applied in the Anglo-Saxon model drives the company to pursue dynamic market 
orientation with extensive internationalization. Because of such dynamism, the 
firm needs the involvement of external entities to realize parts of its goals. The 
extensive internationalization characteristic may, however, put constraints on the 
firm’s ability to realize its strategic goals autonomously. Thus over time, under the 
Anglo-Saxon model the firm tends to direct its growth towards external growth, 
such as through acquisitions, rather than internal growth.  
In contrast, the “dedicated capital” in the Rhine model has the implication of 
a less dynamic market orientation and less extensive internationalization. This may 
become a motivation for the firm to focus on internal strategic actions, actions that 
can be realized autonomously without the involvement of external entities. In the 
long-run, it is likely that the Rhine model drives the firm to focus more on the 
internal growth trajectory compared to the external growth. Figure 10.4 shows the 
internal and external strategic renewal trajectories of Shell with three-year moving 
average, 1959-2004. 
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Figure 10.4: Shell’s external and internal strategic renewal trajectories (1959-2004), 
three-year moving average 
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(Source: Database created by our own systematic document analysis of Shell’s annual reports 1907-2006) 
 
Besides the firm-level analysis, we also incorporated the country-level 
analysis by looking at the proportion of Shell’s shareholders as our moderating 
variable. Here the shareholders from Continental Europe and Japan were 
categorized into the Rhine model, while those from the U.S. and the U.K. were 
categorized into the Anglo-Saxon model. We then ran a correlation analysis. Table 
10.5 shows the correlation matrix resulting from the analysis.  
 
Table 10.5: Correlation matrix of strategic renewal actions during the Shell’s dual 
ownership structure (1959-2004) 
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 
1. Exploratory strategic 
renewal orientation 
0.52 0.15 1  
2. External growth  
strategic renewal 
orientation 
0.47 0.13 -0.18 1  
3. TMT with the Anglo-
Saxon Corporate 
Governance Perspective 
0.55 0.15 -0.41* 0.48* 1 
4. Proportion of 
shareholders from the 
Anglo-Saxon countries 
0.54 0.11 -0.61* 0.39* 0.61 1
* Correlation is significant at p=.01 
 
 
As shown in the correlation matrix (Table 10.5), we found significant (at 
p=.01) negative correlations between the TMT’s corporate governance perspective 
of the Anglo-Saxon model with the exploratory strategic renewal orientation (-
0.41) and between the moderating variable (proportion of shareholders from the 
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Anglo-Saxon background) with the exploratory strategic renewal orientation (-
0.61). On the contrary, we found significant (at p=.01) positive correlations 
between the TMT’s corporate governance perspective of the Anglo-Saxon model 
with the external growth strategic renewal orientation (0.48) and between the 
moderating variable with the external growth strategic renewal orientation (0.39). 
The results demonstrate that under the leadership of the TMT with a corporate 
governance perspective of the Rhine model, Shell focused more on exploratory 
strategic renewal actions and less on the externally-oriented growth while under 
the leadership of the TMT with a corporate governance perspective of the Anglo-
Saxon model, Shell focused less on exploratory strategic renewal actions and more 
on the externally-oriented growth. 
To perform a robustness check, we zoom in on the period of 1985-1991 
when the chairman of CMD was from the RD and respectively on the period of 
1998-2004 when the chairman of CMD was from the STT. We justify our choice 
based on two arguments. Our first argument is that these two periods have equal 
time length, i.e. seven years, which enables the pair-wise comparison. In this 
respect, we assume that the Rhine model of RD-leadership in the CMD at the end 
of 1980s governed the strategy to a large extent and that the Anglo-Saxon model of 
STT-leadership governed the CMD strategic initiatives at the end of 1990s. Our 
second argument is that we take into account the period of 1997 when Shell Oil 
Company in the US was integrated into the group. From the perspective of societal 
context, there is a high likelihood that the Anglo-Saxon model is adopted by most 
firms in the US. This may support the latter point in our first argument that the 
Anglo-Saxon model has stronger influence than the Rhine model in the company 
during the period of 1998-2004.  
Table 10.6 shows the results of the computed average exploration and 
external ratios during the two different leaderships of the CMD at Shell. The 
results from the fine-grained analysis (1985-1991 and 1998-2004) concur with the 
previous findings (1959-2004).  
 
 
Table 10.6: Robustness check - exploratory and external growth strategic renewal 
actions respectively during the RD-leadership (1985-1991) and the STT-leadership 
(1998-2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
214
198 Chapter 10 
 
 
 
 
Finally for an additional robustness check, we conducted a series of 
interviews with key senior managers of Shell and retired executives from Shell. 
They concurred with our findings that the shareholder orientation is getting 
stronger in the company over time especially in the 1990s. One of the executives of 
in the Shell’s top management team shared with us his experience of the changes 
to a stronger shareholder value:  
“I think if we look back until, say 1990s, the shareholders were there and the shareholders 
were very much respected. But the shareholders didn’t have a lot of influence before they got 
a lot more influence in the mid 1990s.”  
(Interview with a Shell’s top executive, 14 May 2007) 
 
His statement was further added by a senior manager of Shell in research and 
development about when the shareholder became stronger in the company: 
“I see that the focus on shareholder values has become stronger since the last 15 years due to 
among others the shareholder orientation that resulted from the integration of Shell Oil, US 
in 1997.” 
(Interview with a Shell’s top manager at the research department, 3 April 2007) 
 
A retired executive of Shell with a 30-year period of service supported the above 
statement, stating that: 
“I think the shareholder orientation was particularly very strong in the 90s. We became more 
Anglo-Saxon. I really saw this move toward a stronger shareholder orientation in the mid 
90s. It arrived at the peak at the end of the integration of Shell Oil in 1997.”  
(Interview with a Shell’s former top executive, 29 March 2007) 
 
In sum, our findings of the exploitative and exploratory strategic renewal 
trajectories have illustrated the third key principle. More specifically over time, the 
studies of Shell and BP have illustrated how the two large incumbent firms attempt 
to simultaneously balance exploratory and exploitative strategic renewal actions. 
The balance state, however, is not easy to achieve. As March suggested although 
firms are often confronted with balancing exploitation and exploration 
concurrently, most firms seem to exhibit an asymmetric preference for short-term 
exploitation improvements. The findings at the BP’s case in this chapter also 
illustrate such asymmetric preference. This asymmetric preference, however, is 
less obvious in the Shell’s case (Table 10.4).  
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Additionally, our study of the influence of TMT’s corporate governance 
perspective on Shell’s strategic renewal trajectories suggests that TMT with the 
long-term orientation of Rhine corporate governance perspective is associated with 
pursuing exploratory and internal growth strategic renewal actions while TMT 
with the short-term orientation of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance perspective 
is associated with focusing on exploitative and external growth strategic renewal 
actions. Additional insights about this issue are also reflected through the 
interviews we conducted at Shell. 
 
 
 
 
10.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
To survive in constantly changing environment, firms must embed concurrently 
improvements in current competences (exploitation) and flexibility to explore new 
competences (exploration) through their strategic renewal actions (Eisenhardt, 
1989a; Volberda, 1998). Furthermore, the research theme of how organizations 
through their top managers manage their strategic renewal trajectories in order to 
thrive over time has long been central to both strategy and organizational scholars. 
This chapter has addressed and studied these two research themes.  
 In the first place of central importance is the issue of how firms 
accommodate the need for making trade-offs between exploration and exploitation 
(Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Gupta et al., 2006). We address this issue by 
proposing to measure exploration and exploitation through two ratios built on the 
studies of Volberda et al. (2001b) and Flier et al. (2003), i.e. exploration and 
exploitation ratios respectively. The results of our analyses from two large long-
lived firms, Shell (1907-2006) and BP (1970-2006) show how both firms attempt 
to balance their exploitative and exploratory strategic renewal actions. Table 10.7 
summarizes the key findings of the exploration and exploitation at Shell and BP. 
 
Table 10.7: Summary of key findings of exploration and exploitation of Shell (1907-
2006) and BP (1970-2006) 
Comparison based on full period of 
investigation 
Equal-period comparison 
Average ratio 
Shell (1907-2006) BP (1970-2006) Shell (1970-2006) BP (1970-2006)
Average 
exploration ratio 
0.49 0.37 0.48 0.37
Average 
exploitation ratio 
0.51 0.63 0.52 0.63
Source: Content analyses of Shell’s (1907-2006) and BP’s (1970-2006) annual reports 
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Table 10.7 shows that the longest duration is conducted through a longitudinal 
content analysis of strategic renewal actions in Shell of 100 years, from 1907 until 
2006. The comparison between Shell and BP was made based on the full period of 
investigation (Shell 1907-2006 vs. BP 1970-2006) as well as based on the equal-
period investigation (Shell vs. BP, 1970-2006). Both types of comparison that over 
time Shell seemed to be better in balancing exploration and exploitation than BP as 
its average exploration ratio is close to 0.50 (a perfectly balanced exploration-
exploitation).  
In the second place through the Shell’s study, this chapter has also explored 
the role of top management team’s corporate governance perspective in guiding the 
direction of a firm’s strategic renewal journeys over time (Volberda et al., 2001a). 
The TMT role can be one of the means of managerial discretions about how to 
balance exploitation and exploration simultaneously. Table 10.8 summarizes the 
key findings of this study of the role of TMT’s corporate governance perspective 
on Shell’s strategic renewal trajectories. 
 
Table 10.8: Summary of key findings of the correlations of the role of TMT’s corporate 
governance perspective on Shell’s strategic renewal trajectories, 1959-2004 
Shell TMT’s corporate 
governance perspective, 
1959-2004 
Exploratory strategic 
renewal trajectory 
External growth strategic 
renewal trajectory 
Rhine model + –  
Anglo-Saxon model – + 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre 
 
Our findings demonstrate that the TMT’s corporate governance perspective 
does influence a firm’s strategic renewal trajectories. In the Shell study, we found 
that TMT with the corporate governance perspective of Anglo-Saxon model is 
more inclined to pursue exploitative (over exploratory) and external (over organic) 
growth of strategic renewal trajectories. Conversely, TMT with the corporate 
governance perspective of Rhine model appears to put a stronger emphasis on 
exploratory and organic growth of strategic renewal trajectories.  
Through this latter study, we have provided complementarily empirical 
evidence on the upper echelon perspective (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and the 
extant corporate governance literature of Anglo-Saxon and Rhine models (Albert, 
1993, 1995; Letza et al., 2004; O’Sullivan, 2000; Smith, 2003; Stadler et al., 2006; 
Tylecote and Conesa, 1999; Whittington and Mayer, 2000). Through our empirical 
study of Royal Dutch Shell plc, we looked at the provenance of Shell’s CMD 
chairmen and board members as an operationalization of the TMT corporate 
governance perspectives. Our findings have shown that it is possible to provide 
explicit proofs to the conceptual characteristics of both corporate governance 
models.  
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Accordingly, the results in this chapter provide an answer to our fourth 
research question of how firms balanced their exploitative and explorative strategic 
renewal over time. The findings in this chapter also illustrate our third proposition 
in Chapter 5: balancing exploration and exploitation positively influences sustained 
strategic renewal. In terms of contribution, the novelty of our study on exploitation 
and exploration lies on an extensive scope of longitudinal visualization of strategic 
renewal trajectories.  By taking this challenge, we hope to encourage scholars to do 
more longitudinal research. This approach has a crucial theoretical implication of 
studying the evolvement of a firm’s strategic renewal trajectories with regards to 
the adaptation with the firm’s changing environment. 
Regarding managerial implications, we contribute to the understanding of 
the role of top management team and their perspectives on corporate governance 
models in a firm’s strategic renewal. To conclude, as Baden-Fuller and Stopford 
(1994) pointed out that strategic renewal capacity of a firm is subject to its 
concurrent and balanced resourcefulness in pursuing novel innovations, 
capitalizing its current capabilities, and rejuvenating its mature business; our 
findings make clear the corporate governance model in use also has a strong 
impact on the strategic renewal capacity of a firm. By doing this, we contend that 
the three key principles are essential antecedents for a firm to sustain its strategic 
renewal over time. 
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11. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 
11.1 Introduction 
Long-lived firms are not simply idiosyncratic outliers of populations of 
organizations. Their long existence in society lies in their strategic ability to renew 
themselves over time. This PhD research has argued that research on organizational 
longevity could be treated as viewing longevity as a firm’s strategic capacity to 
sustain strategic renewal over time. Such capacity may be best investigated by 
combining the dual perspectives of selection and adaptation that are reconciled in a 
coevolutionary perspective. This is because the coevolutionary perspective takes 
into account both internal characteristics of organizations to strategically enhance its 
survivability as well as the forces in their environments that set limits on 
organizational discretion.  
More specifically in this PhD study, we incorporate both selection and 
adaptation perspectives. We propose that firms be assessed not just with respect to 
their performance but respect to their long-term survival which is defined here as 
sustained strategic renewal. To this end, this PhD study intends to investigate the 
dynamic relationships between a firm and its environment in the context of sustained 
strategic renewal by developing a conceptual framework and propositions by 
conducting a longitudinal and comparative case study of large incumbent long-lived 
firms. The focus is on the fundamental scientific questions about three key 
principles of self-renewing organizations (Volberda and Lewin, 2003) to explain the 
sustained strategic renewal phenomenon of large, long-lived incumbent firms. In this 
PhD study, the three key principles are considered as the key prerequisites of 
sustained strategic renewal. 
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Based on the discussed research aim, our study is rooted in the following five 
research questions:  
 
RQ1: Based on a selection-and-adaptation (coevolutionary) perspective, how do 
firms develop their competences to strategically renew themselves over time? 
RQ2: Based on an adaptation perspective, how do firms learn and adapt in the 
context of changing knowledge environment? 
RQ3: How do large incumbent firms regulate their internal rates of change to match 
up with the external rates of change? 
RQ4: How do firms manage self-organization to sustain their strategic renewal over 
time? 
RQ5: How do firms balance their exploratory and exploitative strategic renewal 
actions over time? 
RQ6: To what extent does top management team influence the strategic renewal 
trajectory of a large incumbent firm? 
 
 
Guided by these five research questions, we conducted the study by first 
exploring the three key principles from a coevolutionary perspective (Chapter 3) and 
an adaptation perspective (Chapter 4). This is followed by our choice to investigate 
and operationalize the three key principles through quantitative measurements as 
well as in-depth qualitative analysis. For this purpose, in Chapter 5 we developed 
three propositions related to each of the three key principles and substantiated the 
three key principles through the enabling antecedents introduced by Lewin and 
Volberda (2004). Based on our research design of a comparative-longitudinal and 
multilevel approach (Chapter 6) and empirical settings (Chapter 7), we have 
measured and analyzed the three key principles in Chapter 8, 9, and 10.  
To this end, we use an in-depth contextual data to investigate the influence of 
external environment to internal corporate change and an extended duration of data 
in order to offer a longitudinal and comparative analysis. Since we investigate both 
the environment and firm conditions, our study also takes a multilevel method in 
particular on the industry and firm levels.  
To combine both selection and adaptation perspectives, we propose to 
develop a conceptual framework that helps us to identify and map demonstrable 
constructs into quantifiable indicators. Figure 11.1 which is recaptured from Figure 
5.1 depicts the constructs derived from the three key principles. The framework also 
reflects the environmental and firm dynamics that are indicated in both selection and 
adaptation perspectives. 
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Figure 11.1: Conceptual framework, recaptured from Figure 5.1 
 
The remaining of this chapter is structured as follows. First, we incorporate 
and integrate the key findings of the three key principles. We then highlight 
limitations of this research and accordingly put forward suggestions for future 
research. Reflecting on the key findings of this PhD study, we suggest managerial 
implications that may help firms (through their managers) to build a frame of 
thought towards sustained strategic renewal. Finally, we draw our conclusions at the 
end of this chapter. 
 
 
 
11.2 Key Findings: Integrating Three Key Principles 
Firms do not exist in isolation. They are influenced by external forces from their 
environments. Over time, they need to be able to sense and create a different pattern 
of alignment between their internal characteristics with the changing conditions of 
their operating environments. Environmental turbulence requires firms to create a 
new order through self-organization. Additionally, firms need to simultaneously 
balance the need to address today’s challenges by exploiting their existing 
competences with the need to manage their future by exploring new competences. 
To study this complex phenomenon, we advance the three key principles of self-
renewing organizations (Volberda and Lewin, 2003).  
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As a starting point rooted in literature, we developed three propositions 
related to each of the three key principles as shown in Figure 11.2. From a research 
standpoint, propositions are useful for crystallizing and exploring the demonstrable 
constructs of the three key principles. They enable us to operationalize and calibrate 
the constructs into measurable proxies. To substantiate the three key principles, we 
also discussed the enabling antecedents of each of the principles (Lewin and 
Volberda, 2004) at the dimension of strategy, structure, managerial process, and 
leadership (see Table 2.4 in Chapter 2; and Table 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 in Chapter 5). 
 
Figure 11.2: Summary of propositions of the three key principles and sustained strategic 
renewal 
 
In the first place, of central concern in corporate longevity or sustained 
strategic renewal research is the understanding of how temporal changes in 
environment affect the survival of constituent organizations. This concern deals with 
the issue of alignment between the internal rate of change (IRC) of the firm and the 
external rate of change (ERC) of the environment in which the firm is embedded 
(Chapter 8). In real environments, equilibrium positions can change. To remain or to 
become long-term viable, firms must change when the factors that change the 
equilibrium point change. In this respect, the central question is how fast firms 
should undergo changes relative to environmental changes. We investigated this 
question in Chapter 8 by doing longitudinal and comparative study of two large 
incumbent firms: Shell and BP. The study took place in two levels of analysis: (1) 
the oil industry level as an indicator to assess the external rate of change; and (2) the 
firm level as an indicator to assess the internal rate of change.  
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Additionally we developed measures that comprise homogeneous and 
heterogeneous measures (refer to Table 6.6 and Table 8.1). Homogeneous measures 
are concerned with similar measures both at the industry as well as the firm level. 
Heterogeneous measures, however, are concerned with different measures between 
the industry level and the firm level. For a comparison, in both homogeneous and 
heterogeneous measures we compared the average ERC of the industry with the 
average IRC of the case companies (Shell or BP). To this end, we took the average 
of the industry’s ERC across all measures from both homogeneous and 
heterogeneous measures and by the same token, the two firms’ IRC. Finally we 
calculated the average differences between the average ERC and the average IRC. 
The idea is that an average, i.e. across various indicators, the average IRC must be 
equal or higher compared to the ERC from our comparative-longitudinal study of 
the oil industry, Shell and BP. Table 11.1 summarizes the key findings of 
comparison between IRC and ERC across all measures.  
 
 
Table 11.1: Summary of the key findings of the first principle across measures 
Measures of RC and Period Industry Shell BP 
Homogeneous measures    
Oil Production, 1922-2000 4.90 6.06 6.92 
Patents, 1975-2007 -1.37 0.59 -4.23 
R&D Intensity, 1981-2007 -0.37 0.83 3.73 
External Venturing, 1986-2008 4.73 16.30 10.08 
Heterogeneous Measures    
ERC Oil prices, 1907-2007 4.47 - -
ERC Competitive diversity, 1907-2000 7.74 - -
IRC New products & services, 1970-2007 - 7.91 8.32 
IRC New process, 1970-2007 - 8.62 6.20 
IRC Organizational structure, 1970-2007 - 1.41 2.44 
IRC Internal venturing, 1970-2007 - 4.66 -1.05 
Average annual RC across measures ERC = 3.35 IRCShell = 5.80 IRCBP = 4.05
Difference of average IRC– average ERC 
(∆RC) across measures ∆RCShell = 2.45 ∆RCS\BP = 0.70 
Key finding (Shell and BP): IRC-ERC≥ 0; or IRC ≥ ERC
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre; Adapted from Table 8.17 
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Altogether through our quantitative analysis, we found that over time and to a 
varying degree, both Shell and BP managed to align their internal rates of change 
with the external rates of change of the oil industry. The ∆RC of Shell, however, is 
higher than the ∆RC of BP. This means that although the IRC of both Shell and BP 
exceed the ERC of the oil industry, Shell moves even faster than BP with respect to 
aligning the IRC with the ERC. In addition to the quantitative analysis, we also 
conducted interviews with both former and active top managers of Shell (see Table 
6.3). The analyses of the interview quotes confirm the central premise of the 
importance to align the IRC with the ERC. In sum, the results thus demonstrate that 
to a large extent the average internal rates of change (IRC) of both Shell and BP are 
aligned with the oil industry’s average rates of change. This provides an empirical 
support to the first principle and to our first proposition, i.e. the alignment of the 
internal rate of change of a firm with the external rate of change of the firm’s 
environment positively influences the firms’ sustained strategic renewal efforts.  
In the second place, we investigated the key principle of self-organization 
(Chapter 9). To assess the degree of self-organization over time, we developed some 
measurement indicators that are based on the opposite features of self-organization, 
i.e. centralization of authority (through the measures of hierarchical level and chief 
executive’s span of control) and administrative authority (through the administrative 
intensity measure). By using these measures, we could indicate or assess the level or 
degree of self-organization over the years. For this purpose, we focused on the 
Shell’s case as we have an internal access to the company’s archives. To 
complement the results from the quantitative analyses, we also presented the 
evidence on the key principle through in-depth interviews with the Shell’s top 
managers (see Chapter 9.3). Table 11.2 summarizes the key findings of the 
investigation of the self-organization principle. 
 
Table 11.2: Summary of the key findings of the second principle 
Self-Organization Indication 
Measures 1985-1994 or 
1985-1997 
1998 – 2005 2006-2008 
Hierarchical level ++ – + 
Chief executive’s span of 
control 
++ n.a. n.a. 
Administrative intensity ++ – + 
Recaptured from Table 9.6 
Note:  ++ = a stronger indication of an increase in self-organization than the sign + 
 – = an indication of a decrease in self-organization 
 n.a = data not available 
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The results in Table 11.2 show that from the year 1985 until around 1997/8 the self-
organization of Shell increased over the years as the three measures showed a 
decreasing trend. During the period 1998/9-2005, however, the self-organization of 
Shell seemed to decrease before it depicted a slight increase in the past two years, 
2006-2008. In comparison with the past two years, the level of increase during the 
period 1985-1997/8 seemed to be higher, meaning that there was a stronger 
indication of an increase in self-organization during the period 1985-1998 than in 
the period of 2006-2008. In sum, our results indicate that over time, to a varying 
degree Shell was able to encourage self-organization. This provides an empirical 
evidence on the second principle. 
Finally, we investigated the key principle of concurrently balanced 
exploration and exploitation (Chapter 10). For this particular inquiry, we employed 
longitudinal content analysis method (Chapter 6) to identify exploitative and 
exploratory strategic renewal actions from the annual reports triangulated with data 
from multiple sources. Chapter 10 also addressed our fifth research question of how 
the top management team’s (TMT’s) corporate governance perspective influences a 
firm’s strategic renewal trajectory. Table 11.3 summarizes the key findings of the 
third key principle and the fifth research question. 
 
Table 11.3: Summary of key findings of the third principle (Shell, 1907-2006 and BP, 
1970-2006) and TMT’s corporate governance perspective (Shell, 1959-2004) 
Comparison based on full period of 
investigation 
Equal-period comparison 
Average ratio 
Shell (1907-2006 BP (1970-2006) Shell (1970-2006) BP (1970-2006)
Average 
exploration ratio 
0.49 0.37 0.48 0.37
Average 
exploitation ratio 
0.51 0.63 0.52 0.63
 
Shell TMT’s corporate 
governance perspective, 
1959-2004 
Exploratory strategic 
renewal trajectory 
External growth strategic 
renewal trajectory 
Rhine model + –  
Anglo-Saxon model – + 
 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Centre 
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In principle, we conducted the analyses for both Shell and BP in different 
duration of analysis: Shell (1907-2006) and BP (1970-2006). The comparison 
between Shell and BP was made based on the full period of investigation (Shell 
1907-2006 vs. BP 1970-2006) as well as based on the equal-period investigation 
(Shell vs. BP, 1970-2006).  Both types of comparison show that over time Shell 
seemed to be better in balancing exploration and exploitation than BP as its average 
exploration ratio is close to 0.50 (a perfectly balanced exploration-exploitation). 
Nevertheless both firms strive to balance their exploitative and exploratory strategic 
renewal actions. In this case, Shell seemed to show a more balanced exploratory-
exploitative strategic renewal trajectory than BP. These findings provide empirical 
evidence on the third principle of balancing exploitation and exploration 
simultaneously. Additionally Table 11.3 also shows that the TMT’s corporate 
governance perspective of the Rhine model is associated with exploratory and 
internal growth strategic renewal trajectory; while the one of the Anglo-Saxon 
model has a focus on exploitative and external growth strategic renewal trajectories. 
Altogether, Table 11.4 summarizes the overall key findings of the three key 
principles. Altogether, they give evidence on our three propositions (Figure 11.1). 
 
Table 11.4: Key findings of the three key principles 
Key Principle Shell (Period) BP (Period) 
1. IRC-ERC ≥ 0 (1970-2008) ≥ 0 (1970-2008) 
2. Self-organization + (1985-2007) n.a. 
3. Average exploration ratio* Almost balanced, 0.49 (1907-
2006) 
Less balanced, 0.37 (1970-
2006) 
Note:   IRC = internal rate of change; ERC = external rate of change 
n.a. = not available in this study 
* Balanced exploration-exploitation if the ratio is exactly equal to 0.50 
 
  
Based on the above key findings and the resulting propositions, we conjecture 
that the three key principles are fundamental antecedents that may result in sustained 
strategic renewal. In this respect, we contend that firms have to do equally well in all 
three key principles for sustained strategic renewal. Regarding this, we attempt to 
provide an explanation from an empirical perspective as well as from a conceptual 
perspective.  
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Empirically, our investigation of the three key principles shows the first 
evidence that to a varying degree, the two long-lived firms in our study (Shell and 
BP) have demonstrated an attempt to advance the three key principles altogether. 
Yet the attainment of sustained strategic renewal is difficult, for instance in the face 
of an accelerating rate of environmental change. The complexity of such a dynamic 
perspective makes the empirical investigations of the three key principles even more 
difficult. Thus our empirical investigation does not yet provide an explanation of 
why the three principles are simultaneously needed for sustained strategic renewal. 
However, we can complement this through a conceptual argument.  
Conceptually at its core, sustained strategic renewal needs to be anchored in 
the three key principles on the whole (Volberda and Lewin, 2003). The central 
premise here is that the three key principles are interrelated. This can be 
demonstrated through the interrelationships among the enabling antecedents of the 
three key principles (Lewin and Volberda, 2004). At the same time, although the 
enabling antecedents of three key principles together may somehow look 
overlapping, they can also be contradicting. This can be seen through the tensions 
between change and stability, hierarchy and self-organization, exploitation and 
exploration. Although getting the dynamic balance right can be difficult, there are 
many ways to achieve this end.  
Ambidexterity literature, for instance, suggests that it is possible for an 
organization to do two different things at the same time although at the different 
level of organizational units. This is referred to as structural ambidexterity. In 
principle, structural ambidexterity is an organizational form that separates structural 
subunits for exploration (that indicates changes) and exploitation (that indicates 
stability) by establishing different competences, systems, incentives, processes and 
cultures for each unit (Benner and Tushman, 2003; Jansen et al. 2009). In the case of 
Shell and BP, for example, upstream units such as production may have a tendency 
in exploitation and stability while downstream units such as sales and marketing 
may have a tendency in exploration and changes. Regarding the hierarchical level, 
scholars of structural ambidexterity (e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2003; Jansen et al. 
2009; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996) show that top-level managers should engage in 
both exploration and exploitation activities while business-unit-level managers 
should focus on either exploration or exploitation. Additionally, Mom et al. (2007) 
illustrate that in a firm characterized by this spatial separation, top-down knowledge 
inflows would be of particular value for managers in places focusing on 
exploitation, whereas bottom-up and/or horizontal knowledge inflows would be of 
particular value for managers in places focusing on exploration. 
 Alternatively, ambidexterity literature also suggests the concept of contextual 
ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). In this case, the suggestion is to 
create organizational units in which the tensions between exploration and 
exploitation are reconciled. Whilst the structural ambidexterity posits dual structure 
to do two different things, contextual ambidexterity proposes establishing a 
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collectively selective set of systems and processes across the business unit of an 
organization to enable individual employees to consider both exploration and 
exploitation simultaneously. Contextual ambidexterity also demonstrates that both 
alignment and adaptability are possible across the business units (Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004). Alignment is concerned with coherence among all patterns of 
activity whereas adaptability is concerned with a firm’s capacity to reconfigure 
activities quickly to meet changing demands in the task environment (Simsek, 
2009). This is related to our first key principle. Regarding contextual ambidexterity, 
Mom et al. (2007) contend that in firms or units aiming at synthesizing exploration 
and exploitation, a combination of both top-down and bottom-up, or a combination 
of both top-down and horizontal knowledge inflows would be of particular value for 
managers. Additionally, Lubatkin et al. (2006) propose a top management team 
behavioral integration that acts as a forum to openly and freely exchange differing 
ideas and resolve conflicts to create a set of shared perceptions to facilitate 
organizational ambidexterity. This indicates a self-organizing process.  
Advancing the concepts of structural and contextual ambidexterity, studies of 
technological innovation and strategic renewal indicate that firms may deal with 
tensions between exploration and exploitation by temporally separating the two 
(Audia et al., 2000; Burgelman, 2002). This implies for managers that they shift 
their focus over time from pursuing incremental innovations or stability to pursuing 
radical innovations or strategic renewal, or vice versa. This is an indication of how 
to deal with the tension between stability and change. Thus it relates to our first key 
principle of managing the internal rate of change to match or exceed the external 
rate of change. Mom et al. (2007) show that in such a temporal separation structure, 
top-down knowledge inflows would be of particular value for managers in time 
periods focusing on exploitation, whereas bottom-up and/or horizontal knowledge 
inflows would be of particular value for managers in time periods focusing on 
exploration. 
Reflecting on the above empirical and conceptual argument, we advance a 
mode that suggests that it is necessary for firms to comply with each of the three key 
principles but it will not be sufficient if firms only do well in one or more of the 
three key principles. To put it another way, firms have to perform well in all of the 
three key principles in order to achieve sustained strategic renewal. We visualize our 
conjecture in Figure 11.3. 
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Figure 11.3: Three key principles as antecedents to sustained strategic renewal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Furthermore to achieve sustained strategic renewal, we also contend that a 
firm not only has to perform well in all the three key principles, but they also need to 
implement the three key principles consistently over time. This is also reflected in 
the following interview quote: 
 
“In my opinion, a company that has longevity means that it is capable to renew itself through a 
long period of time. Just doing it once doesn’t give you longevity but if you are capable to do it 
repeatedly and then you will have a long-lasting company.” 
(Interview with an executive in the planning department, 14 March 2007) 
 
  
In the next section, we highlight the limitations of the current PhD research 
and how future research may advance such limitations to provide a more in-depth 
understanding of sustained strategic renewal. 
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11.3 Limitations and Future Research 
The results from our study highlight several limitations and at the same time open 
relevant promising avenues for future research. We will highlight the limitations 
based on our study of the three key principles of self-renewing organizations.  
In the study of the first principle, we use the industry level as a proxy to 
measure the external rate of change. We do not yet distinguish the external rate of 
change between the meso level of institutional environment and macro level of 
global environment (social, political and technological environment) as suggested by 
Lewin et al. (2003). Neither have we delineated the level of change (e.g. corporate 
level strategy, business level strategy, unit level strategy, operational level strategy, 
etc.). Therefore there may be measures to strategic change as well as measures to 
operational change. For instance, on the one hand the oil production may be a 
measure of operational change considering that it is associated with an operational 
activity. On the other hand, the oil production may also be a measure of strategic 
change as oil is a strategic resource for the oil industry/firms. In addition, we do not 
address the issue of a firm’s resources in environmental scanning. Future research 
may study for instance the question of how difference in resources endowments may 
impact on a firm’s initiative to align its internal rate of change with the external rate 
of change. This question is particularly relevant as changing the environment by 
being the first mover to outrun the environmental speed standard, however, can be 
risky (Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985). To initiate and implement internal change to 
beat the external change, older and larger firms need to mobilize the resources that 
they have accumulated over the years and by the goodwill inherent in established 
long-term relationships with key stakeholders such as customers, partners, and 
suppliers. Future research is needed to assess a criticality range of the internal rate of 
change to match or exceed the external rate of change. The last point is that although 
we examined changes in form in response to environmental change, we did not 
explicitly examine how organizations perform during the change from one form to 
another form or how they allocate slack resources to initiate the change.  
In the study of self-organization, we limit ourselves to a single-firm context. 
With this respect, we do not have a benchmark. In the future research, it is necessary 
to employ comparative research on the degree of hierarchical structure of industrial 
organizations (Evans, 1963; Pugh et al., 1968). The second limitation is that we do 
not address the challenging issue of investigating the role of manager in self-
organization (Anderson, 1999b). In self-organizing system, Nonaka (1988) for 
instance, contends that middle management occupies a key position, equipped with 
an ability to combine macro (context-free) strategic information and micro (context-
specific) hands-on information. This is an important area for future research as the 
middle management is regarded as the nuclei of self-organizing groups and an agent 
for change in an organization’s self-renewing process. By incorporating the middle 
management level, middle management may help to effectively eliminate the 
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fluctuation and chaos within an organization’s information creation structure by 
serving as the starting point for action to be taken by upper and lower levels. Taking 
a middle management level also may contribute to the underexplored question about 
managerial agency and the legitimacy of hierarchical structures (Wooldridge et al., 
2008). Future research of this theme may help to provide a more in-depth 
understanding of self-organization. 
In the study of exploration and exploitation, we do not yet address the issue of 
the magnitude of exploratory and exploitative strategic renewal actions. In our 
study, we assume that each strategic renewal action has the same weight (Volberda 
et al., 2001b; Flier et al., 2003). This study has not yet incorporated a method to 
control for the magnitude of individual strategic renewal actions. Future research is 
needed on this issue. Our study of the influence of TMT’s corporate governance 
perspective on a firm’s strategic renewal also has a limitation. In this respect, a 
potential issue for future research is to advance our study to a more context-
dependent understanding of corporate governance (Filatotchev, 2007). As Malerba 
(2004, 2005) and Teece et al. (1997) propound that strategic path also depends on 
the specific sector in which it takes place, bringing in the sector context may be 
useful. It is possible that due to differences among sectors (e.g. managers, 
knowledge, technology) (Malerba, 2004, 2005) may modify the effect of the TMT’s 
corporate governance perspective on how firms in different sectors conduct strategic 
renewal differently. For instance, in science-intensive sectors (e.g. pharmaceuticals, 
electronics) that requires a lot of high risk capital for research and development may 
somehow encourage the exploratory strategic renewal actions even if the top 
management of the firms in these sectors have a corporate governance perspective of 
Anglo-Saxon model.  
When integrating the three key principles, we thought of two key suggestions. 
The first suggestion is to separately measure the sustained strategic renewal which is 
considered here as a dependent variable. In this research, we only indicate the 
sustained strategic renewal through the three key principles but not really measure 
the sustained strategic renewal. The second suggestion would be to investigate the 
interrelationships of the enabling antecedents of the three key principles and how 
such interrelationships may result in sustained strategic renewal. As indicated before 
in this study, we have not yet dealt with this issue. More specifically, we have not 
yet investigated how the enabling antecedents can foster the internal rates of change, 
promote self-organization, and help to balance exploration and exploitation and how 
altogether the three key principles may contribute to sustained strategic renewal. 
Future research may benefit from investigating such antecedents.  
 The final limitation lies in our retrospective approach by looking into the 
historical context. Because of the inherent limitations of both published histories and 
retrospective interviews, future research may explore the use of surveys or 
questionnaires regarding changes that took place during the same period in the same 
organization (e.g., Miller and Friesen, 1980a, b). Also the sheer labor intensity 
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required to conduct a longitudinal comparative research over an extended period of 
time limits us to studying no more than two cases at a time. This is due to the 
difficulty of selecting other cases on spatial and temporal criteria that permit 
meaningful comparisons with the findings from the longitudinal case (Leonard-
Barton, 1990). Future research may consider using time-series analyses technique 
developed for analyzing many variables on many cases at many points in time.  
 
11.4 Managerial Implications 
Research with managers on their perceptions of their environment has indicated that 
managers have different perceptions of problems depending on whether they are 
viewed retrospectively or contemporaneously. Through this PhD study, we have 
indicated that the demand for a firm’s managers to maximize their own 
organization’s chances of survival as a drive for change is certainly needed. Thus the 
task of managers should go beyond the classical strategic management of focusing 
only on the firm’s internal characteristics.  
What is needed here is managers need to have an understanding of both their 
internal and external environments (Johnson & Scholes, 2002; Williamson et al., 
2004). The implications for managers in thinking about long-term survival are that it 
focuses their attention on the long-term impact of actions and events in specific 
ways. Part of the management task is to identify and assess changing economic, 
business, and political conditions, and formulate and implement new strategies to 
improve the firm’s competitive performance.  
Another far-reaching implication is that our study helps managers, especially 
those of large incumbent firms, to realize the importance of the three key principles 
for their firms’ sustained strategic renewal. More specifically, our study implies that 
firms through their managers have to do equally well in all three key principles for 
sustained strategic renewal. To this end, we substantiated managerial implications 
based on the enabling antecedents of the three key principles (Table 5.1-5.3). Figure 
11.4 presents the managerial implications derived from the enabling antecedents of 
the three key principles. The implications are categorized into dimensions of 
strategy, structure, managerial process and leadership. By substantiating these 
dimensions, we hope to provide managers with an insightful understanding of how 
to advance the three key principles of sustained strategic renewal. 
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Figure 11.4: Managerial implications derived from enabling antecedents of three key 
principles 
 
Source: Adapted from Lewin and Volberda (2004); see also Table 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 
 
First with regard to the enabling strategy of the first key principle, managers 
need to be able to formulate strategies that can escalate their internal rates of change 
particularly in times of high rate of environmental change. The strategies can range 
from being a pioneer or an early mover (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Suárez and Lanzolla, 
2007), for instance by introducing new services, products, or processes; to adopting 
a leapfrogging strategy (Beinhocker, 1999; Hackbarth and Kettinger, 2004) in times 
of intensified competition. Firms may also need to consider a strategy that is 
directed towards fostering internal growth (Hitt and Ireland, 1985; Hitt et al., 1996). 
Internal growth means growth and development of a firm through the use of internal 
resources within the firm’s boundary. To carry out such strategies, managers may 
need to consider designing modular structures (Pascale, 1990, 1999) in their 
oganization. Such structures promote flexibility (Volberda, 1998) to interact with 
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their internal and external stakeholders effectively. The first key principle also 
requires managerial processes that can detect and adjust a right rhythm for change 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), for instance, has illustrated this 
process through their study of how US firms deal with high-velocity industries 
primarily through simple rules or patching. Managers may need to try out dynamic 
processes such as seizing benchmarking processes, promoting rapid learning, 
allowing room for experimentation, and even stretching goals (Maira and Thomas, 
1999). Finally, managers may consider adopting leadership styles such as 
facilitators, context setters that are able to guide their organizational members to 
scan and interpret signals from the environment. Leaders need to be able to detect 
emergence of new dominant logics (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986), manage the adaptive 
tension of driving momentum for changes and actually engage in changes.  
Second with regard to self-organization, managers can promote self-
organization by among others focusing on internal growth (Hitt and Ireland, 1985; 
Hitt et al., 1996) and long-term strategic planning such as scenario planning 
(Schoemaker, 1992, 1995). While focusing on internal growth may help to create 
firm distinctive competence (Hitt and Ireland, 1985), focusing on long-term strategic 
planning may help to extend the orientation window of firms so that firms can build 
readiness through change through probing future (Schoemaker, 1992, 1995). 
Furthermore managers could strategize on increasing knowledge integration 
capacity as it may contribute to self-organization (Van den Bosch and Volberda, 
2006). In terms of enabling structures, instead of a traditional authority form 
managers may consider designing low hierarchical structures to streamline the 
information flows (Nonaka, 1988; Kauffman, 1995). Such structures also enable 
managers to build cross-functional interfaces (Maira and Thomas, 1999; Jansen et 
al., 2009) that may help to stimulate a more intensive and effective interaction 
among organizational members. Furthermore, self-organization requires managerial 
processes that are able to facilitate emergent processes (Pascale, 1990, 1999). The 
low hierarchical structure also enables the managerial process of reducing or 
minimizing the number of rules. Such process can also help to promote freedom of 
experimenting with new ideas (Child, 1984; Orton and Weick, 1990).  Finally, in 
encouraging self-organizing processes, managers may take the role of stewards or 
guided controllers, instead of as central controllers (Volberda & Lewin, 2003; 
Pascale, 1999). Additionally, like in the first key principle, leaders act as facilitators 
or context setter rather than as authoritative commander (Pascale, 1999). This is also 
reflected in the transformational leadership style as suggested by Van den Bosch and 
Volberda (2006). 
Third concerning the principle of balanced exploitation and exploration, 
managers could attain the balance through slack resource allocation by establishing 
cross-fertilization across exploratory and exploitative strategic renewal actions 
(Jansen et al., 2008; Sidhu et al., 2004; Smith and Tushman, 2005). As discussed in 
Chapter 11.2, this refers to ambidexterity, i.e. the simultaneous pursuit and 
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combination of exploratory and exploitative innovations within organizations 
(Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). In addition to 
ambidexterity, Burgelman (2002) contends that punctuated equilibrium is another 
way to balance exploration and exploitation simultaneously. To this end, punctuated 
equilibrium contends that the balance can be achieved through a sequential pattern 
of longer periods of exploitation and short bursts of exploration. Therefore with 
respect to structure, managers may benefit from an internal corporate venturing 
structure, ambidextrous structure, and/or structural differentiation. Internal corporate 
venturing structure refers to a structure that stimulates the creation of new business 
within existing firms (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999) through the creation of new 
competencies and capabilities underlying new products and services (Zahra et al., 
1999). Through internal corporate venturing, scholars have suggested that an 
ambidextrous structure design by creating separate units within the corporate 
structure to facilitate new venture development (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996; Jansen 
et al. 2009; Westerman et al., 2006). Such design corresponds also to structural 
differentiation as previously discussed in Chapter 11.2.  Structural differentiation 
may help ambidextrous organizations to maintain multiple competences that deal 
with paradoxical demands such as exploration and exploitation (Gilbert, 2005; 
Burgers et al., 2009; Jansen et al., 2009). In consistent with the internal corporate 
and ambidextrous structures, to balance exploitation and exploration simultaneously 
managers can consider managerial processes such as incorporating venture capital 
metrics (Beinhocker, 1999; Burgelman, 1983; Burgers et al., 2009) and encouraging 
ambidextrous learning (Gilbert, 2006; Westerman et al., 2006; Kwee et al., 
2006/Chapter 4 of this thesis). Venture capital metrics help to create relatively 
robust level for venture managers to manage the stages from pre-venture to 
commercialization fruitfully (Burgelman, 1983). Whereas ambidextrous learning 
enables managers to action learning that concurrently balances exploitation and 
exploration either in low or high levels of balance aligned with the pertaining 
knowledge environment. With reference to enabling leaderships, managers may 
adopt and encourage autonomous entrepreneurial activities (Burgelman, 1983). This 
is particularly relevant for helping managers to manage renewal through internal 
development. Alternatively, managers can employ transformational leadership style 
to stimulate the effectiveness of senior team social integration in ambidextrous 
organizations.  
To conclude, it is necessary for managers to comply with each of the three 
key principles but it may not be sufficient if managers only do well in one or more 
of the three key principles. Managers need to ascertain that they manage the three 
key principles altogether to achieve sustained strategic renewal. This means that to 
be able to sustain strategic renewal, over time managers have to align their internal 
rates of change with the rates of change from their environment, managing self-
organization, and balancing concurrent exploratory and exploitative strategic 
renewal actions. Although this can be a difficult effort, there are few anchor points 
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that can be used by managers. As discussed in Chapter 11.2, the anchor points can 
be demonstrated by organizational ambidexterity literature to explain how the 
enabling antecedents interact and complement one another in bringing about 
sustained strategic renewal. 
 
 
 
11.4 Conclusion 
Explaining corporate longevity, defined in this PhD research as sustained strategic 
renewal requires an encompassing strategic perspective. Such perspective takes into 
account both internal characteristics of organizations as well as the forces in their 
environments that set limits on organizational discretion and thus, the possibility of 
influencing the environmental forces strategically to increase the chance of 
organizational survival. Combining selection and adaptation perspectives produces a 
deeper, more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of firm strategy than either 
perspective alone. The surge of attention to reconcile these two perspectives can be 
attributed to the need to incorporate both the internal dimension of a firm and the 
external dimension of the firm’s environment. Consequently, the essence for 
organizational scholars is to seek to understand how firms and its environment 
evolve over time by tracking changes in key variables. 
 In this study, we addressed the research questions about sustained strategic 
renewal by combining both selection and adaptation perspectives. More specifically, 
our research questions comprise the issue of the development of firm competences, 
organizational learning and adaptation, followed by the investigation of the three 
key principles of self-renewing organizations (Volberda and Lewin, 2003). 
Concerning the three key principles, over time firms are challenged to renew 
themselves by aligning the firms’ internal rates of change with the external rate of 
change of their environments, encouraging and managing self-organization, and 
balancing exploration and exploitation concurrently.  
The research questions that we posed requires an integrative and 
comprehensive research approach that enables us to investigate the three key 
principles of sustained strategic renewal from multiple methods and levels of 
analysis (cf. Lewin & Volberda, 1999). First, we chose a longitudinal method as it 
allows us to incorporate a temporal analysis in studying dynamic processes of 
sustained strategic renewal over an extended period of time. Second, because this 
study focuses mainly on the ‘how’ research questions of strategic renewal, we used a 
case study methodology (Yin, 1984) that examines changes in strategy over long 
periods of time (e.g. Miles and Cameron, 1982; Mintzberg and Waters, 1982; 
Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985). Third, due to the long time span covered in our 
study, we use a retrospective longitudinal approach (Pettigrew, 1990) as it facilitates 
a broader longitudinal scope for investigating changes in a firm’s strategy over time. 
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Fourth, we employed a triangulated method by gathering different types of data that 
can be used as cross-checks. The triangulated method is possible here as we 
combined qualitative and quantitative data from varying sources. Finally, we also 
used a multilevel method when incorporating both selection and adaptation 
perspectives. In particular to study the complex and dynamic interaction among 
organizational and environmental forces, we chose to focus on an industry level as 
well as on a firm level. More specifically, we selected the oil industry as our case 
industry and Shell and BP as our case companies. This is mainly because they had 
experienced a radical transformation of their industry environment from one of 
stability and continuity to one of uncertainty and turbulence (Grant, 2003).  
Rooted in the research methodology, we aimed to collect data, as suggested 
by Pettigrew (1990), that are processual (an emphasis on patterns of strategic 
renewal actions over time), comparative (two case companies in single industry), 
historical (take into account the historical setting of case industry and case 
companies) and contextual (examine the reciprocal relations between processes and 
historical and industry contexts). Our data sources comprise primary and secondary 
data sources (cf. Ginsberg, 1988). As a primary data source, we used historical data 
collected from internal and external sources of the target organization. The data 
include the organizational annual reports and other internal documents, books, 
journals and databases. As a secondary data source, we used retrospective data 
collected directly from members of the target organization through interviews. As 
far as the data analysis method is concerned, we chose the longitudinal content 
analysis technique. The content analysis technique allows us to render the rich 
meaning associated with organizational documents combined with powerful 
quantitative longitudinal analysis (Duriau et al., 2007) by quantifying historical data 
(Ginsberg, 1988).  
Accordingly, we developed measurement indicators to quantitatively assess 
the three key principles. With respect to the first key principle, we developed 
measures that comprise homogeneous and heterogeneous measures (refer to Table 
6.6 and Table 8.1) in an attempt to quantify the internal and external rates of change. 
Through a cross-measure comparison, we found that the average internal rate of 
change of Shell and BP seemed to be aligned with the average external rate of 
change of the oil industry. This provides an empirical support to the first principle. 
With respect to the second principle, due to the data accessibility constraint, we used 
a single firm context, i.e. Shell. The results indicate that over time, to a varying 
degree Shell was able to encourage self-organization; which provides the first 
evidence on the second principle. With respect to the third key principle, although 
difficult both Shell and BP strive to balance their exploitative and exploratory 
strategic renewal actions. In this case, however, Shell seemed to show a more 
balanced exploratory-exploitative strategic renewal trajectory than BP. Additionally, 
we also found that the top management team’s (TMT’s) corporate governance 
perspective appears to play a role in a firm’s strategic renewal trajectory. TMT with 
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a corporate governance perspective of the Anglo-Saxon model appeared to have 
focused on exploitative and external growth of strategic renewal actions while those 
with a corporate governance perspective of the Rhine model appeared to have 
focused on exploratory and internal growth of strategic renewal actions. 
One of the most interesting conjectures that emerge from this PhD study is 
that to achieve sustained strategic renewal, firms need to advance the three key 
principles simultaneously. First, this conjecture emerges from the empirical 
investigation of the three key principles. We found that to a varying degree, the two 
long-lived firms in our study (Shell and BP) have demonstrated an attempt to 
advance the three key principles altogether. Internal firm strategies, structures and 
processes together with external market/industry conditions are important 
determinants of sustained strategic renewal. Second, this conjecture is suggested 
conceptually that sustained strategic renewal are anchored in the three key principles 
on the whole (Volberda and Lewin, 2003). The three key principles are interrelated 
through the interrelationships among the enabling antecedents of the three key 
principles (Lewin and Volberda, 2004). Although getting the dynamic balance right 
can be difficult, there are many anchor points to achieve this end. One of them is 
rooted in the organizational ambidexterity literature. Ambidexterity literature helps 
to explain how it is possible for an organization to do two different things at the 
same time but at the different level of organizational units or at different unit of 
analysis. 
 By exposing trends in the pattern of strategic renewal, we also show that 
strategic renewal trajectories of a firm are subject to the changing contexts in the 
firm’s environment. Regarding this, a suggestion is that strategic management 
should involve the study of firms in the context of their environmental situation. 
Such study should seek to understand how firms and its environment evolve over 
time by tracking changes in key variables.  
To conclude, this research has provided the first empirical evidence on the 
three key principles. The longitudinal approach developed in this thesis proves to be 
fundamental to study the evolvement of a firm’s strategic renewal trajectory. It is a 
promising research design for researchers to study how the interrelationships among 
three key principles on the whole may affect sustained strategic renewal over time. 
Firms that can perform well in these three key principles are able to increase their 
long-term survivability through sustained strategic renewal. It is these features that 
distinguish second-order renewal with the first order-renewal (Table 1.1) and enable 
managed selection coevolutionary adaptation processes (Volberda and Lewin, 
2003). Yet the attainment of sustained strategic renewal requires continuous efforts 
to enlist the support of managers and organizational members at all levels of 
organization. Because of this specific requirement, it is not always easy for firms to 
survive. 
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix A: Interview Questions 
 
 
1. Could you briefly give an overview of your relationship to Royal Dutch Shell (RDS) 
such as years involved, which subsidiary/department, and primary responsibilities held? 
[Visual aid: Organization Chart of RDS; the “Who is Who” system at Shell] 
 
2. In your opinion, what does the word “longevity” mean to you in the context of 
organizations? Do you have the definition of your own?  
 
3. What do you see as the top three organizational factors or organizational capabilities 
that contributed to or caused the sustained strategic renewal of Shell during the years 
___  (e.g. ten years before transition) to ___ (e.g. ten years after transition)?  
[Visual aid: Historical Timeline of RDS] 
 
4. Could you please elaborate on the first main factor or organizational capability? Could 
you please give me specific example(s) that can illustrate the factor/capability? 
 
5. Based on your experience at Shell, what have been some important initiatives and 
changes that Shell has engaged in? 
 
6. [Internal antecedent of strategic renewal:] Did the company make a conscious decision 
to initiate a major change of strategic renewal or transition(s) during this time frame? 
(e.g. development of new products/explorations, utilization of new technology, joint 
venture, mergers and acquisitions, etc).  
[External antecedent of strategic renewal:] Or did any of the transition(s) happen 
because of any particular environmental forces? 
 
7. [If a conscious decision or due to internal antecedent:] To the best of your recollection, 
who initiated and when were the key decisions taken that led to the (major) transition? 
 
8. [External antecedent:] What external/environmental forces that drove management to 
undertake a major transition? Who took the initiative in this sense? Could you please 
give an illustration? 
 
9. If you reflect on the changes discussed, how have the internal changes been aligned to 
the changes in the oil industry? 
 
10. What was the decision making mechanism during the transition era (e.g. who 
developed key strategies and who ran the implementation)? How were this organized? 
 
11. What was your involvement or what role did you have during these periods? Can you 
cite a specific example of how this took place? 
 
12. What was the role, if any, of outside consultants and advisors in making the key 
decisions? Were they involved in the implementation stage as well? 
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13. How did the company manage tensions such as between the need to explore and invest 
in new competences with the need to improve existing competences? 
 
14. How did the company manage the short-term pressures of shareholder values while 
making long-term investments of stakeholder values? 
 
15. In your opinion, what factors that distinguish Shell from other oil companies? Or what 
are the similarities and differences of Shell’s renewal initiatives compared to other oil 
companies, say, for instance, in comparison with BP? 
 
16. Are there any questions that we did not ask, but should have? 
 
17. Who else would you strongly recommend that we interview? 
• Inside management during and after the transition(s) 
• External board members or other key outside people/consultants 
• Others: _____________________________________ 
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Appendix B: Coding Rules of Content Analysis 
 
General coding rules: 
1. Accept and code a strategic renewal action only if it is explicitly mentioned that the action is 
materialized or implemented in the year under review; otherwise: do not code it. Also do not code 
rumors, speculations, assumptions, etc. 
 
2. Actions that do not relate to strategic changes, but that are part of daily operations (e.g., 
continuation of restructuring project; drilling a second well in an existing field, extension of 
production capacity), are not considered strategic actions and should thus not be coded. The same 
goes for constructions that are not aimed at expanding activities (e.g., construction of the second oil 
platform, fourth crude oil distillation plant) and for acquisition or sale of (stakes in) non-strategic 
businesses e.g., participation in hospitals, sawmills, banking and information technology. 
 
3. In some instances two (or more) potential strategic actions are addressed in one text unit. In case 
these actions are discussed separately, they should be coded separately. In case the discussion of the 
two or more strategic actions is general, implying they fall within the same category, they should be 
coded as one action (e.g. opening of five foreign branches in a country is coded as one action, 
exchange of assets). 
 
4. Strategic actions that are complementary should be coded as a single action e.g., the establishment 
of a research consortium/ joint venture and the subsequent start of production are to be coded as one 
strategic action.  
 
5. Deciding on dates: first, look for official date of implementation. If not available, look for date of 
agreement/ signing of contract or the article date. Check other sources for triangulation. 
 
6. In case an action is detected which took place in the period under review, but cannot be precisely 
dated, it should be coded in the year of detection. If an action probably took place outside the time 
period, do not code this action. 
 
7. Strategic renewal actions taken by subsidiary companies in which the parent has majority control 
(more than or equal to 50%), are considered as actions of the parent and should be coded. Actions 
of minority holdings (less than 50%) are not to be coded.   
 
8. A merger or an amalgamation counts as one strategic action. 
 
9. Strategic renewal actions resulted from interorganizational relationships as (strategic) alliances, 
joint ventures or research consortia are considered to be external strategic actions.  
 
10. Do not code actions that do not refer to concrete strategic actions. This includes quotes like 
‘streamlining operations’; ‘cost ratio went down’; ‘sales of a number of assets’, etc. that do not 
have concrete or specific descriptions.   
 
11. Pure financial actions such as bonds and warrants issues are not to be coded. 
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Specific coding rules: 
 
12. When a Letter of Intent is signed, the go-ahead for a project is given (e.g. exploratory wells were 
drilled following the Letter of Intent), there is not enough information to consider a strategic action 
implemented.  Only when an exploration block was commercialized, that implies the 
materialization of a strategic action, it can be coded as a strategic renewal action. 
 
13. Programs or campaigns such as community involvement programs, accreditations and other 
rewards programs are not coded. 
 
14. The introduction of a new installation at an existing plant/ refinery is an implemented strategic 
action and each additional installation that is already operational at that site is just an extension of 
the production capacity. If a new installation/ plant contains a technology that is new for that 
particular market (i.e., country), it is to be coded as exploration.  
 
15. Strategic projects started up or planned in a joint venture, production-sharing agreement or a 
consortium are to be coded as external strategic actions because they are always undertaken in 
conjunction with other organizations. Actions exclusively conducted by fully-owned subsidiaries, 
on the contrary, are always internal strategic actions. 
 
16. If Shell/BP or one of its subsidiaries obtains a license (internal), this implicates the materialization 
of a strategic decision. Licenses are agreements with the government and we assume that the 
corporation will start commercial operations in the contract area. Licenses are internal strategic 
actions, because we consider the government as a reactive participant in the process of obtaining/ 
acquiring licenses. 
 
17. Acquisitions of interests/ territories are always to be coded as external strategic actions since they 
imply participation of parties outside Shell/BP.  
 
18. Joint ventures that are established for the purpose of experimenting with new technologies or 
operating in new markets should be coded as exploration. If it is not clear for what purpose a joint 
venture is established, it should be coded as exploitation.  
 
19. Regarding actions related to production of oil and gas, an action such as drilling in a new oilfield 
is considered strategic activity and drilling additional wells is considered operational 
activity. 
 
20. Actions related to manufacturing or refining of oil products, e.g. an introduction of a new 
process installation at an existing plant is coded as a strategic action and each additional 
installation that is already available at that site is just an operational extension of the 
production capacity. 
 
21. An oilfield in a new unexploited country is considered exploration, each additional oilfield 
in that country is considered exploitation. An exception to this rule is when operations 
ceased in a country for a significant time period (i.e., five years or more) and production in 
existing or new wells starts up again. In this case, the strategic action is exploration. 
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Summary 
 
How do long-lived firms strategically renew themselves over time? To address this 
issue, this PhD thesis refers to corporate longevity as sustained strategic renewal. 
In particular, we investigate three key principles of self-renewing organizations 
(Volberda and Lewin, 2003) to understand and explain sustained strategic renewal 
of large incumbent firms. These three key principles are the principles of matching 
internal rates of change with external rates of change, managing self-organization, 
and synchronizing concurrent exploration and exploitation. To this end, this PhD 
study aims to investigate the dynamic relationships between a firm and its 
environment in the context of sustained strategic renewal by developing a 
conceptual framework and propositions by conducting a longitudinal and 
comparative case study of large incumbent long-lived firms in the oil industry. 
Driven by the challenge to operationalize the three key principles and to 
develop metrics to quantitatively assess the principles, this dissertation intends to 
address the following research questions. (1) Based on a selection-and-adaptation 
(coevolutionary) perspective, how do firms develop their competences to 
strategically renew themselves over time? (2) Based on an adaptation perspective, 
how do firms learn and adapt in the context of changing knowledge environment? 
(3) How do large incumbent firms regulate their internal rates of change to match 
up with the external rates of change? (4) How do firms manage self-organization to 
sustain their strategic renewal over time? (5) How do firms balance their 
exploratory and exploitative strategic renewal actions over time? (6) To what 
extent does top management team influence the strategic renewal trajectory of a 
large incumbent firm?  
Chapter 2 provides key theoretical foundations of sustained strategic 
renewal from two perspectives: environmental selection and adaptation 
perspectives. First, we provide a broad overview of prior research on 
organizational longevity. Second, we integrate three parallel research streams of 
selection perspective, adaptation perspective, and a combined selection-and-
adaptation (i.e. coevolutionary perspective).  Finally, the incorporation of the 
coevolutionary perspective leads us to the discussion of three key principles of 
sustained strategic renewal. 
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Chapter 3 explores the three key principles from a coevolutionary 
perspective through the construct of coevolutionary competence. Coevolutionary 
competence is defined here as the ability to sustain the coordinated deployment of 
assets aimed at achieving a firm’s goals by coevolving with the environment. This 
construct raises the awareness of management to focus on the three key principles. 
To illustrate the coevolutionary competence construct, we conduct two 
longitudinal case studies: The Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) and Royal Ten Cate 
(RTC). We employ the five competence modes introduced by Sanchez & Heene 
(2002) and Sanchez (2004) to illustrate the interplay between managerial 
intentionality and environmental selection over time. Based on the analyses, we 
propound that firms developing coevolutionary competence use the joint impact of 
managerial intentionality and environmental selection on their competence modes 
to implement the three key principles.  
Chapter 4 explores the three key principles by focusing in more depth on an 
adaptation perspective, i.e. through the organizational learning perspective. 
Simultaneously, it addresses the second research question of how firms learn and 
adapt in the context of changing knowledge environment. Building on the literature 
of organizational learning, we identify five types of organizational learning 
through the dimensions of types of knowledge environment and types of action 
learning. Rooted in the three key principles, we propose the notion of 
ambidextrous learning which provides firms with requisite ability to adapt to the 
changing knowledge environment. 
In Chapter 5, we develop a conceptual framework and three propositions 
related to the three key principles. The first proposition suggests that aligning the 
internal rate of change of a firm with the external rate of change of the firm’s 
environment positively influences sustained strategic renewal. The second 
proposition conjectures that self-organization positively influences a firm’s 
sustained strategic renewal. The third proposition suggests that balancing 
exploitation and exploration concurrently over time positively influences sustained 
strategic renewal. Additionally, we substantiated key antecedents of the three key 
principles that comprise enabling strategy, structure, managerial process and 
leadership. 
Chapter 6 outlines and discusses research methodology in carrying out this 
PhD study. We start with elaborating the research methodology and research 
design that used in this research. We also point out how we selected our case 
industry (i.e. the oil industry) and case companies (i.e. Shell, 1907-2008, as our 
focal company and BP, 1970-2008, as our comparative company), data collection 
methods, and data analysis techniques. In sum, we employ (a) a longitudinal 
content analysis method that covers a long period of time, 1907-2008; (b) a 
triangulated method of both qualitative and quantitative data from various sources: 
archival data (like Annual Reports and other documents) and interviews; and (c) a 
273
   257 
  
 
longitudinal, multilevel, and comparative research design to quantitatively 
operationalize and measure the three key principles. 
Chapter 7 provides a brief historical account of the oil industry by 
highlighting its competitive landscape (industry level). It also provides a historical 
background of Shell and BP by highlighting the key firm-level events. This is 
followed by an overview of empirical investigation of three key principles that 
comprises a brief description of variables, methods, levels of analysis, time frame, 
and data sources (Table 7.6). 
Chapter 8 consists of the empirical study of the first key principle as well as 
the third research question, i.e. an investigation of how large incumbent firms 
manage their internal rate of change to match or exceed the external rate of change 
of their environments. To this end, we use a multilevel method (at the industry and 
firm levels) and a comparative study of Shell and BP. To assess the first principle, 
quantitatively, we developed measurement indicators that comprise homogeneous 
and heterogeneous measures. While homogeneous measures are concerned with 
similar measures both at the industry level as well as the firm level, heterogeneous 
measures are concerned with different measures between the industry level and the 
firm level. Our results (Table 8.17) suggest that at different rates, Shell and BP 
have managed to align their internal rates of change (IRC) with the external rates 
of change (ERC) of the oil industry. More particularly, although IRC of both Shell 
and BP exceed the ERC of the oil industry, Shell moves faster than BP. In 
addition, we conducted interviews with Shell’s top managers to provide qualitative 
insights of the rate of change principle. Altogether, the results provide first 
evidence on the first proposition. 
Chapter 9 investigates the second key principle and the fourth research 
question, managing self organization. To investigate self-organization, firm-
specific data that can only be obtained from an internal access to a firm is required. 
Since we only have the access to Shell, for the second key principle, we use a 
single case study of Shell. The idea of self-organization to delayer organizational 
hierarchies leads us to develop three measures to indicate the degree of self-
organization in Shell over time: (a) hierarchical level; (b) chief executive’s span of 
control; and (c) administrative intensity. The results show that to a varying degree 
Shell was able to encourage self-organization. Combining with the qualitative 
insights from the interviews, our results provide first evidence on the second 
proposition. 
Chapter 10 focuses on the issue of how to synchronize exploitation and 
exploration concurrently (the fifth research question). Our results demonstrate that 
both Shell and BP strive to balance their exploitative and exploratory strategic 
renewal actions. In this case, Shell appeared to have a more balanced exploratory-
exploitative strategic renewal trajectory than BP. Additionally using the qualitative 
insights from the interviews, our results provide first evidence on the third 
principle. Besides that, in Chapter 10 we also incorporate the managerial 
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intentionality by investigating the role of top management team in guiding a firm’s 
strategic renewal trajectories over time (the last research question). We found that 
the TMT’s corporate governance perspective of the Rhine model is associated with 
exploratory and internal growth strategic renewal trajectories while the one of the 
Anglo-Saxon model is associated with exploitative and external growth strategic 
renewal trajectories. 
Chapter 11 summarizes the key findings of the three key principles and 
concludes the thesis by presenting our research contributions, managerial 
implications (based on the enabling antecedents of the three key principles), 
research limitations and accordingly suggestions for future research. Based on the 
key findings of the three key principles and the literature of organizational 
ambidexterity, we conjecture that firms need to advance the three key principles 
simultaneously. To conclude, we suggest that the attainment of sustained strategic 
renewal requires continuous efforts of managers and organizational members at all 
levels of an organization. 
 
 
 
275
   259 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nederlandse Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) 
 
 
Hoe passen lang bestaande bedrijven hun strategie aan over de tijd? Om deze vraag 
te beantwoorden, neemt dit proefschrift de drie kernprincipes van 
zelfvernieuwende organisaties (Volberda en Lewin, 2003) als uitgangspunt. Deze 
drie kernprincipes zijn de principes van matching mate van verandering van interne 
verandering met mate van verandering van externe verandering, zelf-organisatie, 
en het synchroniseren van exploratie en exploitatie. Aan de hand van deze drie 
kernprincipes wordt de dynamische interactie tussen een bedrijf en zijn omgeving 
in de context van duurzame strategische vernieuwing geplaatst. Daarnaast 
ontwikkelt het proefschrift een conceptueel kader en proposities. Hierbij wordt 
gebruik gemaakt van een longitudinale en vergelijkende case study van gevestigde 
bedrijven in de olieindustrie. 
Dit proefschrift richt zich op de volgende onderzoeksvragen. (1) Hoe 
ontwikkelen bedrijven hun vermogen om strategisch te vernieuwen vanuit een 
selectie-en-aanpassings (co-evolutionair) perspectief? (2) Hoe leren en passen 
bedrijven zich aan in de context van een veranderende kennisomgeving vanuit het 
aanpassingsperspectief? (3) Hoe stemmen gevestigde bedrijven hun mate van 
interne verandering af op de externe mate van verandering? (4) Hoe passen 
bedrijven hun organisatie over de tijd om zo hun strategische vernieuwing te 
ondersteunen? (5) Hoe vinden bedrijven gelijktijdig een evenwicht tussen hun 
exploratieve en exploitatieve strategische vernieuwingsacties? (6) Hoe en in welke 
mate oefent het Top Management Team invloed uit op het proces van strategische 
vernieuwing? 
Hoofdstuk 2 biedt de theoretische basis van dit proefschrift. Hierbij wordt 
gebruik gemaakt van twee perspectieven: omgevingsselectie en 
aanpassingsperspectieven. Ten eerste, bieden wij een overzicht van eerder 
onderzoek naar organisatorische levensduur. Ten tweede, integreren wij drie 
theoretische perspectieven, te weten het selectieperspectief, het 
aanpassingsperspectief, en de gecombineerde selectie-en-aanpassing (d.w.z. co-
evolutionair perspectief). Tot slot leidt de integratie van het co-evolutionaire 
perspectief ons tot de bespreking van de drie kernprincipes van duurzame 
strategische vernieuwing. 
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Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt de drie kernprincipes vanuit een co-evolutionair 
perspectief. Hierbij wordt gebruik gemaakt van het concept van co-evolutionaire 
competentie. Co-evolutionaire competentie wordt hier als capaciteit om de 
gecoördineerde plaatsing van activa gedefiniërd te ondersteunen die op het 
bereiken van de doelstellingen van een bedrijf door met de omgeving worden 
gericht coevolving. Ter illustratie van het concept van co-evolutonaire competentie 
worden twee casussen beschreven: The Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) en 
Koninklijke Ten Cate (RTC). Wij illustreren de vijf compententies die door 
Sanchez & Heene (2002) en Sanchez (2004) zijn ontwikkeld. Gebaseerd op de 
casussen, concluderen wij dat bedrijven die beschikken over co-evolutionaire 
competenties beter in staat zijn om de drie kernprincipes te implementeren door die 
omgeving te selecteren die het beste aansluit bij de doelstellingen van het 
management.  
Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt de kernprincipes vanuit het aanpassingsperspectief 
waarbij bedrijven leren van en zich aanpassen aan de omgevingsveranderingen. Dit 
hoofdstuk behandelt de tweede onderzoeksvraag. Hoe leren en passen bedrijven 
zich aan in de context van veranderende kennisomgeving? Voortbouwend op de 
literatuur van het organisatorische leren, onderscheiden wij vijf manieren waarop 
bedrijven leren aan de hand van de dimensies van de kennisomgeving en de wijze 
waarop actie leren wordt toegepast. Gebaseerd op de drie kernprincipes, 
ontwikkelen wij het concept van het ambidextere leren waarbij bedrijven de 
vereiste competentie ontwikkelen om zich aan de veranderende kennisomgeving 
aan te passen. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 ontwikkelen wij een conceptueel kader en drie proposities 
met betrekking tot de drie kernprincipes. De eerste propositie stelt dat afstemming 
van de interne mate van verandering op de externe mate van verandering een een 
positieve invloed heeft op duurzame strategische vernieuwing. De tweede 
propositie stelt dat zelf-organisatie een positieve uitwerking heeft op duurzame 
strategische vernieuwing. De derde propositie stelt het in balans brengen van 
exploratie en exploitatie een positief effect heeft op strategische vernieuwing. 
Daarnaast verankeren wij de antecedenten van de drie kernprincipes die strategie, 
structuur, bestuursproces en leiderschap faciliteren. 
Hoofdstuk 6 bespreekt de onderzoekmethodologie inzake dit proefschrift. 
Wij beginnen met het uitwerken van de onderzoekmethodologie en de 
onderzoekopzet. Wij bespreken hoe wij de bedrijfstak hebben geselecteerd (d.w.z. 
de olieindustrie) alsook hoe wij tot onze casussen zijn gekomen (d.w.z. Shell, 
1907-2008, als ons bedrijf van studie en BP, 1970-2008, als ons vergelijkend 
bedrijf). Daarnaast bespreken we de methodes van de gegevensinzameling en de 
technieken van de gegevensanalyse. In het bijzonder gebruiken wij (a) een 
longitudinale inhoudsanalyse die de jaren 1907-2008 beslaat; (b) een triangulaire 
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onderzoeksmethode van zowel kwalitatieve als kwantitatieve gegevens uit diverse 
bronnen: archivistische gegevens (zoals jaarverslagen en andere documenten) en 
gesprekken; en (c) longitudinaal, multilevel, en een vergelijkende onderzoeksopzet 
waarbij de drie kernprincipes worden gekwantificeerd. 
Hoofdstuk 7 presenteert een korte historische bespreking van de 
ontwikkeling van de olieindustrie.  Het hoofdstuk verschaft ook de historische 
achtergrond van Shell en BP door de belangrijkste historische gebeurtenissen te 
bespreken. Dit wordt gevolgd door een overzicht van empirisch onderzoek omtrent 
de drie kernprincipes welke een korte beschrijving van variabelen, methodes, 
niveaus van analyse, tijdkader, en gegevensbronnen omvat (zie Tabel 7.6). 
Hoofdstuk 8 presenteert de resultaten van onze empirische studie naar het 
eerste kernprincipe evenals de derde onderzoeksvraag. Hoe stemmen gevestigde 
bedrijven hun mate van interne verandering af op de externe mate van 
verandering? Daartoe analyseren wij de data op verscheidene niveaus (op het 
niveau van de bedrijfstak en het niveau van de onderneming). Daarnaast maken wij 
een vergelijking tussen Shell en BP. Om het eerste kernprincipe te kwantificeren 
maken wij gebruik van homogene en heterogene maatstaven. De homogene 
maatstaven zijn soortgelijke maatstaven die betrekking hebben op zowel het niveau 
van de bedrijfstak als het bedrijfsniveau. De heterogene maatstaven verschillen 
tussen het industrieniveau en het bedrijfsniveau. Onze resultaten (zie Tabel 8.17) 
tonen dat Shell en BP erin zijn geslaagd om hun interne mate van verandering 
(IRC) zijn af te stemmen op de externe mate van verandering (ERC). Echter Shell 
past zich hierbij sneller aan dan BP. Wij voeren gesprekken met de hoogste 
managers van Shell om zo nader kwalitatief inzicht te verwerven in het proces van 
verandering. 
Hoofdstuk 9 onderzoekt het tweede kernprincipe en de vierde 
onderzoeksvraag. Hoe passen bedrijven hun organisatie over de tijd om zo hun 
strategische vernieuwing te ondersteunen? Hiertoe wordt gebruik gemaakt van 
bedrijfsspecifieke informatie die niet publiek beschikbaar is. Wij bestuderen hier 
alleen de Shell casus omdat wij alleen interne toegang hebben tot deze 
onderneming. Het idee van zelf-organisatie ter ontmanteling van hiërarchische 
structuren brengt ons ertoe om drie maatstaven te ontwikkelen om de mate van 
zelf-organisatie van Shell te meten: (a) het hiërarchisch niveau; (b) de spanwijdte 
van de bestuursvoorzitter; en (c) de administratieve intensiteit. De resultaten tonen 
aan dat Shell tot op zekere hoogte in staat is om zelf-organisatie te bevorderen. In 
combinatie met de kwalitatieve inzichten vanuit de gesprekken met topmanagers, 
ondersteunen onze resultaten de tweede propositie. 
Hoofdstuk 10 concentreert zich op de vraag hoe exploitatie en exploratie 
gelijktijdig afgestemd kunnen worden (de vijfde onderzoeksvraag). Onze resultaten 
tonen aan dat zowel Shell als BP ernaar streven om hun exploitatieve en 
exploratieve strategische vernieuwingsacties in balans te brengen. Shell volgt 
hiertoe een evenwichtigere aanpak dan BP. Deze bevinding ondersteunt het derde 
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kernprincipe. Hoofdstuk 10 beschouwt tevens de doelstellingen van het Top 
Management Team (TMT) en hoe deze doelstellingen relateren aan duurzame 
strategische vernieuwing (de laatste onderzoeksvraag). Wij vinden dat het model 
van ondernemingsbestuur van belang is. Als er wordt gekozen voor een Rijnlands 
model ligt de nadruk op exploratieve en interne groei terwijl de keuze voor een 
Angelsaksisch model gepaard gaat met exploitatieve en externe groei. 
Hoofdstuk 11 vat de belangrijkste bevindingen omtrent de drie 
kernprincipes samen en besluit met een bespreking van onze onderzoeksbijdragen, 
praktische aanbevelingen voor managers, de beperkingen van het onderzoek en 
aanbevelingen voor toekomstig onderzoek. Wij stellen dat ondernemingen de drie 
kernprincipes gelijktijdig moeten implementeren. Wij besluiten met de stelling dat 
het bewerkstelligen van duurzame strategische vernieuwing onafgebroken 
inspanningen vergt van managers op alle niveaus binnen de organisatie. 
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Ringkasan (Summary in Indonesian) 
 
Bagaimana perusahaan yang berumur panjang mempebaharui strategi mereka dari 
waktu ke waktu? Dissertasi ini mempelajari tema ini dengan melihat kelanggengan 
perusahaan dari cara mereka memperbaharui strategi mereka secara berkelanjutan. 
Khususnya, kami menyelidiki tiga prinsip utama tentang perusahaan yang 
memperbaharui diri (Volberda dan Lewin, 2003) untuk mengerti dan menerangkan 
pembaharuan strategi perusahaan besar yang sudah lama berdiri. Tiga prinsip 
utama ini adalah prinsip menyesuaikan laju perubahan internal perusahaan dengan 
laju perubahaan external perusahaan, mengelola self-organisasi, dan menyesuaikan 
eksplorasi dan eksploitasi secara bersamaan. Untuk mencapai tujuan ini, studi dari 
riset ini bertujuan untuk menyelidiki hubungan dinamis perusahaan dan 
lingkungannya dengan mengembangkan kerangka konseptual dan proposisi dengan 
mengadakan studi kasus longitudinal dan perbandingan perusahaan besar yang 
berumur panjang di industri minyak.  
Untuk mengoperasionalisasi ketiga prinsip utama dengan mengembangkan 
metrics untuk mengevaluasis ketiga prinsip ini secara kuantitatif, disertasi ini 
bermaksud menyelidiki enam pertanyaan penelitian berikut. (1) Berdasarkan 
perspektif seleksi-dan-adaptasi (co-evolusioner) perspektif, bagaimana perusahaan 
mengembangkan kompetensi mereka untuk melakukan pembaharuan strategis dari 
waktu ke waktu? (2) Berdasarkan perspektif adaptasi, bagaimana perusahaan 
belajar dan menyesuaikan diri dalam konteks perkembangan pengetahuan? (3) 
Bagaimana perusahaan besar mengatur laju perubahan internal agar sebanding 
dengan laju perubahan eksternal? (4) Bagaimana perusahaan mengelola self-
organisasi agar pembaharuan strategis berkelanjutan dari waktu ke waktu? (5) 
Bagaimana perusahaan menyeimbangkan dua tindakan strategis yaitu eksplorasi 
dan eksploitasi? (6) Sejauh mana pengaruh tim management dalam hal 
pembaharuan strategis yang berkelanjutan dari perusahaan besar tersebut? 
Bab 2 memberikan landasan teoritis pembaharuan strategis yang terus-
menerus dari dua perspektif: perspektif seleksi dan adaptasi. Pertama, kami 
melakukan peninjauan luas tentang penelitian terdahulu mengenai topik umur 
panjang perusahaan. Kedua, kami mengintegrasikan tiga perspektif penelitian yaitu 
seleksi, adaptasi, dan gabungan seleksi-dan-adaptasi (atau perspektif co-
evolusioner). Akhirnya, penggabungan perspektif co-evolusioner membawa kami 
ke diskusi tentang tiga prinsip utama dari pembaharuan strategis secara terus-
menerus.  
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Bab 3 menjelajahi ketiga prinsip utama dari perspektif co-evolusioner 
melalui konsep kompetensi ko-evolusioner. Kompetensi ko-evolusioner di sini 
didefinisikan sebagai kemampuan untuk mempertahankan kelanjutan penggunaan 
asset yang dikoordinasikan untuk mencapai tujuan perusahaan melalui konsep 
keharmonian dengan lingkungan. Untuk menjelaskan konsep kompetensi ko-
evolusioner, kami melakukan dua longitudinal studi kasus: Hudson’s Bay 
Company (HBC) dan Royal Ten Cate (RTC). Kami menggunakan kelima 
competence mode yang diperkenalkan oleh Sanchez & Heene (2002) dan Sanchez 
(2004) untuk menjelaskan interaksi antara manajer dengan perubahan lingkungan 
dari waktu ke waktu. Berdasarkan hasil analisa, kami mengemukakan bahwa 
perusahaan yang mengembangkan penggunaan kompetensi ko-evolusioner 
menggunakan dampak bersama dari interaksi manajer dengan lingkungan untuk 
melaksanakan ketiga prinsip utama.  
Bab 4 menjelajahi ketiga prinsip utama dengan befokus pada perspektif 
adaptasi, yaitu perspektif organizational learning. Secara bersamaan, bab ini 
menanggapi pertanyaan penelitian yang kedua: bagaimana perusahaan belajar dan 
menyesuaikan diri dalam konteks perkembangan pengetahuan. Berdasarkan 
literatur, kami mengenalkan lima macam organizational learning melalui dimensi 
tipe pengetahuan dan cara belajar. Berdsarkan ketiga prinsip utama, kami 
mengusulkan bahwa ambidextrous learning mempersiapkan perusahaan dengan 
kemampuan untuk menyesuaikan diri bila lingkungan pengetahuan berubah.  
Di Bab 5, kami mengembangkan kerangka konseptual dan tiga proposisi 
yang berhubungan dengan ketiga prinsip utama. Proposisi pertama mengusulkan 
bahwa penyesuaian laju perubahan internal perusahaan dengan laju perusahaan 
eksternal secara positif mempengaruhi pembaharuan strategis yang berkelanjutan. 
Proposisi kedua mengusulkan bahwa self-organisasi secara positif mempengaruhi 
perusahaan untuk mempertahankan pembaharuan strategis. Proposisi ketiga 
mengusulkan bahwa penyeimbangan eksploitasi dan eksplorasi secara bersamaan 
dari waktu ke waktu secara positif mempengaruhi pembaharuan strategis yang 
berkelanjutan. Lebih lanjut, kami membahas tentang key antecedents dari ketiga 
prinsip utama yang terdiri dari strategi, struktur, proses manajerial dan 
kepemimpinan. 
Bab 6 membahas metodologi penelitian yang digunakan dalam riset PhD ini. 
Kami mulai dengan menguraikan metodologi penelitian dan bentuk penelitian. 
Kami juga menunjukkan bagaimana kami memilih kasus industri kami (industri 
minyak) dan kasus perusahaan (Shell, 1907-2008, sebagai perusahaan utama dan 
BP, 1970-2008, sebagai perusahaan perbandingan), metode koleksi data, dan 
teknik analisa data. Singkatnya, kami menggunakan (a) metode longitudinal 
content anaysis yang meliputi jangka waktu yang panjang, 1907-2008; (b) metode 
triangulasi dari data kualitatif maupun kuantitatif dari berbagai sumber: data 
kearsipan (seperti Laporan Tahunan dan dokumen lain) dan wawancara; dan (c) 
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longitudinal, multilevel, dan pola penelitian perbandingan untuk menilai secara 
kuantitatif ketiga prinsip utama.  
Bab 7 membahas secara singkat sejarah industri minyak dengan menyoroti 
persaingan di industri tersebut. Bab ini juga membahas latar belakang sejarah Shell 
dan BP dengan menyoroti peristiwa pokok dari kedua perusahaan tersebut. Ini 
diikuti oleh peninjauan luas tentang penelitian empiris ketiga prinsip utama yang 
terdiri dari deskripsi ringkas variabel, metode, tingkat analisa, jangka waktu, dan 
sumber data (Table 7.6).  
Bab 8 terdiri atas penelitian empiris prinsip pertama serta pertanyaan 
penelitian ketiga, yaitu perusahaan besar mengelola laju perubahan internal dengan 
menyesuaikan atau melebihi laju perubahan eksternal. Untuk mencapai tujuan ini, 
kami memakai metode multilevel (tingkat industri dan tingkat perusahaan) dan 
penelitian perbandingan antara Shell dan BP. Untuk menilai prinsip pertama secara 
kuantitatif, kami mengembangkan metrics yang terdiri dari metrics homogen dan 
heterogen. Metrics homogen mencakup tingkat industri dan perusahaan sedangkan 
metrics ukuran heterogen mencakup secara metrics yang berbeda antara tingkat 
industri dengan tingkat perusahaan. Dari hasil analisa (Table 8.17), kami 
menyarankan bahwa walaupun dengan laju yang bervariasi, Shell dan BP mampu 
menyesuaikan laju perubahan internal (IRC) mereka dengan laju perubahan 
eksternal (ERC) di industri minyak. Sebagai tambahan, kami juga mengadakan 
wawancara dengan top manajer di Shell untuk memberikan wawasan kualitatif 
tentang prinsip pertama. Secara keseluruhan, hasil analisa menyediakan bukti awal 
atas proposisi pertama. 
Bab 9 menyelidiki prinsip kedua dan pertanyaan penelitian keempat yaitu 
tentang self-organisasi. Untuk menyelidiki self-organisasi, kami memerlukan data 
perusahaan yang hanya bisa didapatkan dari akses internal perusahaan. Berhubung 
kami hanya mempunyai akses di Shell, untuk penelitian prinsip kedua kami 
memakai satu studi kasus, yaitu Shell. Dengan gagasan bahwa self-organisasi 
mengurangi hirarki organisasi, kami mengembangkan tiga metrics untuk 
menunjukkan tingkat self-organisasi di Shell dari waktu ke waktu: (a) tingkat 
hirarki; (b) chief executive’s span of control; dan (c) intensitas administratif. Hasil 
menunjukkan bahwa dalam derajat yang bervariasi, Shell mampu mengadakan 
self-organisasi. Ditambah dengan wawasan kualitatif dari wawancara, hasil kami 
menyediakan bukti awal atas proposisi kedua.  
Bab 10 berfokus atas persoalan bagaimana caranya untuk menyeimbangkan 
eksploitasi dan eksplorasi secara bersamaan (pertanyaan penelitian kelima). Hasil 
kami menunjukkan bahwa baik Shell maupun BP bekerja keras untuk 
menyeimbangkan eksploitasi dan eksplorasi. Di kasus ini, Shell lebih mampu 
menyeimbangkan ekplorasi dan eksploitasi daripada BP. Melalui penggunaan 
wawasan kualitatif dari wawancara, hasil kami menyediakan bukti awal atas 
prinsip ketiga. Lagi pula, di Bab 10 kami juga menyelidiki peran manajer dalam 
menuntun jalan perusahaan untuk pembaharuan strategis yang berkelanjutan 
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(pertanyaan penelitian terakhir). Kami menemukan bahwa perspektif corporate 
governance berdasarkan Rhine model lebih berfokus pada eksplorasi dan 
perkembangan internal sedangkan untuk Anglo-Saxon model lebih berfokus pada 
eksploitasi dan perkembangan eksternal.  
Bab 11 meringkaskan kesimpulan dari hasil analisa ketiga prinsip utama dan 
menguraikan sumbangan penelitian kami, implikasi manajerial (berdasarkan 
enabling antecedents dari ketiga prinsip utama), keterbatasan penelitian dan saran 
untuk penelitian berikutnya. Berdasarkan hasil analisa ketiga prinsip utama dan 
literature organizational ambidexterity, kami mengusulkan bahwa perusahaan perlu 
mengelola ketiga prinsip utama secara bersamaan. Sebagai kesimpulan, kami 
mengusulkan bahwa pencapaian pembaharuan strategis yang berkelanjutan 
menghendaki usaha terus-menerus dari manajer dan semua karyawan di setiap 
tingkat organisasi. 
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A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF LONG-LIVED FIRMS
How do long-lived firms strategically renew themselves over time? Viewing organiza -
tional longevity as sustained strategic renewal, this PhD research investigates three key
principles of self-renewing organizations. Building on the coevolutionary perspective that
incorporates both selection and adaptation perspectives, we developed a comprehensive
framework to investigate these three key principles in the oil industry as our case industry,
with Shell (1907-2008) as our focal case company and BP (1970-2008) as our comparative
case company. Besides the multilevel and comparative case study methods, we employed
the method of longitudinal content analysis to incorporate the temporal analysis of
sustained strategic renewal over an extended period of time. First, we investigated the
principle of matching the internal rate of change with the external rate of change. Our
results suggest that aligning the internal rate of change of a firm with the external rate of
change of the firm’s environment positively influences the firms’ sustained strategic
renewal. Second, enviro nmental turbulence requires firms to renew their organizational
structure and develop self-organization. Our findings propound that self-organization
positively influences sustained strategic renewal. Third, we investigated exploratory and
exploitative strategic renewal trajectories as well as the role of top management team
(TMT) in influencing these trajectories. We found that balancing exploration and
exploitation positively influences sustained strategic renewal and that the TMT’s
corporate governance per spective (share holders / stakeholders) does influence strategic
renewal trajectories. Finally, we substan tiated managerial implications based on the
enabling antecedents of the three key principles.
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